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Chapter 1
Introduction
During George W. Bush’s first term many intellectuals in the International Relations (IR)
field were talking about the greatness of American power. Many of them labeled the United
States “the new Rome on the Potomac” or “A Modern-day Empire”. The United States
accounted for twenty-five percent of the world’s economic output with its five percent of the
world’s population (Nye, 2010: 2). The U.S. made up nearly half of global military expenditures;
at the same time, it had the most extensive soft-power resources (Nye). However, starting with
Bush’s second term in office, an increasing number of scholars have hotly debated the future of
the U.S. power and its hegemony. They are insisting that something fundamentally changed in
the U.S., and they interpret this fundamental change as the beginning of American power
decline, which is very much reminiscent of the Athenians’ Sicilian Expedition. It is well-known
case in the IR that the defeat of Athenians in Sicily was the turning point for Athenians. This
changed the way their power was regarded by its enemies, and more importantly, by its allies.
Before the shocked defeat, Athenians were seen as a powerful state that was able to hold wide
and strong alliances against its enemies. However, after the defeat, due to the decline of
Athenians power, many of its former allies made new alliances against Athenians. According to
scholars, this is exactly what is happening to the U.S. They believe that starting from the second
half of the first decade of 21st century the U.S. is losing its power in the international relations
with fewer allies. Actually, this is not the first time that this debate has been raised. Since World
War II, scholars, politicians and economists have resurrected the issue of the decline of U.S.
power for each decade. Mao’s victory in China in the late 1940s, the Korean War, the Sputnik
challenge of the Soviet Russia in the 1950s, the social unrest and Vietnam War in the 1960s, the

7
end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil shocks in the 1970s, Japan’s challenge and
recessions in the 1980s, the dotcom bust, September 11, the war in Afghanistan, and especially
in Iraq, were interpreted as the beginning of the American decline. The financial crises of 2008
and the rise of China as a world next superpower could be the latest cases of the same debate.
However, intellectuals who support the idea of U.S. power is in decline believe that this time is
different and the decline is real.
This overall situation raises questions that if it is really something different than previous
cases? Is decline of U.S. power for real this time? In most definitions, national or state power is
defined as a mix of military, social, political and economic strengths. However, since the
establishment of the modern state system, many intellectuals have considered economic
strength or power as one of the most important indicators for measuring national power.
According to them, without economic power there is no way to increase military and political
power capabilities. The links among a nation’s economic prosperity and its growth as a military,
political, and then super power became much stronger in last centuries. Economic power has
become the key to success in world politics following the end of the Cold War. From that
perspective, this research paper will focus on the economic side of the debate by scrutinizing
whether U.S. economic power is in decline and whether China is replacing the U.S. as the
world’s next economic superpower.
The questions above make measuring economic power correctly in the 21st century
crucially important. It is also important that the inefficient or inadequate methodology or
absence of good variables to calculate national economic power will make this research invalid,
unreliable and inaccurate. However, before we take into account all these concerns and focus
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on our economic variables, we have to know what power is and what are the resources of
economic power in different parts of history and especially in today’s world?
Power is one of the most important and most discussed terms in International Relations. In
its most general sense power is the ability to do things and to control others. Robert Dahl
defines power as “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do” (Dahl, 1957:
205). Coercion plays important role on Dahl’s definition. Meanwhile, Morton Baratz and Peter
Bachrach argue that it is possible to shape others’ preferences by controlling their expectations
of what is legitimate or feasible (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 641-642). In this case, if others
accept the legitimacy of the institutions and the social discourse, then these people may not feel
coercion while they are taking their decisions. Finally, Joseph Nye argues that before measuring
power in terms of the changed behavior of others, we have to know other people’s preferences.
He thinks a person or an institution can shape basic or initial preferences. In other words, Nye
says without overriding your initial preferences, a person or an institution can get you to want
the same outcomes that this person or institution wants (Nye, 1990: 26).
It is commonly agreed by scholars that a state’s ability to shape other states’ behavior is
associated with the possession of certain resources that this state has but other states do not or
partially have (Waltz, 1978: 192; Morgenthau, 1967: 106-158; Kissinger, 2015: 9; German, 1960:
138-144). However, the same agreement can’t be reached on what these resources are. Despite
a wealth of data, there is persistent disagreement for the questions of how to measure the
economic power of states in a changing world and what sources provide the best basis for
economic power.
Throughout the modern state system, different economic power resources played a crucial
role in different periods for measuring economic power of the leading countries. For example, in
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early modern Europe, most of wealth creation and economic rise of states is connected to
military capabilities of these states. However, it was clear that without economic resources
there was no way to increase military capabilities. Since most of the 16th century, warfare was
fought by armies composed largely of mercenaries of various nationalities that were paid by
monarchies. From that point, once a country increased its trade and its finance, then this
country would find it easier to maintain large armies. Paul Kennedy indicates this correlation. In
his study, he points out the link between productive and revenue raising capabilities and military
strength (Kennedy, 1987: xvi). Therefore, finding additional economic resources to cover costs
of the wars was the only way to protect the wealth and prosperity of states in this era. From
that point, starting from the 16th century, some countries took a leading role for exploiting
natural resources and building colonial trade in the New World.
The link between controlling oversees trade and an individual nation’s economic rise
become much stronger in the 17th century. A.T Mahan, George Modelski and W.R. Thompson
believe that the economic leadership role of a state is based on the particular nation’s use of
naval strength to control the world’s oceans and merchant marines (Mahan, 1890: 1 ; Modelski
and Thompson, 1988: 1-5).
Average cost of any war was increased by double in the 18th century (University of Nevada
– Las Vegas). Countries in this century fought until they were militarily and financially exhausted.
Joseph Nye, J. Peter Submilch and Stephen Krasner stress population by emphasizing its
economic side. According to them, the welfare of a country was directly proportional to its
population. In this period, the extent and effectiveness of a population size could be seen in the
service of production and wealth creation (Nye, 1991: 7; Submilch, 2011: 74; Krasner, 1999: 1920).
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Many dramatic changes occurred in the 19th century that made it quite different from
earlier eras. Due to that, economic power resources changed significantly. The mercantilist
thought lost its popularity; meanwhile, the century witnessed the rise of free trade ideology.
Improvements in transportation and communication played important roles on states’ strength
in this century. Besides that, industrial and technological developments made drastic
amendment in states’ economic power status.
Hans Morgenthau is one the most effective scholars who focuses on states’ industrial or
economic capacity. He strongly believes that industrial or economic indicators lead to military
power, and then national power (Morgenthau, 1967: 106-158). Many other intellectuals who
analyze this century believe that countries’ share of world output was the main indicator of their
economic strength. The production of coal and steel output was taken as a potential national
strength and industrialization indicated a country’s overall economy and its technical capacity
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1979: 165-166).
Scholars’ definitions of economic power in the 20th were not very different than that of
19th century. Like in the previous century these scholars pay specific attention to production,
industrialization and share of world output. Davis Kinsgley uses national income as a proxy for
states’ economic power. In his study he stresses that the idea of increasing real income per
capita is connected to attaining greater national economic power (Kinsgley, 1954: 206-242).
Charles Hitch and Roland McKean use Gross National Products (GNP) in their analyses. They
believe advancement in the military technology has dramatically changed the threat that
nations face in the 20th century. Countries which effectively resist these new threats are the
ones that have substantial economic power. According to Hitch and McKean, countries’
substantial economic power can be regarded as the nation’s capacity to produce goods, as
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measured by gross national product (Hitch and McKean 1960: vi). Bruce Russett also believes
that GNP is one of the best indicators for measuring national economic power in this century.
However, he thinks due to the difficulties inherent in conversion to a common currency unit,
total fuel and electric energy consumption for each nation might be even better summary
measure of national economic power. He clarifies that by explaining the strong correlation
between energy consumption and gross national product (Russett, 1968: 293). He also believes
that using energy consumption as an indicator for national economic power makes crossnational comparison much easier and more reliable.
Government revenue is another indicator that is used for calculating national economic
power in this era. Steven Rosen used central government revenue as a rough measure of
national economic power and explains that by saying there was no GNP data available for the
time before 1930. Today the data is available; however, Rosen believes that government
revenues as an indicator for measuring national economic strength may be more sensitive than
gross national product (Rosen, 1972: 171).
Scholars who focus on a single economic indicator believe that their measures are
sufficient and appropriate. However, they are criticized by mathematically sophisticated
scholars. These intellectuals bring several multivariable approaches with many additional
variables to the field of measuring national economic power.
One of the earliest users of multivariable measurement was Klaus Knorr. According to
Knorr, main bases of national economic power consist of states’ foreign trade transaction,
volume of this transaction to size of GNP, international currency reserves and gold and its
natural resources (Knorr, 1973: 84-93). A.F.K. Organski focuses on a variety of economic
elements for measuring economic power of nations in the 20th century. According to him,

12
economic power is about industrial and technological power, which is based on machinery
production or manufactured goods (Organski, 1968: 139). He asserts that great manufacturing
countries have always been great economic powers such as Germany, Great Britain and the U.S.
According to him, elements that are very much related to national economic power are the
share of world output, production of iron and steel and industrialization (Organski).
New technologies from information & communication to manufacturing, from biotech &
life sciences to energy fields have created huge changes in the traditional bases of economic
power in the 21st century. Scholars Nye, Ferguson, Kirshner, Cumings, Gilboy and Cox focus on
economic indicators such as the size and quality of GDP, trade, export-import balance, finance
stability, productivity, the level of technology and science, natural and human resources, and
political and legal institutions for markets in order to measure economic power of the nations.
As it mentioned above that different power resources played very different roles in
different periods throughout history. Therefore, finding resources that provide the best basis to
measure the states’ economic power is crucially important for analyzing this study’s research
questions. It is important that this paper’s research questions have been studied at length by
various scholars. However, as this paper covers them in the second chapter, most of these
scholars’ studies suffer a multiplicity of weaknesses. Thus, there is a need for a more
comprehensive research study that properly analyzes this topic. In that respect, this research
study, which is different from earlier studies, not only gather and interpret the data. It also
reveals the stories behind the data, and answers not only “what, when, and who” questions, but
also “why and how” questions which prior research studies miss. This paper asserts that there is
no way to draw a conclusion or persuade readers if the study does not provide a proper
explanation behind the data. From that point, after taking everything into account, this research
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study’s results contradict the results of previous studies. For example, contrary to most of the
previous studies, which state that the financial crisis of 2007-09 created a situation that
significantly undermined American economic power, this research study finds out that U.S.
economic power is not in absolute, long-term, fundamental and irreversible decline. It is in a
relative decline (a decrease in relative external economic power) that the U.S. has experienced
several times in the past. From the same perspective, contrary to many previous studies, which
argue that China will displace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower, this study
reveals that it will be very hard for China to continue its high-paced economic growth in the
future. That means rather than displacing the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower,
China’s future will be more about dealing with its own economic problems.
All these assertions are scrutinized in detail after the methodology chapter. In the next
chapter this paper focuses on scholars and their analyses on whether the U.S. is a declining
economic power and whether China is replacing the U.S. as the world next superpower. By
reviewing literature, this research paper aims to find out new angles and ideas that further
explore the topic.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The literature in this review encapsulates numerous perspectives. Some scholars in IR
argue that American economic power is declining. They believe that something has changed in
the U.S. (such as Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ huge domestic and international
expenditures, serious financial and economic problems in Nixon and Carter administrations,
growing income inequalities in Regan administration) and/or in the world (such as OPEC’s oil
embargo, Japanese and German industrialization and their rapid economic growth) and they
interpret these changes as the beginning of American economic decline. From that point, they
think U.S. economy very much resembles those of the past eras of Spain, the Netherlands,
France, and the British Empire. On the other hand, some contemporary intellectuals interpret
the financial crisis of 2007-09 as a watershed event that changed the economic balance of
power in the world. They believe it was an economic catastrophe for the U.S.; therefore, it
diminished U.S. economic power in the world. In addition, a big part of contemporary
intellectuals’ arguments are based on China. According to them, China has proved its economic
prowess in the world by growing at ten percent on average for more than 30 years which
permits China to challenge American economic power all around the world. From that point,
many scholars who think American economic power is in decline also believe that China will
displace the U.S. as the world next economic superpower. In order to explore certain
perspective from important scholars, the following section will look at individual scholars’
perspectives.
One of the most well-known intellectuals, Paul Kennedy, pays special attention to
countries’ productive economic resources in his prominent study in the late 1980s. According to
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Kennedy, the U.S. was the most economically powerful country in the world after WWII. The U.S
possessed two-thirds of the world’s total gold reserve, produced more than half of the total
manufacturing production, and supplied one-third of the world’s exports (Kennedy, 1987: 385).
However, not more than three decades later, he asserts the U.S. encountered serious economic
problems, which cost the U.S. to lose the relative share of the world’s wealth, production, and
trade. He links this decline to his theory of “imperial overstretch”, which refers to the
overextension either economically or militarily eventually leads to the exhaustion of vital
domestic resources, and decline (xv-xvi). Kennedy believes that all Great Powers –Spanish,
Dutch, French and British- shared the same set of conditions that extensively allocate their
resources for defense instead of investment and research and development. This eventually led
them toward decline in their power and in losing their abilities to hold or carry out their
economic and military roles in the world. Paul Kennedy believes that there are similarities
between the U.S.’s position today and the declined Great Powers in the past. Like other great
powers in the past, in order to secure its dominant status, the U.S. felt it necessary to assign
more resources for defense while its economy was in decline. In the 1970s and 1980s U.S. share
of global manufacturing and GNP was down, agriculture was in crisis, government was heavily in
debt, and inflation was high (432-434). However, at the same time, the U.S. increased its
military expenditures overseas and devoted a large share of its resources to the military forces.
Kennedy believes this leads the U.S. decline in its economic power and then national power
which is very much the same case for the Great Powers in previous centuries (434).
Clyde Prestowitz also believes that the U.S. economy is in trouble and supports Kennedy’s
thoughts from different aspects. According to Prestowitz, America seriously over-stretched its
economy (Prestowitz, 2010: 39). He asserts that due to six false doctrines, the U.S. is
experiencing a relative and absolute decline in economy that makes the U.S. each year look a
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little bit more like that of previous Great Powers of Rome, Spain and Great Britain. His list of
doctrines includes; the prioritization of short-time geopolitical interests, the cultural shift
toward consumerism, the belief of market fundamentalism, the theory of pure free trade, the
globalization of U.S. corporations, and the addiction to cheap energy (72-247). Prestowitz
stresses that most of these doctrines worked fine in the past; however, it becomes apparent as
the global economy and the U.S. evolved that the U.S. needs to adopt new doctrines. Prestowitz
believes that in today’s world, while the U.S. loses its economic supremacy, China is moving
toward the top. Due to its production technology, its transportation and communication
infrastructure, its tax and financial incentives, its highly disciplined and energetic labor force,
and its currency that was managed to remain weak against the dollar, China is gaining more
economic power each and every year, which turns the country a dominant power of the world
economy. Prestowitz visualized China’s economic rise as a natural return to its historic position
(2005: 58-75). However, he did the same kind of analysis three decades earlier. In the second
half of the 1980s, he thought that U.S. economy was in decline and talked about the end of the
American economic hegemony. According to him, a powerful state must sustain a leading role in
a wide number of industries (1988: 503). In the 1970s, the U.S. was the world leader in
technology, military, industry and finance. However, a decade later, the U.S. was the leader only
in military power. In other areas the U.S. had traded places with Japan. According to Prestowitz,
the dynamism of Japanese management, the cooperative and flexible attitude of labor and the
supportive role of government were the reasons of Japan’s economic success (108). He asserted
by that time that Japan became an undisputed economic superpower (3). Time shows that he
was not right on his finding that Japan became the world undisputed dominant economic
power. Since his analysis Japan has struggled with many crises that many times sent the country
into serious long-lasting recessions and economic slowdowns. He admitted this two decades
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later by saying Japan seems like a dying country. According to him, the reasons behind this
include overvalued yen, changes in the tradition of government-business partnership, raising
other new Asian competitors, its energy dependency and competitiveness (2015: 148-169).
Donald W. White is another scholar who also believes that U.S. economy has gone through
cycle of rise and decline. He says after the end of the WWII, as the world’s leading economic
power the U.S. had produced almost half of the world economy. In the early 1970s he indicates
the figure had fallen to less than 30 percent (White, 1996: 383). White stresses that even though
U.S. economy was in decline, many government officials by that time still believed that
economically the U.S. were unchallenged in the world while they were celebrating the
achievement of the world’s first trillion-dollar economy. A decade later, the American
percentage of world production slid from almost 30 percent to nearly 20 percent (384). From
that point, like Prestowitz, White believes that economic leadership of the U.S. was challenged
by some countries, particularly Japan. However, White asserts that American economic decline
was not the result of the revival of Japan. He thinks Japan had not grabbed some secret
information that had been unknown to the Americans. According to him, Japanese were doing
the same things that Americans had done in earlier periods, such as applying technology to
production, working hard for the future reward, putting capital into production of high-quality
goods at low cost, and providing most of their citizens a sense of well-being (402). From that
point White thinks that Americans opened the way for Japanese to exceed them economically
by choosing consumption on luxury and foreign goods instead of focusing on discipline of
production.
About two decades after White’s analysis, Charles A. Kupchan makes a claim about future
challenger of the American economic hegemony which is very different than other intellectuals’
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findings. According to Kupchan’s research, with its superior technological base, its
competitiveness and its huge market, Europe will soon emerge as America’s only major
economic competitor. Kupchan believes that the intense focus on regional trade in the EU made
European countries economically stronger and competitive. Besides that, following the sharp
decline of the U.S. technology sector in the early 2000s, the venture capital began flowing
primarily to Europe, which increased the possibility of productivity of Europe that the U.S. had
enjoyed a decade ago (Kupchan, 2002: 137). Kupchan predicts that as Europe’s productivity,
competitiveness and wealth increase, so will European’s appetite for greater international
economic influence. And as the U.S. dominates the international economic order, the EU’s
search for greater economic autonomy and status, which eventually take the form of resisting
U.S. international economic influence (119-154). Since Kupchan’s analysis EU has experienced
with many serious economic and political crises which brought the Union on the verge of
disintegration. From that point, it is clear that like Prestowitz’s study over Japan, Kupchan’s
analysis over EU was not justifiable. However, Kupchan sees the financial crisis of 2007-9 as a
tragic event that created harsh economic realities for the U.S. According to Kupchan, new
economic situation in the U.S. undermine its dominant status in the global economic order
(2012: 62-67). Therefore, he thinks that in the twenty-first century the U.S. will not be the
dominant power of the international economic order. However, Kupchan argues that nor China
or anyone else will be the world economic superpower. He thinks there will be many economic
power centers in the world such as China, India, Brazil, and Europe. From that point, he believes
that for the first time in modern history, the world will not have an economic center of gravity
(2012: 3).
Robert O. Keohane, in his influential 1984 book, agrees that the ability and willingness of
the U.S. to allocate significant resources to maintain its international economic regime declined
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few decades after the WWII. He thinks it seems unlikely that the U.S. will regain its global
economic leadership in the world that it had during the 1950s and the 1960s. According to
Keohane, the reason for this decline was the production and control of oil (Keohane, 1984: 176178). He thinks the ability of the United States to carry out its economic leadership mostly
depended on control and exploitation of oil supplies abroad and then the ability to remain as a
leader in multilateral trade and monetary regimes (178). But due to the dramatic changes (end
of the gold standard system, the oil crisis etc.) in the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, the
ability of the United States to control the oil market and use this control as a source of influence
over Europe and Japan seriously declined. This decline eventually weakened U.S.’s trade and its
monetary regimes. In all, it caused the U.S. to lose its global economic leadership (201, 244).
Like many other intellectuals Thomas J. McCormick believes that the U.S. emerged from
the WWII as the only global economic power. According to him, the American economy at the
end of the WWII was the workshop, the bakery, and the banker of the world. On the other hand,
all other previous Great Powers; Great Britain, Germany, France, Soviet Union and Japan laid in
ruin and their economies were completely devastated by war (McCormick, 1995: 47). However,
few decades later in his analysis which is similar to Kennedy’s overstretch theory, he asserts that
the U.S. global economic leadership is in decline due to transferring a huge amount of resources
from civilian to military production, neglecting modernization and research and development
needs of the domestic industrial plants, and overinvesting in foreign countries (7). McCormick
indicates that these policies eroded American productivity and competitiveness. This situation
eventually created serious economic crises, structural unemployment, economic slowdowns,
income inequalities, heavy tax loads, and triple-dip recessions. He thinks that in the post-Cold
War era the Soviet economy went over the cliff; however, the American economy hovered on
the brink of the same cliff (239).
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Stanley Hoffman compares U.S economy at the end of the 20th century with U.S. economy
at the end of the WWII. He argues that most of the economic decline is normal and also has
been planned by the U.S. He thinks since WWII the U.S. has done everything possible to help the
economies in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Western Europe even though its share of world
GDP negatively affected from this policy. For the period after the Vietnam war Hoffman agrees
with McCormick that overconsumption, underinvestment, insufficient industrial productivity,
short-sightedness in industry, and lack of research and development were major factors that
caused U.S. economy to decline (Hoffmann, 1998: 95-96). He believes in the current system U.S.
global economic leadership status has been put in doubt, by Japan and also by the rise of United
Europe mostly dominated by Germany (122).
Gideon Rachman characterizes the era after the end of Japanese threat to American
economic hegemony as the age of American supremacy. However, about a decade later, he
thinks this age come to an end with the arrival of new economic challenger, China. He asserts
that China as an economic challenger is really different than previous ones (Rachman, 2011: 60).
According to Rachman, China has proved its economic prowess on the global stage by growing
at nine to ten percent on average for about three decades (60-61). This economic prowess is
already allowing China to challenge American economic influence all over the world. On the
other hand, he argues the predictions of the demise of the Chinese economic achievements
were wrong in the past (such as the prediction of economic stagnation after the Tiananmen
Square massacre in the late 1980s, or the prediction of economic meltdown due to fragile
structure of Chinese financial-banking system), and these kinds of predictions will be wrong in
the future (63). Roger Altman supports Rachman’s argument by revealing that China emerged
from the financial crisis unscratched while countries all around the world were severely affected
from it. According to Altman, the reason behind that is the nature of the Chinese political and
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economic systems that are completely different than western world. First of all, the Chinese
financial system plays a small role in its economy. China remains relatively closed economy in
terms of foreign capital or portfolio investment. Besides that, China runs a budget surplus and
carries little government debt. In addition, Chinese households save more than 40 percent of
their incomes that increase Chinese investment and its foreign exchange reserves (Altman,
2009: 8). In sum, Altman indicates that due to these factors China is little affected by the
financial crisis while much of the rest of the world has been hit seriously (9). On the other hand,
Rachman argues with the statement that says because globalization spreads liberal economic
values such as a free and open market, deregulation, privatization, and competition to, China
will become an economically more liberal country in the future. According to Rachman, these
assumptions will not work out, by using Beijing Consensus or Chinese Economic Model, China
has managed to use policies that curb liberal economic values on the one hand and it continues
its economic success on the other hand. Therefore, Rachman believes that China will be
dominant economic power in the world and that every country will be obligated to adapt to this
very new situation (Rachman, 2016: 2-5). From that perspective, John Ikenberry probably
disagrees with Rachman. According to Ikenberry, it is true that economic power and influence is
undeniably flowing away from the U.S. to China and the U.S. will be less able to shape the world
economic order. However, he asserts that economic system that was created by the U.S. and its
allies after the WWII is still alive and well (Ikenberry, 2011: 57-58). Ikenberry thinks over many
decades liberal economic order has facilitated many regional and global transformation. For
example, many countries in East Asia, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America
transformed their economic structures and joined the international trading system with the help
of American-led liberal international order. From that point, he believes that neither China nor
any other emerging powers want to contest the rules and principles of the liberal international
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order. China just wishes to gain more authority within the system. Besides that, Ikenberry thinks
that alternative economic order “Beijing Model“, which is less open, more strict, rule-based
model that includes heavy state involvement in the economy, would not advance the interest of
other states on a global scale due to the fact that there are always a few states in this system
which opportunistically exploit the other countries (61).
Jonathon Kirshner does not agree with the idea that says the American-led liberal
international economic model is strong and stable and China is fine with its principles. Kirshner
believes that China has a huge desire for reducing its dependency on the U.S. dollar and
American-dominated global economic model. For that desire, Chinese leaders accelerate the
pace of RMB internationalization, promote regional monetary cooperation, and propose reform
of American-led global monetary management (Kirshner, 2014: 120). Kirshner explains the
reason why China wants to change global economic model with the declining economic power
and influence of the U.S. He believes that the financial crisis of 2007-09 undermined American
economic power and influence in the world (2). According to Kirshner, the starting point of this
decline was actually before the financial crisis of 2008. He says in the East Asian crisis, the
America-led economic model which advocates the free-market economic principles and the
reduction of state involvement was met with skepticism first in some Asian and Latin American
countries, and then in much of the world with big resentment (80). After various financial crises
at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s he emphasizes that, countries that rigorously
followed American-led economic model or Washington consensus principles usually ended up
with serious economic crises. Later, the financial crisis of 2007-09 accelerated this process.
Kirshner thinks the crisis brought up another important consequence other than relative erosion
of the economic influence of the U.S. It was the reality of the increased economic influences of
China. He indicates that China has experienced sustained and exceptional growth for over thirty
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years. Due to this growth, the Chinese economy reached over 50 percent of the size of
America’s from its seven percent at the end of the Cold War (157). Therefore, China wants to
play a major economic role in the new world; however, Chinese leaders think American-led
global economic order prevents them playing that role.
Niall Ferguson is another scholar who thinks the time for China has arrived. According to
him, China is on the brink of surpassing the U.S. as world’s leading economic power and the
financial crisis of 2007-09 just acted as an accelerator of that trend (Ferguson, 2011: 307-308).
He believes that the decline of U.S. economic power is mostly about huge budget deficit and
public debt in the U.S. He believes that it is very hard to achieve any economic growth under a
heavy debt and deficit burden (2014: 147). From that point, even before the financial crisis he
tries to take attention to U.S. soaring budget deficit and national debt. However, he said even
though the seriousness of the problem, many Americans including well-informed scholars
refused to believe bad financial conditions of the U.S. Ferguson believes this is because of East
Asian capital that finance and stabilize U.S. unbalanced budget each and every year (2004: 262).
After the financial crisis, he indicates that the fiscal position of the U.S. was worse than that of
Greece. The debt-to-revenue ratio (which is the ratio of sovereign debt to all government
revenue) of the U.S. was over 300 percent in 2009 (2011: 310). Other than debt-to-revenue
ration, he believes that government solvency is also very much depended on interest rate that
investors demand. From that perspective, he stresses that more than half of the U.S. debt is in
the hands of foreign creditors and over a fifth is held by the monetary authorities of China (311).
In sum, Ferguson believes that the U.S. is at the end of its economic predominance and China is
very ready to be world next economic superpower.
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Fareed Zakaria like most of previous intellectuals above believes that China has been
experiencing rates of economic growth over the past few decades that were once unimaginable.
On the other hand, the U.S. has been struggling with slow growth, high unemployment and
overwhelming indebtedness (Zakaria, 2012: 2). The financial crisis of 2007-09 worsened the
situation for the U.S. For many years saving and investment rates are low and trade, budget and
account deficits are high in the U.S. By contrast, China has high saving and investment rates and
trade and budget surpluses during the same period. In all, China has grown over 9 percent for
three decades. Besides that, China’s income per capita has increased twentyfold and its foreign
exchange reserve is the largest in the world (100-110). Zakaria describes the country as one of
the most successful development stories in world history. From that perspective, he believes
that the world is experiencing a great economic power shift. In the old world, American
economic ideas had been the starting points for international economic action. However, after
the financial crisis of 2007-09 the U.S. lost its economic power and its ability to create broad
coalition in order to solve complex economic problems of states in the world (232). On the other
hand, he states that China is taking up more space and more roles for the world economic
problems.
There are some scholars on the other hand who think economically the U.S. is still the
most powerful and most influential state in the world. They argue that there is no clear longterm absolute U.S. economic power decline. Some scholars believe the U.S. is in a relative
economic power decline in terms of U.S. share of world gross products, share of global
manufacturing activity, employment and GDP growth. At the same time, they admit that the
U.S. has serious debt and deficit problems. However, they assert that this is not the same idea
that the U.S. is in irreversible economic power decline. There are many factors, such as market
size, competitiveness, productivity, national resources, human development, technological and
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scientific achievements and the role of dollar in the world that make the U.S. the largest and
richest economic power in the world. On the other hand, they criticize scholars who think China
will be the world’s next economic superpower. They believe these scholars are exaggerating
China’s economic achievement. They believe that China will face serious financial and economic
problems in the future that put this country into the middle-income trap like other countries
such as Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Turkey. From that point, they predict that China in the future
will be all about meeting the needs of its own people rather than creating a global economic
hegemony.
Samuel Huntington believed there are no facts or events that prove the U.S. economic
power is in decline. According to Huntington, scholars who believe the U.S. is losing its economic
hegemony in the world, tend to paint an impressionistic and fictitious picture of U.S. economy.
He indicates that according to these scholars U.S. economy is in irresistible decline due to its
mounting trade and fiscal deficit and its continuing and even accelerating decline of world
production (Huntington, 1988: 76-81). However, Huntington argues that debt and deficit are
overwhelmingly the result of the economic policies of U.S. government. These policies are used
in order to stimulate investment, growth and revenues. According to Huntington, if these
policies fail, they can be reversed by another set of policies that possibly not create any debt
and deficit. On the other hand, he points out that the U.S. produced around 40 percent of world
product in the 1950s. That share declined drastically to lower 20 percent of world product at the
end of the 1960s (81). Since then it has remained the same. He argues that in the past two
decades (1968-1988) the share of gross world product certainly has not declined. From that
point he asserts that the arguments of scholars who believe the U.S. has suffered precipitous
decline and center of economic production is shifting from the U.S. to other countries are
obviously not supported by the facts (90-96).
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Bruce Cumings agrees with Huntington’s analysis. Cummings believes the U.S. is still the
only dominant economic power in the world at the end of the twentieth century. He indicates
that the unemployment and inflation rates decreased at twenty-year low, the stock market
went up and broke the records, the big federal budget deficit turned into a surplus, and
economic growth reached almost five percent in the United States (Cumings, 1999: 271). After
all of these factors, like Huntington’s thesis, he claims that no regional or major powers can
challenge American global economic position. He thinks American international economic
leadership is dependent on various strengths from mass consumption to scientific and
technological prowess (275-295). Michael Cox agrees with Cumings and believes the U.S. has a
great deal of economic power, much more than any other country in the world, now and for the
foreseeable future. He approves Cumings’s list of factors that makes the U.S. a dominant
economic power and adds more factors to the list such as natural resources (oil, gas, coal, and
food that the U.S. possesses), economic competitiveness, innovation, corporate strengths, and
American position in the world economic system (Cox, 2012: 371-376). On the other hand, he
accepts that after the financial crisis there are some serious economic problems in the U.S., such
as the declining trend of the U.S. share of the world GDP, growing public and external
indebtedness and rising income inequalities. However, Cox believes that this is hardly the same
idea that U.S. economy is in irreversible or absolute decline. Robert Kagan agrees with that
statement. Kagan thinks during and after the financial crisis due to dismal economic situation
the perception of American economic decline is certainly understandable. However, he believes
the financial crisis cannot be interpreted as the beginning of the American economic decline.
According to Kagan, it is true that there is a relative economic decline in the U.S.; however, this
is mostly about the choice of Obama administration (Kagan, 2012). He states in order to decide
whether American economy is in absolute decline one should do a more rigorous examination
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by scrutinizing long-term data such as the size and the influence of the U.S. economy. Kagan
argues in terms of long-term factors the U.S.’ economic position in the world has not seriously
changed despite the financial crisis of 2007-09 (2012). Kagan interprets the financial crisis of
2007-09 is just another crisis like in the past. He indicates that the U.S. suffered deep and
prolonged economic crises in the past; however, in each case, the U.S. rebounded and actually
ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis (2012). From the
same point, Matthias Matthijs argues that in order to decide whether U.S. economy is in decline,
we have to look beyond short-term economic growth performance. We have to focus on longterm growth indicators such as human capital, technology, research and development,
innovation as well as on aspects of economic legitimacy such as influence over international
institutions, and ability to create and impose economic ideas (Matthijs, 2012:42). He says when
we consider all these ingredients we see the U.S. economy is still far ahead of all other
countries. In total, he believes the U.S. is more likely than any other states to stay at the top of
the world economy in the coming decades (44, 51).
Michael Cox thinks China’s economic success is exaggerated by politicians, intellectuals
and some parts of the public. He thinks China, like many other regional powers, has serious
internal and external challenges that limit this country’s economic ability to move ahead (Cox,
2012: 379). George Gilboy focuses some of these challenges. Gilboy asserts that Chinese
government frequently resists political and social reforms that are needed for a healthy
economy. Due to the risks that inherent in China’s unreformed political and social system,
Chinese managers focus on short-term profits, local autonomy and excessive diversification
(Gilboy, 2004: 33-35). On the other hand, according to Gilboy, Chinese economic reforms are
mostly inefficient (36). Gilboy claims that these reforms strongly favor state-owned enterprises
that prevent the creation of private sectors. Besides that, China’s entry to the world economy
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reinforces its dependence on foreign investment. In order to attract more foreign investment,
the Chinese government creates an investment friendly environment for foreign investors. Due
to this environment foreign firms accounted for 55 percent of China’s exports and also secure
strong positions in the Chinese domestic market (38-40). China’s entry to the world economy
also reinforces its dependence on foreign technology. Many Chinese firms need to import
critical, high-tech components and manufacturing equipments from the US and other
industrialized countries for their domestic operations (38). He believes Chinese markets are
fragmented and the rules are constantly changing under manipulation by officials. So from that
point, he predicts that without implementing structural economic reforms China cannot be a
global economic competitor of the U.S. Matthias Matthijs agrees with these statements and also
talks about the stability of Chinese financial market and Chinese economic model that is called
“Beijing Consensus”. According to Matthijs the Beijing model and financial market have their
own vulnerabilities and without serious reforms they cannot last long (Matthijs, 48-51).
Salvatore Babones’s analyses the issue from different perspective; however, his findings
match with earlier scholars’ analyses. According to Babones, China‘s massive economic growth
over the past two decades was mostly about the two one-time boosts that led to massive
increases in economic productivity in China (Babones, 2011: 82). One of these boosts he talks
about the population’s declining fertility rate. Babones says declining fertility rate freed up
women in China to join the formal labor market. Women, who used to work in the home, are
now working in the money economy which increases China’s GDP. The second factor he talks
about is urbanization. From the same point, he indicates hundreds of millions of people who
used to stay in the village and work on the farm, now moved to cities. Urbanization in China
increases GDP because urban populations are more financially productive than rural ones.
Babones believes these are the one-time benefits and it already boosted Chinese economy (85-
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88). Therefore, China will face all kinds of economic problems in upcoming future, which make
China enter into the middle-income trap (88). From the same perspective, Michael Beckley
believes it is true that over the last two decades, China’s GDP has risen more than 8 percent
annually and its reported debt-to-GDP ratio reported is very low (Beckley, 2012: 58-59).
However, Beckley thinks GDP cannot be taken as a proxy of national economic power. Besides
that, Beckley thinks China’s true level of public debt is much higher than reported figures.
According to Beckley, China’s real debt-to-GDP ratio is between 70 and 150 percent, which will
negatively affect China’s GDP growth soon (60). Beckley also thinks that several factors (surplus
of cheap labor and capital, expanding export market abroad, and sufficient natural supplies such
as water and air) that promoted rapid Chinese growth in the past are now disappearing (60).
From that point, he thinks China’s economic growth will slow in the future, which will create
various economic challenges for China.
Charles Krauthammer thinks the China threat is vastly exaggerated. According to
Krauthammer, American economic strength is in relative decline and this decline is a choice and
it is in America hands (Krauthammer, 2009: 1-5). From that point, his analysis gets very close to
that of Robert Kagan. Like Kagan, Krauthammer believes the Obama administration’s liberal
ambitious economic policies move America from its traditional individualistic policies to more
equitable European style social democratic policies. Krauthammer thinks social democratic
policies come with some cost that include higher unemployment, higher debt and deficit
amount, less innovation, less dynamism, less productivity, and less overall economic growth (15). Besides that, Krauthammer asserts that one of the major threats to the American economy
comes from trade deficit, and two-third of this deficit comes from imported oil. However, he
thinks this is not a fixed fact. It is a choice. He indicates, for example, if we remove the ban on
new nuclear plants, and offshore and Arctic drilling, then we can eliminate our massive trade
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deficit. In all, Krauthammer thinks all of these threats cannot still be interpreted as the U.S. is in
absolute economic decline. He believes the U.S. has the most dynamic, innovative, productive,
technologically advanced economy in the world (5). Krauthammer believes these are the factors
that will continue to make the American economy the most powerful economy in the world.
One of the most influential foreign policy thinkers, Joseph Nye, also think that U.S.
economy is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, the U.S. economy will remain its top
position in the world in the coming decades (Nye, 2010: 11-12). Nye agrees with Krauthammer’s
forces list that makes American economy the most powerful economy in the 21st century.
However, he adds more forces such as competitiveness, leading in critical new sectors,
investment in R&D, energy and education. According to Nye, the U.S. is doing well for almost all
of these forces. For example, U.S. productivity increased significantly after 1995 as well as its
competitiveness, which is now ranked as one of the highest in the world (2002: 126-128). He
indicates that the U.S. is the world leader for investment in R&D with its huge spending, which is
higher than the next seven countries combined (2011: 192-193). The U.S. also leads in many
critical new sectors such as information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology. Besides
that, according to Nye, after the shale revolution, the U.S. decreased its dependence on energy
imports and actually starts exporting energy to other countries (2015: 79-80). Finally, he thinks
American higher education is strong. Higher education spending as a percentage of U.S. GDP is
doubled as compared to countries such as France, Germany, Britain and Japan (191-197).
However, he claims that doesn’t mean there is no challenges and challenger. For challenges,
Nye’s list includes saving, debt, income inequalities and lower level education. According to Nye,
U.S. personal saving rate was down to near zero at the beginning of the 21st century from almost
10 percent in the 1970s (2002: 128). In addition, U.S. government debt level exceeds 90 percent
(critical point for many economists) of GDP (2011: 195). Nye also argues that income inequality,
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which poses serious problems to the economy, is high and it has risen steadily over the past
decades. Finally, he asserts that American education is struggling at the lower level. According to
Nye, American students at the lower levels are not really improving their knowledge and skills
enough to keep pace with an advancing economy in the 21st century (196). On the other hand,
he scrutinizes China as an economic challenger to U.S. economic supremacy. It is true that there
is a rapid economic growth in China for the last few decades. It is important to know that China
benefits greatly from imported technologies and cheap labor in the early stages of economic
growth. However, Nye believes China’s growth rates will slow as its economy reaches higher
level of development. In addition, Nye asserts that China will face serious economic problems
from income inequality, corruption, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOE), and unstable
financial market. From that perspective, Nye believes that China still lags far behind the U.S
economy. He thinks China is not likely to become a peer rival to the U.S. on a global basis;
however, it could be a big economic challenger for the U.S. in Asia (186).
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Chapter 3
Rationale of the Study
After scrutinizing previous researchers’ analyses on declining economic power of the U.S.
and rising China’s economic power as the world’s next superpower, it has been found out that
there are some gaps and weaknesses in these intellectuals’ analyses. First of all, some scholars
have a flawed understanding of American economic role in the world. It is interesting that
scholars such as Charles Krauthammer, Niall Ferguson, Clyde Prestowitz and Robert Kagan
confused being an economic superpower in the world and enforcing and pressuring on other
countries such as Japan, Germany, France, and China to get what it wants on every economic
issue. In addition, there has been confusion about one of the critical terms, “decline”, in some of
these intellectuals’ studies. The term is ambiguous and has many different meanings. For
example, some scholars draw a distinction between relative and absolute economic decline in
their analysis such as Joseph Nye, Bruce Cumings, Fareed Zakaria, Michael Cox and Paul
Kennedy. On the other hand, some scholars, such as Donald White, Gideon Rachman, Jonathan
Kirshner, and Thomas McCormick do not make a distinction and use these two terms
interchangeably. However, it is important to know that relative economic decline is very
different than absolute economic decline. In relative economic decline, other countries’
economic power increase much faster or greater than the first country’s economic power. For
instance, in the 17th century and especially in the 18th century, the Netherlands’ economy was
still in a good shape. However, they were in economic decline relative to other countries such as
France and Britain, which were growing much faster and greater than the Netherlands. On the
other hand, in absolute decline, a country loses some of its critical economic power resources or
loses its ability to use economic power resources effectively that leads that country to a long-
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term economic (GDP) decline. According to Nye, this type of economic power decline starts
inside the country and then it contributes to loss of external power (2015: 20-21). Holy Rome
and Ottoman Empires, that experienced a significant decline in economic activities (GDP) over
an extended period of time, can be examples of absolute economic decline.
On the other hand, some intellectuals, such as Charles Kupchan, Clyde Prestowitz, Niall
Ferguson, and Roger Altman measure current economic power of the countries with short-term
data and then make predictions about the future economic conditions of these countries.
However, it is crucial to know that there is no single future, there are many possible futures. If
factors like humans and their complex interactions are involved in the process, then predicting
the economic future of states become so much harder. For example, some intellectuals and
politicians such as Horace Walpole and David Tume predicted that the United Kingdom (U.K.)
would be an unimportant economic power when the U.K. lost its colonist in the New World
(Walpole, 1842: 266; Stanlis, 1976: 192-193). However, they couldn’t foresee the effects of
industrial and technological revolutions, which gave the U.K. another century of economic
hegemony. In a more contemporary example, it was famously calculated and predicted by many
respected intellectuals such as Prestowitz, Hoffman, and White in the U.S., taught that Japan
would become “number one” economic power in the world; however, not even a decade later,
the Japanese financial system almost collapsed and the country fell into a long-term recession
which is known as the Lost Decade of Japan. Finally, in a more dramatic example, before the
financial crisis of 2008 -after thousands of research and enormous of data analysis- the
president of the Federal Reserve Bank told Americans that the U.S. market could never fail;
however, it did only about two years later. All of these examples assure that confidence should
be reserved when intellectuals and politicians explain what the world economy is going to look
like in 50, 30 or even 10 years later.
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From the same perspective, some scholars, such as Charles Kupchan, Gideon Rachman,
and Roger Altman, use linear projection of economic growth trends in their studies. However,
this could be misleading. It is essential to know that when countries grow, their growths will be
more difficult to achieve and happen more slowly. When economies move up the value chain,
they move their production from simple manufactured goods to more technological and
complex products. In the early stages of production, countries such as China benefit from cheap
labor and imported technologies; however, in the upper stages, they have to change their
growth model in order to produce more sophisticated products. That process usually slows
down their economic growth rate. For instance, it took 30 years for South Korea to raise its GDP
per capita from one-thirtieth of U.S. GDP per capita to one-third of U.S. GDP per capita.
However, it took about 20 years to reach from one-third of U.S. GDP per capita to one-half of
U.S. GDP per capita (Babones, 80). More importantly, if the country fails to innovate or is
unsuccessful in changing its economic growth model, then this country’s growth slows down.
This is the situation that some countries, such as Mexico, Russia, and Turkey, have already
experienced for more than two decades.
It is also important that some scholars failed to focus on key variables related to measuring
economic power in the contemporary world in their studies. From that point, they take some
economic variables as dogma and ignore the rest. For example, Gideon Rachman, Michael Cox,
and Fareed Zakaria consider GDP as the single and most important variable and interpret the
health of the country’s economy based on this indicator. GDP is one of the most important
indicators; however, measuring overall health of the economy only by this variable makes any
research study questionable. GDP is a measurement of a nation’s overall economic activities.
From that point, GDP gives no information about composure or structure of an economy.
Besides currency values, exchange rates play important roles for measuring GDP. When a
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currency is under speculative attack, the market exchange rates of that country become
inaccurate which cause a major shift in GDP. On the other hand, for elections or many other
short-term benefits, law-makers can use policies such as easy credit and low interest rates in
their country in order to increase employment and maximize GDP. However, in the long-run,
these policies could have disastrous effects by raising inflation and budget deficit. It is important
to know that if there is spending, GDP increases. However, high spending doesn’t always mean a
flourishing economy. For example, many oil rich Arabic countries do irresponsible spending on
projects that actually bring no benefits to the country in the future. Besides that, GDP does not
give information about income inequalities, environmental quality, unemployment, and many
other factors that affect people’s standard of living. Finally, in many countries, the value of
currencies varies from market to market. For example, Iran uses three foreign exchange rates in
its economy. Countries such as Iran, China, Turkey, and Russia constantly use this and other type
of methods in order to manipulate their official GDP data. From that point, it is clear that using
GDP as a proxy for economic or national power of a country is controversial. In order to support
findings about GDP, many other variables should be taken into account such as inflation,
demand and supply of currency, debt, saving, export-import balance, and monetary and fiscal
policies. GDP is calculated by market exchange rate and market exchange rate is determined by
various variables mentioned above. The GDP of a country will be inaccurate if that particular
country manipulates any of these variables.
This is not only the case for GDP. The same kinds of challenges are common for the
variables such as debt, unemployment, productivity, savings, and interest rates. For example,
Niall Ferguson, Paul Kennedy, and Robert Keohane pay specific attention to debt. According to
them, it is very hard to achieve any economic growth under a debt and deficit burden. It is true
that debt affects the economy and creates serious economic problems from higher inflation to
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lower income and from lower investors’ confidence to higher unemployment. However, it is
important to know that in some cases debt can be created in order to boost economic growth
and finance the investment. For example, many times the U.S. government has increased debt
and deficit spending in order to overcome economic slowdowns. This means the debt or deficit
spending is not always a bad thing.
Another field which many scholars over-simplify is savings. Savings is one of the essential
parts of economics. If there is low savings then there will be low investment and low growth.
Many scholars such as Paul Kennedy, Stanley Hoffmann, Gideon Rachman, Fareed Zakaria,
Joseph Nye, and Michael Backley emphasize the low savings rate in the U.S. and talk about its
negative effects on overall economy. However, it is important to know that in many cases
American savings rates are miscalculated. Many intellectuals usually focus on one side of the
story by scrutinizing personal and/or government savings of the U.S. However, at the aggregate
level the situation looks much better when they add corporate saving into the account. In other
words, the low level personal and government savings are balanced out by corporate savings in
the U.S. Nonetheless the situation could be at critical level if all three savings levels are low. But
even in that case the U.S. has some exceptions. Because there are still many foreigners who
want to invest in the U.S. or they want to hold their capital in the U.S. market, which gives the
U.S. ability to cover the savings gap. However, that doesn’t make everything fine. If foreigners’
money that comes into the U.S. is used for investment, research and development projects,
then this brings beneficial impacts for economic growth. However, if this money is used for
budget deficits and excess U.S. consumption, then this creates huge buildups of debts and
causes additional serious deleterious impacts on economic growth in the U.S.
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Productivity is another variable that needs specific attention. It is one of the most
important indicators in economics. A country’s sustained long-term economic growth and its
ability to improve its standard of living come from increases in productivity (BCCampus, 2019).
Nye, Prestowitz, Babones, Huntington, and Cox focus on productivity and analyze the
relationship between productivity and economic growth of the U.S. in their studies. However, in
their studies, these scholars rarely analyze the factors that affect productivity. For example,
there are some forces that influence productivity over time, such as technological development,
human capital, and public capital. However, it is important to know that each of these forces has
different level of contribution to productivity. For example, increases in public capital cannot
constantly contribute to productivity. It has one-time benefit that boosts the productivity and
then its contribution margin decreases. It is important to know that the rate of productivity is
very much dependent on the type of force. From that perspective, for example, the reason of
Chinese productivity growth in the 1980s is very different than that of 2000s. Due to that,
Chinese economy experienced different rates of growth in each of these decades.
It is also important to mention that psychology plays an important role in many
researchers’ analyses. When it is compared to other nations, it can be seen that Americans are
more likely to worry about their economic decline. Even after the financial crises in the late
1950s and early 1960s, there was pessimism about the future of the country’s economy. The
current discussion of decline of U.S. economic power and the possibility of China to be the next
economic superpower touch at the nerve of many American intellectuals. From that point, some
scholars, such as Niall Ferguson, Jonathan Kirshner, Fareed Zakaria, John Ikenberry, Robert
Kagan and Gideon Rachman, constantly talk about Chinese economic growth and its leading
position in some fields such as manufacturing and its foreign reserves especially in the U.S.
However, in most of the cases, they rarely address whether China can sustain such high
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economic growth rates for the next twenty years or more in order to catch up to the U.S. or,
they do not specifically focus on factors such as growing imbalance between high savings and
low consumption, reliance on export market for growth, weak banking and financial system, and
high level of corruption in China. Furthermore, they rarely touch upon political, environmental,
social, and territorial difficulties that China is facing at present and which will likely grow more
intense in the future. It is clear that all these challenges undermine the overall efficiency of
Chinese potential economic growth in the future.
In all, there are many gaps and weaknesses in these scholars’ studies that seriously
undermine the measurement of economic power in the 21st century properly. Due to these
weaknesses and gaps, it has become clear that their judgment on whether U.S. economic power
is in decline and whether the rise of China as the world’s next economic superpower is highly
questionable. The overall situation above raises the importance of the following question; why
we need to scrutinize this topic.
Creating economic prosperity, stabilizing markets, supporting employment, and protecting
business development are the major economic objectives of almost all countries. In order to
reach these objectives, countries use various economic policies. It is important that countries’
economic policies are very much relevant to their economic role and/or position in the world. A
government can adopt different economic policies if this and other countries’ economic roles
and positions in the world have significantly changed. From that point, it is highly possible that
the U.S. changes its economic policies if the country is in economic decline or if China rises as a
world’s next economic superpower. It mentioned above that scholars who believe the U.S. is in
economic decline and China is replacing the U.S. as world’s next economic superpower
substantially support protectionist and nationalist policies against China. For instance, if they
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persuade the public and officials with their findings, although the situation shows the opposite,
then their policies can be adopted as the U.S. official economic policies. These policies like
Smoot-Hawley tariff in the early 1930s, can create disastrous consequences by increasing
protectionist and nationalistic policies in the industrial sector first and then to all sectors of the
economy and not between the U.S and China but all around the world. From many perspectives,
this is actually very much what is happening to the U.S. now. However, there is a big chance that
these actions or these policies can diminish American economic power even more without
necessarily strengthening it. The same can be said for scholars who think the U.S. has the most
powerful economy in the world and China cannot be world economic superpower.
Underestimating Chinese economic power and ignoring problems such as debt, and low savings
in the U.S. and taking no action for fixing them can also create catastrophic consequences for
the U.S. economy. For example, it would be a serious mistake for the U.S. to assume that the
Chinese economic challenges in the future will disappear. It will be wise for the U.S. to deal with
these issues before they get unsolvable. In sum, it becomes clear that a study that fairly
presents all perspectives is needed. This actually brings us to next section which is methodology.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
Due to gaps and weaknesses in previous scholars’ analyses, there is a need for a more
comprehensive study that accurately analyzes whether U.S. economic power is in decline and
whether China is replacing the U.S. as a world’s next economic superpower. For analyzing and
answering these research questions accurately, we have to measure economic power of the U.S.
and China in a changing world correctly. In order to achieve that, this research study adopts the
pragmatic research approach. In a pragmatic research approach, there are many different ways
of interpreting the world and undertaking research. No single point of view can give the entire
picture (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2012: 109). A pragmatic researcher does not see the
world as an absolute unity. The truth is what works at a specific time. There is no law of nature;
for example, a certain amount of economic power doesn’t always give any country a guarantee
to implement its policies accordingly. It is important to know that there is no country in today’s
world and there never was in the past that has/had capacity to get what it wants on every single
economic issue. For example, Great Britain which was economically one of the most powerful
countries in the world in the 1860s adopted a free-trade policy; however, many countries such
as U.S. Austro-Hungarian Empire, the U.S. and Russia by that time opposed this policy by using
protectionist policies. From that point, it is crucial that economic power measured in resources
does not always equal to economic power measured in preferred outcomes.
For the method of this research study, this research study uses a mixed method research
approach for collecting, analyzing, and reporting the database. The reason why this paper
choses this particular approach is because pragmatist approach creates an environment where
researchers can use multiple methods, assumptions, and analysis in order to answer their
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research problems much more accurately (Croswell, 2003: 204-205). The mixed method
research approach basically integrates quantitative and qualitative research and data in a
research study. That means for this study this paper collects and analyzes not only numerical
data, which is the norm for quantitative research, but also narrative data, which is customary for
qualitative research in order to address the research problems. Therefore, this approach
provides qualitative and quantitative research strengths. With this approach this study is also
able to employ deductive and inductive analysis.
In the first part, this research study qualitatively explores existing case-studies and
analyzes perspectives of American economic power. These cases are international economic and
financial events such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system, OPEC oil embargo
and trade and tariff disagreements in the GATT and WTO from World War II to today. From
these cases, this research paper aims to find out whether the U.S. has enough economic power
to get other countries to do what it wants them to do. In other words, this study explores
whether the U.S. has ability to get other countries to do what they otherwise would not do.
After a substantial amount of cases have been scrutinized, this research paper builds a pattern
and then develops a theory that explains the data results. In this section, qualitative data is used
with an inductive analysis. Cases are gathered from the resources such as documents, books,
scholarly and newspaper articles, reports, and historic records such as archives.
A deductive analysis succeeds inductive analysis. Research questions of this section are “Is
U.S. economic power really in decline?” and “Can China replace the U.S. as the world’s next
economic superpower?” For these questions, this research starts with a hypothesis that says
“U.S. economic power is not in decline and China cannot replace the U.S. as world next
economic superpower”. These hypotheses are examined by analyzing quantitative data that
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collected to explore different economic power variables. It was mentioned earlier that since the
beginning of the modern state system, different economic variables have played important roles
in different periods for assessing national economic power of states. From that point, it is
important to find variables that provide a right mix for measuring economic power in the postindustrial world. For that aim this research study focuses on economic variables such as GDP,
consumer price index (CPI) or inflation rate, productivity, saving, and finally budget deficit and
debt. The following section provides an introduction to variables, and scrutinizes their
interconnected relations by analyzing how a change in one variable very much affects the other
variable/s. From that perspective, the next section also tries to explain the reasons why these
particular variables are taken as right basis for measuring economic power.
A. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The economic power of nations is usually measured by gross domestic product. GDP is
basically the total market value of all final goods and services produced within a country (Callen,
2018). Each county measures its GDP in its local currency therefore comparison can become a
challenge. Due to that, countries convert their GDP which measured in local currency to GDP in
U.S. dollars by using market exchange rate. Market exchange rate is the worth of a country’s
currency in terms of another currency. Market exchange rates are usually free-floating and they
are determined in the international financial market by the demand and supply of currencies.
The demand and supply of any particular country’s currency is determined by several factors
such as inflation, unemployment, trade, interest rates, and monetary and fiscal policies of this
country. The process seems smooth; however, things are not working out as it is planned. It is
always the case that when a currency is under speculative attack, the market exchange rates of
countries become inaccurate and misleading which cause significant shifts in GDP measurement.
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This is not the only challenge. There are many other cases. For example, for political and social
reasons law-makers can make unwise decisions in order to maximize GDP and acquire shortterm benefits. Government and the Central bank have a significant impact on the growth of the
GDP of a country. For elections or many others short-term benefits government officials can use
policies such as easy credits and low interest rates which increase the spending, employment
rate and GDP. However, in the long-run these policies could have disastrous effect on overall
health of the economy by raising inflation, and budget deficit. In addition, government officials
can do irresponsible spending on projects that bring no benefits in the long-run. By definition, if
there is a spending, the GDP increases. However, it is crucial that spending doesn’t always mean
a flourishing economy. Thus, it is clear that GDP is only interested in the quantity in spending
and ignore the more important part of quality in spending. From that perspective, GDP sees
them the same way if a country spends $300 million for developing a new tank for the army that
never use and a company in this country spends $300 million for producing high tech
machineries. Furthermore, GDP does not give information about income inequalities,
environmental quality, unemployment and many other factors that significantly affect people’s
standard of living. However, all these factors play crucial role on stable and healthy economy in
the long-run. GDP neglects the value of non-monetary activities. From that point, it excludes
non-market transaction such as household production and unpaid services. However, in many
developing countries, major business transactions occurred informally and big parts of
transaction are not registered which result in inaccurate low GDP numbers for these countries.
It is also important to know that GDP makes no distinction between productive and destructive
activities. GDP increases when the numbers of transactions increases in an economy. From that
point, it is not very important if the people are sick, if there is a huge natural disaster like a
major flood or earthquake, or there is an accident as long as money is spent to treat the sick and
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repair the damage. From the same point things such as unsustainable credit card debt, stock
market bubbles or sub-prime lending all increase GDP. Besides that, crime, pollution, and
resource depletion are also increase GDP if there is spending for preventing crime, mitigating
the pollution and rescuing wetlands and forests. In total, it can be said that the GDP alone may
not be accurate indicator that gives information about health of the economy. However, its
variation can at least give an idea that if the economy is growing or stagnant or in a recession. It
is usually accepted that if there is a stable rising GDP then there is a healthy and growing
economy. In this economy people get jobs, earn good wages, and increase their income. On the
other hand, if the GDP decreases then the economy of this country shrinks. People lose their
jobs, and income. Investors do not invest and production drops. Business revenue and customer
spending decline. All these factors can cause a recession. The rule of thumb is that two
consecutive quarters of shrinking GDP is the signal for a recession (Berge, 2014: 1). Finally, it can
be said that GDP gives a rough view about how well a country’s economy is functioning. It is a
good picture that gives an idea about a country’s economy, but it is not a complete picture. For
scrutinizing GDP, this paper focus on indicators such as percentage change in the value of all
goods and services produced in a country, reason of percentage change, causes of change,
sources of long-term GDP growth, share of a country GDP as a percentage of global GDP,
monetary and fiscal policies that increase or decrease GDP, and domestic and international
events that spur or curb GDP growth.
There are times when the GDP increases as a result of rising prices. In that situation, the
country still produces the same amount of goods and services. However, these goods and
services are priced higher than a year before. Therefore, in order to compare changes in the
production of a country between different periods more accurately, the effect of price changes
or inflation must be isolated. For this reason, the term Real GDP is used in this study. Real GDP is
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an inflation-adjusted measure that indicates the value in base-year prices of goods and services
produced by a country in a given year (Callen). Real GDP provides a more accurate figure of GDP
growth.
Conversely, this paper is highly concerned about the reliability of purchasing power parity
(PPP), particularly for China’s PPP. PPP is an important economic concept that compares
different countries’ currencies through a model called basket of goods and services. In this
model, PPP assumes that prices of (basket) goods and services in one country should be equal to
prices of similar (basket) goods and services in another country when they are expressed in a
common currency (OECD, 2020). This assumption derives from the Law of One Price (LOOP)
principle. It is crucial to note that this principle only works within strict circumstances. However,
there are some forces, such as trade restriction, transportation cost, government intervention,
tax differences, and limitations on competitions, contribute to persistent price differentials in
some countries. In that respect, this paper asserts that China strongly uses these forces and
manipulates the prices of goods and services. This paper will further discuss this topic within the
third section that Chinese authorities use price control mechanisms in various critical areas that
includes energy (oil, gas, electricity), food (pork, corn and wheat) and most of the real estate in
order to keep the prices of these goods and services within socially reasonable ranges (below
the market level). In addition to that, due to various reasons, the Chinese government keeps
non-tradeable goods and services (wages, insurance, rent and utilities and public services)
artificially low. This is another factor that leads to lower prices. Moreover, low transportation
and logistics costs in China reduce the input cost and put downward pressure on prices. Trade
restrictions, limitations on competition, and taxes are the other factors that Chinese authorities
use for manipulating supply and demand curves in China. All in all, the prices of most of the
goods and services are not determined under the free-market principles. Therefore, using PPP,
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which works under the LOOP principles, is not an appropriate way to measure China’s economic
power in the global economy.
Scholars, such as Jeffrey Frankel and Michael Pettis, address this concern and state that
PPP is a good measurement if someone wants to compare people’s living standard or income
per capita across countries (Frankel, 2014; 2020; Pettis, 2014). However, if someone wants to
compare countries’ power in the global economy, it is better to use GDPs at market exchange
rates (2014; 2020). According to Frankel, the size and/or power of a country’s economy is about
how much goods and services this country’s currency can buy in the world market; it is not
about how much local goods and services this county’s currency can buy in their domestic
market (2014). Additionally, World Bank has some concerns regarding the reliability of its PPP
statistics. World Bank states that PPP comparisons between countries with different economic
structures are less accurate than PPP comparisons between countries with similar economic
structures (World Bank, 2017). From the same perspective, World Bank announces that PPP
measurement for services are less precise than PPP measurement for goods (2017). Finally,
World Bank warns that the credibility of PPP measurement very much depends on the quality of
the price data that participating countries contribute (2017). In that respect, it is important to
know that China only partially joined World Bank’s International Comparison Program (ICP) in
1993 and, until 2005, China had never participated in a full ICP program (Deaton, 2009: 34). In
2005, China’s price collection took place in 11 cities that Chinese government decided (35).
Since then, the Chinese government has increased its contribution to ICP. However, in 2020
Chinese authorities still have many concerns about the reliability of ICP’ results. They believe
serious limitations exists in ICP’s results (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2020). In that
respect, they don’t endorse ICP’s results as official statistics (2020). From that point, Chinese
officials recommend the use of exchange-based GDP statistic, which is recognized by
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governments all over the world (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2017). From the same
perspective, OECD does not recommend using its PPP statistics in many situations that include
calculating national growth rate and establishing precise rankings of countries (OECD, 2012: 37).
There are also serious concerns about ICP’s methodological shift in PPP calculation. It is
important to note that ICP, is one of the world’s largest and most complex statistical
measurements, has been updating its technique and methodology, such as weighing the
importance of different goods and services in different countries, in order to make a meaningful
comparison of prices across countries since the end of 1960s (Deaton, 52). Nevertheless, after
many years of updating ICP’s approach, it is still far from optimal. In sum, this paper asserts that
using PPP is not an appropriate way to measure China’s economic capacity. In that respect, the
figure (GDP based on PPP) that indicates China’s economy has already surpassed that of the U.S.
to become the world’s largest economy is misleading. Therefore, this paper does not take this
indicator into account.
B. Consumer Price Index (CPI)
Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the average change in prices of household goods and
services such as food, transportation, medical care, housing, education, appeal and recreation
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). According to changes in prices the country experiences
inflation, or deflation. For example, increasing in prices of goods and services (CPI) refers to
inflation. There are many ways that lead to inflation; monetary policy is one of them. If a
country uses monetary policies and increases its money supply more than its size of the
economy then the purchasing power of currency in that country decreases while prices of
everything rise. Besides that, expectations, demand and supply shocks also create inflation. In
order to curb inflation, countries usually raise the interest rates. High interest rates lead to high
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unemployment, low investment and low economic growth. Eventually all these factors
contribute to an economic crisis. Therefore, raising prices are bad for the economy. However, on
the other hand, falling prices also create a situation that hurts economy. For example, if prices
are falling in a country, then consumers postpone their purchasing decisions in order to get
goods and services cheaper in the future. However, this leads to less demand for goods and
services in that country which results in less production, less investment and more
unemployment. Overall, that situation also causes serious economic slowdown. Therefore,
finding the right balance is very important task for governments and central banks. From that
point, for example, while decreasing interest rates in order to boost the economy, officials have
to be aware of the risks of driving up inflation. From the same perspective, while increasing
interest rates for cooling down the economy, officials have to be mindful of the risks of
recession that slows productivity, and reduce employment. For analyzing prices and its effect on
economy this paper will focus on average price changes over time, causes of these price
changes, effectiveness of fiscal and especially monetary policies in controlling price changes,
consequences of these policies and its effect on GDP growth.
C. Budget Deficit and Debt
Budget deficit is the annual differences between government spending and government
revenue (Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2019). If the government spends more than it collects
then there is a deficit. One the other hand, national debt is the total amount of money that
government owes (U.S. Government of Accountability Office, 2019). Therefore, debt means the
accumulation of past and present deficits. Budget deficit and national debt affect each other.
For example, if there is a deficit then the government has to raise the money to cover the
deficit. This type of financing creates public debt. On the other hand, debt decreases tax
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revenue and increase budget deficit. Besides that, the interest on the debt is added to the
deficit which also increases the deficit. Deficit and debt seriously affect the economy. In some
cases, deficit spending can boost economic growth and finance the investment. However, deficit
in most of the cases causes serious economic problems. First of all, it increases the national
debt. Secondly, in order to cover budget deficit government borrows from the private sectors.
Because of that transaction, the private sectors have fewer funds to spend and invest which at
the end slowdown the economic growth. Countries with large and chronic deficit struggle to
attract investors due to low confidence rate about the future of this economy. Finally, budget
deficit causes inflation. For example, in order to cover budget deficit government issues bonds.
However, if government-issued-bonds are not attractive then government has to print money to
buy bonds on its own. However, during this process money supply increases higher than that of
the actual size of the economy which eventually decreases purchasing power of currency. The
scenario can be set up differently but each time deficit negatively affects the purchasing power
of currency. From the same perspective, national debt also causes serious economic difficulties.
First, due to the accumulation of past and present deficits, cost of interest increases. The more
government spends on interest, the less is left for anything else. Thus, government raises taxes
or cut spending on services for paying the increased debt services. Therefore, rising debt leads
to lower incomes. High level of debt diminishes investors’ confidence and decreases foreign
investment. From same points, investors doubt about government’s ability to repay debt which
results in demanding even higher interest rates. Lower confidence and reduced investment slow
down productivity and wages first, and then overall economic growth later. Debt also decreases
government’s ability to respond future economic, political and social crises. Finally, the inflation
becomes a serious problem if the government prints money to pay for its debt. This (inflation)
would reduce the value of domestic debt; however, it increases the burden of its foreign debt.
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Besides that, inflation creates many crucial problems that it mentioned earlier. For scrutinizing
deficit/debt section, questions such as how big is the debt/deficit (amount of debt/deficits,
debt/deficit-to-GDP ratio, share of global debt as a percentage), what cause the debt/deficit,
what percentage of the debt/deficit owned by domestic/foreign entities, and is the debt/deficit
getting better or worse need to be answered.
D. Saving
Saving simply means the portion of income that left over after personal expenditures on
goods and services is subtracted from the total income (Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002: 14).
Factors such as people’s preferences for the future over present consumption, economic
uncertainties, changes in interest rates, government fiscal policies and population
characteristics play important role on saving decision. Other than individuals, companies and
governments also do saving. Companies’ savings are the part of their profits that do not pay out
to shareholders in order to finance investment in the business. From the same perspective,
government’ saving occurs when its revenues exceed its expenditures. This is the amount that
left to spend for future investments. It is widely known that saving is important for economic
prosperity of a country. Savings leads to increase income through investing in investment
vehicles. However, if there is not enough saving then there will be less investment which causes
lower economic growths, shortages and eventually crisis. Therefore, if the saving rate is low,
then individuals, companies or governments have to look for available savings through domestic
and international financial institutions. However, that way of finding investment resources bring
cost with them. It is also crucial that individuals, companies, and governments cannot heavily
depend on financial intermediaries for their investments. Because it is important to note that
borrowing indefinitely from financial institutions causes higher inflation and higher interest
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rates and then an economic downturn. For that reason, these entities have to cover their
investments with their savings. For analyzing saving, this study focusses on indicators such as
total amount of saving, gross national saving as a percentage of GNI and GDP, differences
among the amount/rate of personal, business and government saving, changes in these
amounts/rates over time, the reason of changes and its effect on overall economy.
E. Productivity
Productivity measures output for every unit of input. Increasing productivity indicates
greater efficiency in production of goods and services. There are some factors that increase
countries’ productivity. Technological development is one of them. Countries improve their
productivity as new technologies are introduced and diffuse through the economy (National
Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, 2017: 55-59). Countries also increase their
productivity by investing in human capital. Workers who receive better education, better
training, and higher level of knowledge become more productive over time. Another way of
improving productivity is investing on public capital. Besides that, countries that provide better
infrastructure such as roads, railways, harbors, bridges, airports and power plants make their
companies more productive than their counterparts in other countries that suffer from
inadequate infrastructure. It is crucial that productivity helps countries to increase their GDP.
Other than GDP growth, higher productivity also leads to higher competitiveness, lower unit
costs, higher wages, higher profits, better trade performance, and better living standards.
Productive countries are more dynamic and very much connected to the world. They invest in
technology and critical sectors. They attract highly skilled and creative people all around the
world. In the long run it is fair to say that a country’s ability to improve its living standards very
much depends on its ability to raise its productivity (Krugman, 1992: 9). On the other hand,
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when productivity decreases in a country, it reduces workers’ wages and corporate profits in
that country. Reduced wages and profits lead to lower investment rate and lower investment
rate causes lower GDP growth rates. In order to examine productivity this paper emphasizes on
output per hour of workers, ratio of aggregate output to aggregate inputs, resources that
contribute to productivity, changes in these resources over time, and its effect on economic
growth.
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Chapter 5
Case Studies
Introduction
As it mentioned earlier that power is the ability to influence behavior of others in line with
one’s own interest (Organski, 104). Therefore, powerful countries have capacity to force other
countries to do things they otherwise would not do or have at least a serious impact on other
countries’ decision-making (Nye, 1990: 154; Baldwin 1979: 161). From the same perspective,
economic power is the ability to control and influence the behavior of other countries through
use of economic assets (Whalley, 2009: 2-9). An economically powerful country has capacity to
make decisions that benefit itself alone at the same time this country has ability to decrease the
capacity of other countries that pose threats to its interest. In that respect, since the end of
WWII, it has been believed that the U.S., as the world’s leading economic power, has played a
dominant role for identifying and structuring world economic issues, taking measures to deal
with these issues, organizing and implementing international efforts and enforcing norms, rules,
and principles to address these issues. However, starting from the end of the 2000s some
scholars began to argue that the financial crisis of 2007-09 undermined the legacy of this
success. They think due to the financial crisis the world experienced enormous (power) changes,
and these (power) changes diminished U.S.’s ability to set the rules and provide solutions for the
world economic issues. In order words, these scholars claim that after the financial crisis of
2007-09 the U.S. lost its capacity to influence other countries in line with its own interest. From
that point, this study scrutinizes four case studies in the following section and finds out whether
the U.S. experienced an alleged power decline. Put it differently, whether the U.S. has enough
power to get other countries to do what it wants them to do.
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France and the Breakdown of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System
Introduction
It is important that after WWII, the U.S., as the world’s largest economic power, took a
special role to provide norms, rules, and principles of the world economic system in order to
maintain its dominant position in the system. In that respect, in 1944 the U.S. took a leading role
in designing foundation of the world’s international monetary system, Bretton Woods system,
which created the rules, norms and principles for commercial and financial relations among the
countries.
However, on the other hand, France criticized the Bretton Woods international monetary
system from different perspectives, challenged the U.S. leadership position in the system,
undermined the confidence of the system and finally played a crucial role in the breakdown of
the system.
From this point, this case study aims to scrutinize the relationship between these two
powers by focusing on how a war-devastated ‘middle power’ country, France, successfully
undermined the Bretton Woods international monetary system, which was mostly designed by
the world’s dominant economic power, the U.S. In the first section, this paper gives a brief
history of the US-France relations. It is important to examine historical background that could
provide possible explanation of the French action of challenging the U.S.-designed international
monetary system. The second section focuses on creation of the Bretton Woods international
monetary system and tries to find out why the world in the first place needed another monetary
system at the end of the WWII. The next section examines whether Bretton Woods succeeded
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and whether it contributed to the world’s economic development. From that point, this paper
explores who really benefited most from the system and more specifically if the U.S. benefited
disproportionately from Bretton Woods agreement. In the last section the focus will be on the
French criticism toward the Bretton Woods system and their actions that effectively weakened
and helped to accelerate the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system.
History of the U.S. & France Relationship
Even though there may have several areas of disagreements between France and the U.S.,
the relationship between these two countries has been strong, stable and mutually beneficial
for both countries since the 18th century.
It is important that at the end of the Seven Years’ War in the second half of the 18th
century France was heavily defeated and expelled from most of its North American lands from
the British. Due to the bitterness of its humiliating defeat in this war, having lost most of its
territories in North America and a way to get a retaliation from Britain without involving in
another direct war with them induced the French to help American colonies for their
Revolutionary war against Britain. As a result of that, France formed a critical and friendly
relationship with American colonies by signing treaties of commerce and alliance in the middle
of the American Revolutionary War. While the treaty of Commerce promoted trade and
commercial ties between these two countries, the treaty of Alliance created a mutual defense
between the U.S. and the France against Great Britain (The Library of Congress, 2020). It is
important that, according to these treaties, neither France nor the U.S. could seek a separate
peace agreement with Great Britain (The Library of Congress). It is also important that with
these treaties Kingdom of France was the first country that formally recognized the U.S. as an
independent nation (U.S. Department of State, 2019).
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Starting from the end of the 18th century till the last quarter of the 19th century there were
several events that put strain on the relationship between these two countries. The undeclared
Quasi War at the end of the 18th century, the declaration of Napoleon as the Emperor of France,
his conquest of Europe, depredation of American neutral shipping during the Napoleonic Wars,
procrastination in payment of indemnities to the U.S. and then election of Andrew Jackson and
his decision of reprisal of indemnities that were not paid by the French were several events in
the first half of the 19th century that temporarily raised tensions between these two countries
(U.S. Department of State, 2019; 2020; McLamore, 1932: 234-235; Thomas, 1976: 51).
During the U.S. Civil War, France helped the Confederate forces. The reason behind that
was to weaken the U.S. power in order to protect its cotton trade in the U.S. and also its large
investment in Mexico (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Beside that France took advantages of
the U.S. Civil War and placed Austrian archduke of Habsburg on the throne in Mexico. However,
the U.S. did not recognize the new government in Mexico and increased its pressure for France
to withdraw its forces from there (Library of Congress, 1997).
After the fall of Napoleon III in the middle of the second half of the 19th century the
relationship between France and the U.S. started to develop again. However, it was important
that there was a significant change on countries’ power. The events after the U.S. Civil War, such
as the expulsion of French from Mexico, the withdrawal of the Great Britain from Canada and
the purchase of Alaska from Russia made the U.S. only dominant power in the continent. In
addition to that, the U.S. went through a big economic transformation. The rapid technological
innovation and large-scale agriculture production in the late 19th century accelerated economic
growth in the U.S. In sum, from Civil war to the end of the 19th century U.S.’s relative share of
world wealth boosted from 15 percent to over 35 percent (Singer and Small, 1993: 60-71).
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Meanwhile, France was experiencing a serious stagnation. Its economic power was in decline
compared to the U.S. and all other major power at the end of this century. France’s relative
share of world wealth declined from 12 percent in 1860s to 8 percent at the end of the century
(Singer and Small). There was an economic growth in France from the beginning of the new
century to the WWI, however, it was too little too late. France became very dependent on
American supplies and financial assistance when WWI started. During the war American support
to France was incalculable. It was clear that without the U.S. support the victory would not have
been possible for France (Lloyd, 2014). During this period, France acted like a privileged ally of
the U.S. France would able to ask for anything and obtain everything from the U.S.
It was important that France was one of the victors of the WWI; however, at the end of the
war, France was much needier and much poorer than Central Powers. During the war, France
had suffered millions of causalities and borrowed heavily especially from the U.S. Large part of
France were devastated and economic growth declined substantially. The huge cost of the war
crucially weakened the financial structure of France. Therefore, French thought that the country
should never experience anything like that in the future. From that point, France’s main goal
was that Germany as the only cause of the war should not be able to rise again. Thus, France
aggressively engaged in diminishing German military, economic powers, and its capabilities. On
the other hand, the U.S.’s aim was to integrate Germany into the world economic and political
community as an equal partner.
These two completely conflicting views created tension between the U.S. and France.
Other than that, there were some other issues such as President Wilson’s 14-points proposal for
the World peace and prosperity, the U.S. senate’s decision that refused to ratify the League of
Nations treaty, the problem of France’s huge war debts and the U.S.’s demand on repayment of
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its bonds in full, on the other hand, American financial assistance to Germany which allowed
that country to pay for reparations, French insistence on building a strong Poland that annexed
some German land in order to create hostility between these two countries and their desire for
establishing an European army that watch and keep Germany down added more pressure to the
U.S.-France relationship (National Archives, 2020; U.S. Senate, 2020; BBC, 2011; Reinhart and
Trebesch, 2014: 23-24).
It is important that in the early interwar years the U.S. became the de facto economic and
financial center of the world (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 1989: 433). On the other hand,
France and its economy were devastated due to loss of labor and infrastructure in WWI. France
accounted for only 5 percent of world total wealth at the end of WWI (Singer and Small). It was
crucial that as a victorious nation of the Great War, France, seemed unable to create solutions
for the political and economic problems of the world. From that point, France, in these years,
found itself playing a lower level role in the world politics. The Great Depression in the early
1930s brought many other serious economic and financial problems to this country. In addition
to that, political crisis just worsened the overall situation. The country torn apart; governments
fell one after another. French public were deeply divided. On the one hand, far right parties
supported Mussolini, Franco and Hitler, on the other hand, communist party praised Stalin
(Embassy of France in Washington D.C., 2015). Meanwhile nationalist became pacifist due to the
fear of communism (Embassy of France in Washington D.C.). French Third Republic was in a
serious crisis in the 1930s that made France changed its primary concern from a German
invasion to a possibility of a civil war. During this time American influence in France which had
started decades ago reached its peak. From that perspective, France desperately looked for help
from U.S. when the WWII started.
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Figure 1. Relative Share of the World Wealth (1830-1940)
Source: J. David Singer, and Melvin Small. (1993). National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985. Ann Arbor, MI:
ICPSR. 1993. Note: Singer and Small take state’s mobilizable wealth (which refers to economic resources) and
technological development as indicators of state power. They agree that GNP is probably the most commonly used
indicator of state’s wealth. However, they think that GNP does not capture important differences in the mobilize
wealth (economic resources) and technological sophistication of different states (62-63).

After WWII, Americans were welcome as a liberating force by France. The prestige of the
U.S. was at its peak in France after the victory. During the early Cold War period the main goal of
France was to secure itself from the German threat by keeping Germany down. Americans, on
the other hand, decided to build up Germany, at least, the part of Germany they controlled. The
U.S. also wanted to integrate Germany into the Western world. According to Americans, French
policy of holding Germany down forever would eventually push this country to Soviet camp
(Creswell and Trachtenger, 2003: 5-7). France had little choice in this manner. At the beginning
very reluctantly and then increasingly inclined to accept the strategy that the U.S. promoted.
French realized that with this strategy Germany integrate into the Western political system
which would automatically limit Germany’s freedom of action. Besides that, if Germany stayed
divided between east and west, and if Russian forces remained in the eastern part of the
country, then western forces and especially American forces would stay in Western Germany
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which would provide France security not just against the Soviets, but also against Germany
(Creswell and Trachtenger, 15).
However, it was important that the memories of the war were still in people’s mind in
France and anti-German feelings were strong. In that respect, even though France officials
embraced this strategy they wanted to proceed carefully, slowly, and cautiously.
Creation of German military unit was another important issue area in the early Cold War
era. It was important that Americans were worried that entire Europe would eventually fall into
Soviet camp if Western powers did not act on time for creating a defense bloc against Soviet
Russia (Condit, 1996: 191-204). According to Americans, Western Germany would be an
important part of their defense bloc (Condit). Therefore, the U.S. insisted on rearmament of the
West Germany within the framework of an integrated European defense force. On the other
hand, France tried to hold back that plan largely for their domestic political reasons, and instead
of rejecting this plan they offered an alternative plan of their own which was a creation of highly
integrated European Army. However, it is crucial that a few years after its proposal, the French
government rejected its own plan and accepted American plan. From France’s standpoint they
understood that the U.S.’s western defense force, NATO, plan made sense. According to them,
integration of West Germany into the NATO with its limited power would pose no threat to
France, and on the other hand, with this way West Germany could contribute to the defense of
the West against the Soviet threats (Creswell and Trachtenger: 24-26).
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It was highly crucial that during this era France seemed incapable of following a firm and
consistent policy against the U.S. The declining power of this country was the main reason of
that. France became much weaker than previous times that could only be classified as a middle
power country. From that point, France was rarely likely to get its way for most of international
issue. On the other hand, the U.S. rose as the dominant economic power and one of the two
military superpowers of the world. Like in other cases for rearming the West Germany and
creating the western defense force, NATO, the Americans was holding all the cards and
eventually got what they wanted.
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the 1950s and throughout the 1960s France was able to pursue completely different policy
which was much more stable and persistent than its previous policies. This policy was basically
against the U.S. designed international monetary system which is also known as the Bretton
Woods international monetary system.
Bretton Woods International Monetary System
In its peak of the WWII Allied power governments decided to establish an international
economic structure for the post-war period in order to avoid the detected weaknesses of the
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economic policies of countries in the interwar period. These weaknesses (beggar-thy-neighbor
trade strategy, unstable exchange rate policies, protectionism, and incompatible national
monetary principles) were considered as the main contributors of the Great Depression, and
many other economic and financial downturns all around the world that led countries by that
time to WWII. In the middle of the 1940s the new international monetary system (Bretton
Woods) was established. It is important to know that contrary to its name, Bretton Woods
international monetary system did not only include countries’ monetary policies. It also covered
their economic and financial policies. Two institutions International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) later known as the World
Bank also created under this system.
Bretton Woods international monetary system very much resembled the gold exchange
standard system in the pre and interwar period. However, it was concentrated on dollar. In this
system, the U.S. declared par value of its currency as $35 per ounce and all other countries
declare par value of their currencies in terms of dollars (Bordo, 1993: 49). Declaring a par value
was important. Because member countries had to exchange their own currencies for gold or
convertible currency if other countries that held their currency requested it. In this exchange,
countries used their declared par value. With this way, countries established a fixed relationship
among their national currencies. It is crucial that in Bretton Woods system countries could
change their declared par value only within a narrow margin which was plus or minus of no
more than 1 percent of point (Simard, Bordo and White, 1994). However, in case of
fundamental disequilibrium countries were able to adjust (revalue or devalue) their parities.
But, even in this case before adjusting their currencies, countries had to have IMF’s permission.
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It is important that in order to prevent external financial and economic difficulties, which
created serious disequilibrium problems for its members, IMF could provide financial assistance
from its funds. That means, member countries had not relied on specific mutual support
agreements among central banks like in the previous monetary system of the interwar period
(Truman, 2017: 5).
On the other hand, the Bretton Woods monetary system required its member countries to
remove their restrictions on current account. Member countries had to permit inflow and
outflow of goods and services (export-import). However, the system allowed them to maintain
their controls on capital accounts such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and
loans from foreign governments (Helleiner, 1994: 47-48; Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016: 4-5). The
reason behind that was the huge speculative movements of money which had undermined the
currency stabilities of countries in the previous period (Helleiner, 25-33).
Besides that, member countries in this monetary system accepted some obligations that
restricted their discretion. Bretton Woods institutions used surveillance over its member
countries’ economic, financial, and monetary policies. A member country that in external
financial problems could receive some financial support from the funds only if this country
adopted adequate fiscal and monetary policies to correct its underlying economic problems,
also if this country’s policies had very little adverse economic effects on other member countries
(International Monetary Fund, IMF, 2020).
It is important that it took more than a decade for Bretton Woods international monetary
system to fully operated. It was also important that even though all its planning and designing
stages the system lasted a little more than a decade (1959-1971). However, it made some
significant changes in the world economic and financial environments.
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Benefit of the Bretton Woods System
The system was relatively successful and contributed a lot to development of the world
free trade. During the era of the Bretton Woods system, the world economy experienced a rapid
GDP growth from about $1 trillion in 1959 to $3.3 trillion in 1971 (World Bank, 2020). Besides
that, world industrial production grew significantly, and real exchange rates were mostly
stabilized. There was a high level of capital mobility, especially between the U.S. and Europe,
that helped to increase investment and financial integration among countries (Morawetz,
1977:11-22). A high level of capital mobility and overall economic prosperity substantially
increased trade. On the other hand, Bretton Woods institution’s IMF served as agency that set
the rules for discouraging opportunistic behaviors of countries, coordinating transition to
stability, and increasing confidence in the system. Likewise, another Bretton Woods institution,
GATT, reduced tariff, and regulated international trade. Cooperation between governments and
countries’ financial institutions increased during this period. Countries tried to find solutions for
their problems even in the troubled times. On the other hand, dominance of the U.S. assured
confidence in the system especially during the early years.
Who Benefit the most from Bretton Woods System
However, it is important that other than providing confidence to the Bretton Woods
system, there were many factors that brought generous benefits to the U.S. First of all, the U.S.
dollar was the reserve currency and the U.S. was the currency provider of the system. This is
because of the U.S. was the only country at the end of the WWII that was prepared to exchange
its currency into gold at the request of other countries. Due to that role, the Bretton Woods
system provided a substantial seigniorage right to the U.S. at the expense of other countries.
With that privilege, the U.S. was able to print money and send it abroad in huge amount without
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the fear of inflation and devaluation. However, it is important that the seigniorage right works
only if other countries are willing to accept and add to the dollars they already held in their
reserves. The U.S. was able to finance its balance of payment deficit by its seigniorage right
(Eichengreen, 2011: 3-4, 117-118). With this right, the U.S. made massive investment, built
many military bases, and expanded its influence all around the world.
Moreover, due to its currency role in the world the U.S. had a huge flexibility for deciding
its fiscal and monetary policies. The U.S. was able to determine its rate of monetary or fiscal
growth with its substantial freedom; however, other countries, given their commitment to peg
the value of their currency to the dollar, would have to adjust their monetary and fiscal growth
in order to stabilize the exchange rate. Therefore, when the U.S. changed its monetary or fiscal
policies, there would be serious spillover effects on financial stabilities in other countries. For
example, if the U.S. used expansionary policies, that would create inflationary pressure in other
countries. Thus, other countries had to decide what they would do with their surplus dollars,
whether they hold it as reserve, or they request conversion of their dollars into gold.
France’s Actions and the Breakdown of the Bretton Woods System
The position of the U.S. in the Bretton Woods international monetary system helped this
country to maintain its economic hegemony over the world until the late 1950s and other
countries could not resist that. However, starting from the late 1950s and especially in the 1960s
there was a country that took the leading role of opposing the position of the U.S. in the world
monetary system. This country was France.
France criticized the extraordinary position of the U.S. (as a currency provider) in the
Bretton Woods system. French officials thought that due to this extraordinary position American
corporations made huge investment in the world especially in Western Europe, and American
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government created numerous military bases and launched many military operations all around
the world (Simard, Bordo and White, 1994). Moreover, French officials believed that this
position allowed the U.S. to fund its balance of payments deficit without making any substantial
adjustment. They thought financing account deficit by simply issuing money was the way of
exporting inflation to the rest of the world (Bordo, 2017:15-17). French government strongly
criticized these and launched a nationalistic policy that deliberately converting their dollars
holdings into gold in order to undermine confidence in the dollar and challenge the Bretton
Woods international monetary system. With that policy French officials aimed to reduce
American political and economic dominance position in Europe and also in the world. From
many points, French policy of threating the Bretton Woods system was somehow successful.
The system faced serious difficulties in the second half of the 1960s and finally it collapsed in
1971 when President Nixon cut the link between the dollar and gold.
However, it should be pointed out that the French influence was very weak during the
establishment and the early years of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. For
example, France officials and intellectuals did not offer any plan of their own in the Bretton
Woods conference in New Hampshire. They simply supported the U.S.-U.K. plan as a final
agreement. This was because the French economy was experiencing serious internal and
external imbalances that restrained France from playing a major role for contributing and
designing the world’s next monetary system in this period.
France created its own plan in the late 1950s that put the gold at the center of the world
monetary system. From that point, French version of monetary system could be interpreted as
an initial phase toward a return to an international gold standard. However, this proposal was
mostly neglected by reserve countries. At the end of the 1950s, French government started to
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convert its dollar reserves into gold in order to reduce American gold reserves and weaken
confidence in the dollar. World Gold Council (WGC) and World Bank financial statistics stated
that France increased its gold reserves from 516 metric tons in 1957 to 1458 metric tons in
1960. It is important that most of these golds were purchased from the U.S. Treasury (World
Bank, WGC, 1999). Thus, in the same period the U.S. gold reserved declined from 20312 metric
tons to 15822 tons (IMF and WGC). A year later in 1961 there was a disagreement between
France and reserve countries about expanding IMF’s resources. French government thought
that there is no shortage of IMF’s resources. They believed
Balance of Payments (1960-68)
Billions of U.S. dollars
USA
U.K.
1960
-3.4
-0.4
1961
-1.3
0.1
1962
-2.6
0.2
1963
-1.9
-0.4
1964
-1.5
-1.8
1965
-1.3
-0.4
1966
0.2
-1.5
1967
-3.4
-1
1968
1.8
-3

providing limitless source of reserves to nations in
difficulties would weaken balancing budget principle of the
Bretton Woods system (Dale, 1961).

Table 1 U.S. and U.K Balance of Payments
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. (2020). U.K. Office for National
Statistics. (2020).

From that point, France specifically focused on the size and persistence of the U.S. balance of
payments deficit. French officials in the early 1960s warned reserve countries, the U.S. and the
U.K., for their huge balance of payments deficit. They believed that due to huge budget deficit of
the U.S., the world experiences a generalized inflation. From that point, France criticized the
international monetary system from several points. First of all, French officials asserted that
Bretton Woods monetary system had no effective institution to control balance of payments
deficit. French officials also thought that there was an asymmetry between reserve countries
which could easily finance their deficit by printing money and other countries that that had no
such a right. From this point France made a proposal for a reform of Bretton Woods monetary
system; however, this proposal was rejected by the U.S.
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French continued to convert its dollar holdings into gold. Gold made more than 73 percent of
French reserves at the end of 1964 (Simard, Bordo and White). The next year when French
reform proposal was rejected by the U.S. they retaliated that by increasing their gold reserved
from 3314 metric tons to 4182 tons (WGC). With that rise, gold accounted for 86 percent of the
French reserves (New York Times, 1966). Besides that, several high ranking French official
include French President de Gaulle aggressively attacked the existing monetary system and
discussed the probability of retuning to a gold standard system.
The clash between the French and American views was intensified in the middle of the
1960s. French decided to drop their support for composite reserve unit (CRU) and increased its
gold reserves. It was clear for many countries in the middle of the 1960s that official dollar
liabilities held by foreign countries exceeded that of the U.S. monetary gold stock (Triffin
Dilemma) (Bordo 2020: 198-200). From that point the U.S. began to worry about the French
action of constantly converting its dollars into gold could be followed by other countries that
eventually reduce the U.S. gold stock to a point that lead to a run. It was important that there
were many signs that, this was already happening. More and more countries started to convert
their dollar holdings into gold and the gold component of the U.S. reserves had been constantly
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falling since 1957. By that time the U.S. became fearful that a serious loss of gold reserves would
carry the risk of undermining confidence and encouraging speculation not for the U.S. currency
but also for the overall Bretton Woods international monetary system. From that point, the U.S.
Treasury developed policies that include many controls and policies in order to decrease balance
of payments deficits and discourage conversion of dollars into gold. The U.S. officials had put
many of these controls and restrictions into effect even in the early 1960s. For example, U.S.
government encouraged export by subsidizing loans from the Export-Import Bank in order to
increase dollar inflow as early as 1960. Besides that, the U.S. government reduced its defense
and non-defense government purchases abroad, asked banks and other financial institutions to
curtail their overseas lending, increased taxes on foreign earnings of U.S. corporations, and
reduced allowance for tourist purchases abroad. These early actions were able to decrease
capital outflow and increase capital inflow; however, it provided just temporarily short-term
solution. Problem would have returned when the control and restrictions eased or removed.
From that point, the U.S. Treasury introduced several measures in order to provide more
concrete and stable solutions that encourage capital inflows and prevent foreign officials from
converting their dollars into gold. The creation of the Gold Pool was one of these measures in
the early 1960s. Eight countries in that organization pooled some of their gold reserves in order
to prevent a rise in the free market price of gold which led to a run on the U.S. gold stock
(Bordo, 1993: 56). Another action was the Reciprocal Credit Agreement which also called “swap”
agreement that the U.S. signed with each major Western country. This agreement allowed
Federal Reserve Bank of the U.S. to borrow other countries’ currency in time of need. With this
agreement the U.S. increased its banks’ access to affordable financing and maintained liquidity
without selling any of its gold reserves. Moreover, Roosa Bond allowed the U.S. to borrow other
countries’ currency that could be used instead of gold when a country wanted to convert its
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dollars into gold (Bordo). Besides that, lending facilities of IMF were expanded under General
Agreement to Borrow (GAB). Member countries that were in economic crisis used these
expanded resources instead of applying the U.S. to borrow money which increase the U.S.
capital outflow. The U.S. issued an “interest equalization tax” that imposed a tax in foreign loans
which also aimed to reduce capital outflow (Langer and Schwartz, 1965: 42). Meanwhile the U.S.
monetary officials used a policy that called “operation twist” for strengthening dollar and
stimulating capital inflows. In this policy Federal Reserve sold short-term treasury bills to raise
short-term interest rates for encouraging capital inflows; at the same time, the U.S. Treasury
bought long-term debt to lower long-term interest rates and attract investment (Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2011). Another long-term plan was to issue composite reserve
unit (CRU). Under this plan the U.S. and other members placed some of its currency to a pool
and received a related amount of CRU’s that could be used as equivalent to gold. An extension
of the CRU was special drawing right (SDR) which also operated as an addition to the existing
money reserves of member countries. This was because the gold was not sufficient to support
growth in global trade and financial transactions in the second half of the 1960s. SDR was not a
real currency; however, member countries used it as a real currency and traded their SDRs
between each other.
Most of these policies, controls and restrictions relatively helped the U.S. to protects its
gold reserves, at the same time they encouraged capital inflows and reduced balance of
payment deficit until the middle of the 1960s. However, France on the other hand, opposed
many of these policies. For example, they dropped their support for CRU, pulled themselves out
of Gold Pool, opposed creating an international currency reserve unit, followed uncooperative
policies that merely put France in an isolated position many times, and some other times
convinced other common market countries to go along with them in order to put pressure on
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U.S. for a reform in the system. Besides that, numerous French officials including finance
minister and president used hard bargaining line by making contradictory statements for the
international monetary system which created a confidence problem inside the system and
contributed to serious speculative attack against dollar. France kept systematically converting
their dollar reserve into gold. Late in the 1960s France seemed to not use this policy explicitly. It
was crucial that by that time there was a high possibility that French government used other
countries’ central bank to convert its dollars reserves into gold at the New York Federal Reserve.
Countries in the Northern Africa, especially Algeria and Libya which were heavily dominated by
France, had the highest demands for converting their dollars holdings into gold by that time.
Algeria increased its gold reserves from $5.7 million in 1966 to $156 million in 1967 and $245
million in 1968 (World Bank, 2020). From the same point, (before Gaddafi) Libya boosted its
gold reserves to $102 million in 1968 from $2 million in 1966 (World Bank). However, French
authorities denied these claims.
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It was important that world
economy became more turbulent in the

second half of the 1960s. Inflation rate increased steeply in the U.S. after Kennedy and Johnson
administration monetary and fiscal policies. When these policies met with growing gold scarcity
it created a situation that increased speculations in the financial market and undermined the
dollar’s relationship with gold. On the other hand, after the election of Labor Party in 1964, the
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U.K. experienced serious balance of payments deficit. In order to improve its economic
situation, the British planned to join into the European Common Market. However, French
prepared two conditions for British membership. The first condition, it said that the British had
to drop sterling as an international reserve currency and second condition French insisted that
British had to achieve equilibrium in their international balance of payments (Simard, Bordo and
White). From that point, it was important that France persuaded other European Community
(EC) countries for supporting its policies against Britain. Besides that, a combination of domestic
and overseas events such as Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, closure of Suez Canal, rise in oil and other
commodity prices, increased tension with China after British embassy attacked in Beijing, riots in
Hong Kong, civil war in Nigeria, British withdrawal from Aden and weathered support of the U.S.
for British economy created a situation that force the sterling parity be changed. Therefore, at
the end of 1967 British currency was devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 (House of Common Library,
2017).
In the aftermath of the sterling devaluation French reinforced their pressure for a reform in
the Bretton Woods system. This situation increased speculative attack to the system, at the
same time it set off a huge wave of buying gold from the market. From that point, main reserve
currency, dollar, started to weaken. There were various reasons that explain the depreciation of
dollar. First of all, devaluation of the British pound sterling as the second reserve currency in the
Bretton Woods system meant that the devaluation of dollar could be the next. Besides that,
both countries (the U.S. and the U.K.) had been running balance of payments deficit. Kennedy
and Johnson administrations in the U.S. and labor party in the U.K. had used expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies and both countries had been reluctant to take severe measures for
restraining inflationary pressure in their economies. From that point, in the eyes of foreign
authorities two countries were the same. If one failed, other would follow. It is also important
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that in order to provide support for the pound sterling, the U.S. had led international initiatives
by that time which strengthened the sense of the dollar increasingly linked to the credibility of
the pound sterling. Eventually, sterling crisis increased speculation on the gold-dollar parity. Due
to that, the Gold Pool which established for stabilizing price of gold at $35 was collapse at the
end of the 1960s. The end of Gold Pool provoked the creation of a two-tier gold market (Bordo,
Monnet, Naef, 2017: 2). This new situation seriously threatened gold-dollar convertibility on the
one hand, and on the other hand, it mounted speculative pressure for the overall system. After
all these speculative pressures, the U.S. abandoned its commitment to peg the dollar to gold. In
other words, the U.S. destroyed the foundation of the gold-dollar exchange system. With this
end, the U.S. lost its privileged positions and lost its leadership position in the international
monetary system.
It is very essential that France played a crucial role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
international monetary system. Except few periods including the one in the early 20th century,
the French economy was in constant decline compared to not only U.S. but also all other major
countries. France became far more dependent on U.S. assistance during WWI. After the war, the
French economy was on the verge of collapse. In the interwar years, the Great Depression and
serious domestic political crises made the situation even worse for France. From that point, the
country was unable to create any policy for the world’s economic and political problems. Thus, it
is not surprising that France was in desperate need of U.S. assistance when WWII started. After
the war, France became much weaker than previous times and ranked as a middle power
country. During the early post-war period France seemed incapable of following solid and stable
policies to get its way for most of international issues. However, it is quite important that
starting in the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s France, as a middle power
country, followed completely different policies against U.S. designed international monetary
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system that included aggressively, purposely and systematically converting its dollars holding
into gold that aimed to deplete the stock of the U.S. gold reserves and reduce the capacity of
the U.S. to support its currency in circulation in order to undermine U.S. economic leadership
position in the world. It was important that after many years of steady and consistent effort
France successfully challenged the U.S. leadership role in the international economic regime by
playing a major role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.
In total, this case raises the question that whether the U.S. power was in decline in this
period. According to many power definitions, an economically powerful country has capacity to
make decision that benefit itself, at the same time it has ability to decrease the capacity of other
countries that intend to reduce its benefit and challenge its leadership position (Organski 1968;
Nye 1990; Baldwin 1979; Whalley 2009). However, in this case that did not happen, even though
France’s policies ultimately hurt U.S. interests, and upended the system that constructed by the
U.S. which was the world’s dominant economic power. From that perspective, it can be said that
in the post-industrial world there is no country in the world that has ability to get what it’s want
on every issues. In order words, the U.S.’s inaction against France does not necessarily mean
that the U.S. power was in decline by that time. Following cases would help us to understand
more about this theme.

The Oil Crisis and the Role of Saudi Arabia
Despite major social, economic, political, and cultural differences between Saudi Arabia
and the U.S., these two countries were able to overlook their differences and establish a
mutually beneficial relationship in general. After three decades of struggling, King Abdul Aziz Al
Saud was able to unify the Arabian Peninsula and proclaimed the independence of Saudi Arabia
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in 1932 (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Saudi Arabia, 2020). However, the U.S. at that time had
no interest and had no official representation in this country. On the other hand, King Abdul Aziz
Al Saud (Ibn Saud) was very willing to establish full diplomatic relationship with the U.S. In order
to build stronger relationship, Ibn Saud granted a concession to a U.S. oil company, Standard Oil
of California, to explore for oil in the Saudi Arabian lands (Sorkhabi, 2018). Not even a decade
later, when the rich oil resources were found for the first time in this country, the relationship
between the Saudi Arabia and the U.S. strengthened.
Until WWII, the relationship between these two countries grew gradually. It is important
that during WWII some of Saudi’s oil facilities were bombed by Axis powers, which made Saudis
look for closer relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. by that time began to
realize the importance of oil, more specifically the importance of Saudi oil. The U.S. petroleum
companies by that time urged the president to accept more liability for security and political
stability of Saudi Arabia (Metz, 1992). From that point, in 1945 Saudi’s King Abdul Aziz Al Saud
and the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt met for the first time in their countries’ history. In
this meeting King Abdul Aziz allowed the U.S. military to use Saudis’ air space and also build
airfields in Saudi Arabia in order to protect oil facilities from possible attacks and also secure the
region against Marxists and nationalist/revolutionist movements which posed a direct threat to
the Saudi monarchy (Beauchamp, 2016). Meanwhile due to the threat of communism after the
end of the WWII, the U.S. planned a strategy, containment, that prevent the spread of
communism in many parts of the world included Arabic peninsula. From that point, because of
its important geographic location and its world’s richest oil reserves, the security of Saudi Arabia
became one of the top priorities for the U.S. President Truman formally assured King Ibn Saud
about his country’s political stability and territorial integrity was a primary objective of the U.S.
(U.S. Department of State, Office of Historian, 2020). A few years later, the U.S. expanded their
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initial relationship with Saudis into a more stronger security alliance and signed a mutual
defense assistance agreement in 1951 with Saudi Arabia (U.S. Department of State, 1952: 14601462).
In 1953, King Abdul Aziz died and his son Saud became the new King of Saudis. Meanwhile
President Eisenhower revised the U.S.’s anti-communist alliance strategy. This new anti-Soviet
strategy turned some of the Saudis’ regional rivals and enemies such as Iran and Iraq into
important players for the U.S. Saudis displayed their displeasure with this new strategy by
replacing U.S. forces with pro-Soviet Egyptian forces in the middle of the 1950s. However, a few
years later when the Suez crisis broke out Saudis changed their previous policy and began to
cooperate with the U.S. again. The U.S.’s opposition to the French-British-Israeli plan of seizing
the Suez Canal played important role on Saudis’ decision to improve relationship with the U.S.
King Saud of Saudi Arabia interpreted this policy as the U.S.’s opposition to Israelis plan and
giving the land back to Arabs. However, the U.S.’s real intention of opposing this plan was
because of the high possibility of increasing Soviet influence in this region if Britain-France and
Israel seized the Suez Canal (U.S. National Security Agencies, 1988: 8-12).
At the end of the 1950s Saudis once again approached to pro-Soviet alliance after the
Egypt and Syria united their power to form United Arab Republic in 1958. Nevertheless, few
years later when the Yemeni revolution started, Saudi used anti-revolution policies in order to
curb this movement. King Saud predicted that revolutionary feelings could reach Saudi Arabia if
it succeeded in Yemen (Ferris, 2016). On the other hand, Egypt strongly supported
revolutionists. In the early 1960s, Egyptian forces started to attack Saudi Arabia from its bases in
Yemen due to Saudis anti-revolutionary interventions (Rugh, 2015: 140-141). After these attacks
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Saudi desperately sought the U.S. support. By that time, U.S. responded Saudis’ request urgently
by sending several war planes to the region (Public Broadcasting Service, PBS, 2014).
When the conflict ended before the middle of the 1960s Prince Faisal forced his brother
King Saud to abdicate in his favor to become the new king. King Faisal strongly rejected to have
any relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, except the 1967 Arab oil embargo which
was imposed on some Western countries including the U.S. during and after the third ArabIsraeli war, he established close relationship with the West especially with the U.S. Even though
there were many accusations of his pro-American foreign policies, he continued to cooperate
with the U.S. and remained a strong ally of the U.S. until 1973.
Oil Embargo
In October 1973, Arab oil producing countries led by Saudi Arabia cut their oil production
and imposed an oil embargo against the U.S. and some other western countries in retaliation for
their support to Israel during the Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or Yom
Kippur War. Due to embargo and oil production cuts the average oil price of crude petroleum
first doubled and then quadrupled (from $2.90 per barrel to $11.65) in a few months that
created serious structural challenges to stability of the U.S. economy (Corbett, 2013).

Figure 5 Price of Crude Oil from
1960 to 1976
Source: Federal Reserve Bank
of St Louis, FRED. 2020

This embargo and high oil
prices came as a shock to
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the U.S. Because the October War or Yom Kippur War was not the first war between Arabs and
Israelis and from the same perspective the embargo of 1973 was not the first oil embargo that
was imposed on the U.S. and Western world.
There were three Arab-Israeli wars (first in 1948 when Arab countries attacked Israel after
Israel announced its independence in 1948, second in 1956 when Israel attacked Egypt after
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nassar seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, and finally in
1967 when Israel launched an air strike to Egypt and its allies after years of diplomatic tension
between Israel and Arabs) before the October war and there were four oil crises (first in 1948
during the first Arab-Israel war, second in 1951-53 when Iranian prime minister Mohammed
Mosaddegh nationalized Iranian oil industry, third in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis, and
fourth in 1967 during the third Arab-Israeli war) before the oil crisis of 1973. None of these
initial cases contributed to significant economic setback in the U.S. also in the Western world
like the one in 1973. From that point, it is important to know that this embargo and oil
production cut coincided with many other factors in the U.S. such as declining domestic oil
production, rising oil import, growing dependence on foreign oil, devaluation of the U.S.
currency, rising consumer prices and national debt and declining employment in the U.S. in the
first half of the 1970s and caused the U.S. to experience the worst economic recession in 197375 since the Great Depression.
The effects of the Saudi-led oil embargo of 1973-74 on the U.S. economy were disastrous.
First of all, high oil prices weakened the consumer confidence in the U.S. and made them spend
less on goods and services. On the other hand, due to high oil prices and lower consumer
demand producers reduced their production significantly. In sum, oil embargo decreased U.S.’s
economic growth by approximately 2.5 percent (Verrastro and Caruso, 2013). It is important
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that under the embargo, the Nixon administration extended its wage-price control policy of
1971. An initial 3 months control policy turned into almost 3 years of policy. During this period
companies were forced to keep wages high. Due to high wages companies could not reduce
their production costs. Consequently, they could not lower their prices to stimulate overall
demand. In order to survive companies laid off workers which increased the unemployment
number over 7 percent by that time (Bryan, 2013). In addition to that, government price control,
which planned to maintain oil affordability, created even higher oil shortages in the markets.
When the price control was dismantled the results were devastating. The oil shortage and high
oil prices had widespread effect on commodities throughout the economy which created a
serious inflationary pressure. The consumer price index rose above 10 percent in 1974 (Bryan).
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve tried to control inflation and stimulate economic growth or
decrease unemployment at the same time by using stop-and-go monetary policies. Due to Fed
stop-and-go policies companies in the U.S. lost their confidence for the future. In order to
survive these companies simply reduced their cost by laying off employees which worsening the
overall economy.
Besides that, embargo brought up new challenges to the U.S. designed world economic
and political system. First of all, the embargo led to significant increase in prices of goods and
services in the world. High inflation slowed down the world economic activities. The world
economic growth declined to 4 percent annually after the embargo which was 5.1 percent
before the crisis (The Washington Post, 1978). The rise in the world oil prices created big
account surpluses for oil-exporting countries; however, these surpluses mostly deposited in
Western banks for lending out to oil-importing developing countries in order to finance their
energy imports. High oil prices increased these countries' budget deficit/debt which contributed
to deteriorate their overall economic situation. Eventually these countries aggregated,
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nonaligned movement, in the U.N. and passed a resolution that demanding the creation of a
new international economic order in which included a series of economic reforms such as more
equitable distribution of resources, a greater share of benefits derived from the exploitation of
southern resources, preferred trade agreements with developed countries, a more
comprehensive approach to third world countries’ debt relief and a more sustainable solution
for economic development of the third world countries (Karunanayake, 1976: 111-118). From
that perspective, there was a serious challenge to U.S. designed international economic order
from the Third World Countries. On the other hand, economic downturn also had serious
impacts on developed countries which were highly dependent on export revenues for their
economic growth. Price rise of oil caused a serious inflation of other goods in the world which
led to a low demand for imports by developing countries. Before the embargo and high oil
prices, developed countries’ economic growth was around 6 percent annually; however, after
the embargo it decreased to 4 percent (Giovanni, 2014: 15-16). In addition to that, many
developed countries’ unemployment number severely increased due to high oil prices.
From that point, many countries tried to rise against the embargo and Arabs or more
specifically Saudi’s monopoly over oil; however, by that time they were too reliant on the
imported oil. They felt that high oil prices and oil shortage created a very high level of economic
uncertainty which posed a serious threat to their economic security. The overall situation put
pressure on these countries which later turned into a tension between the U.S. and its allies and
eventually made these countries to reexamine their alliance with the U.S. Most of these
countries believed that the high oil prices and oil shortage in the world was the result of U.S.
pro-Israeli foreign policies (Hughes, 2008: 3-4, 32-34; Licklider, 1988: 216-218). Besides that,
during the oil embargo Saudi-led Arab governments classified Western countries as they support
or oppose to Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and used their policies toward these
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countries accordingly. From that point, in order to get different treatment from oil producing
countries especially from Saudi Arabia some Western countries and Japan reconsidered their
relationship with the U.S. Some of them shifted their policies remarkably and disassociated
themselves from U.S. pro-Israeli foreign policies. For example, Britain refused to allow the U.S.
to use British bases in U.K. and Cyprus for its airlift to resupply Israel (Licklider, 212). Other
European countries also turned down many U.S. requests and distanced themselves from it.
Even Canada after the embargo imposed on some countries, they quickly moved to pro-Arab
position and shifted their voting practices in the U.N. even though their Middle Eastern oil
dependence by that time was extremely low (213-14). It is important that some developed
countries such as Japan moved ahead and almost broke off diplomatic relationship with Israel
(Stork, 1974: 7).
In all, under the embargo many former U.S. allies started to use more independent policies
in order to get friendlier treatment from the oil producing countries. From that point, it is
important that Saudi’s led oil embargo of 1973-74 undermined the U.S. power in terms of
influencing behavior of other countries in line with its own interest. The consequences of this
embargo seriously challenged the U.S. position in the world by undermining the country’s
confidence. It is important that there have been very few events in the U.S. history such as the
Saudi led embargo of 1973-74 that produced deep, significant, and enduring economic, political,
and social consequences both domestically and internationally.
Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Oil Crisis
It is crucial that as an only swing producer of oil (the ability to manipulate the price of oil in
the world market by raising or lowering its own production) by that time Saudi Arabia, which
was believed to be one of the closest U.S. allies in the region, was the leading proponent of the
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1973-74 embargo. This was not the first attempt of the Saudis. After the Six-Day War between
Arab countries and Israel in 1967, Saudi Arabia and some other oil producing Arab countries
imposed an oil embargo to countries that aided Israel (the U.K. and the U.S.). However, due to
the lack of unity among Arab countries, this embargo failed to achieve its objectives and
resulted in the weakening of embargoing countries rather than those embargoed.
The Six-Day War caused severe losses of life and land for the Arab countries. The
expansion of Israel provoked radicalization in many parts of Arab world. The Arab nationalist
Baath party overtook Iraqi government in a military coup in 1968, a leftwing revolution
overthrew a conservative monarchy in Libya in the following year, and the situation in North and
South Yemen continued to be problematic. Arab Nationalist government took the control of
country in South Yemen few months after the Six-Day War which brought revolutionary
movement to Saudi Arabia’s doorstep. It is important that all these revolutionary regimes aimed
to destroy Saudi Arabia’s or King Faisal’s monarchic regime. On the other hand, King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia connected revolutionary movements and states with communism that denies the
existence of God which is the worst sin in the religion of Islam. From that point, right after the
embargo King Faisal remained close to the U.S. for protecting himself and his monarchic regime
from the threats in the region.
King Faisal expanded his defense budget tremendously with the U.S (Sher, 2017: 20). Due
to increased military power King Faisal was able to secure his monarchy from the anti-imperial
nationalist movements that were sweeping the Arab world after the Six-Day War. However, on
the other hand, King Faisal was exasperated by U.S.’s willful ignorance of implementing UN
Resolution 242, which was adopted unanimously by the U.N. Security Council in the aftermath
of the Six-Day War and mandated the return of the Arab territories lost in this war (United
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Nations Security Council, 1967). He believed unless the Arab-Israeli problem was solved, there
would be more wars and more revolutionary movements that seriously threaten his regime in
Saudi Arabia. From that point, he warned the U.S. and tried to get the U.S. to hear his political
demand. Despite that, the U.S. dismissed Faisal’s demand. That ignorance convinced King Faisal
that he had to change his initial policy to a more aggressive policy that include inducing other
countries to wage a war against Israel, and using the “oil weapon” against the U.S. He therefore
agreed to send weapon and hundreds of millions of dollars to Egypt for building a strong military
that able to fight against Israel in the early 1970s. Faisal also thought that with this help he could
draw Egypt’s Anwar Sadat away from Libya’s Qaddafi who also offered help to Egypt. Faisal
believed that Qaddafi is a dangerous man who supports most of the radical revolutionary
movements all around the Middle East. In addition to that, a few months before the Yom Kippur
War, Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal had secretly met with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and
persuaded him to use an oil embargo for punishing Western countries if they supplied weapons
and aided to Israel in the upcoming military conflict. With the assured backing of King Faisal,
Anwar Sadat attacked Israel in October 1973. From that point, it is important that Saudi Arabia
played a major role in events that leading up to the Yom Kippur War which triggered the Oil
Embargo of 1973-74.
When the Arab-Israeli war broke out, U.S. supported Israel against the Arabs and deployed
significant military aid to that country. Due to that Saudis decided to cut all exports to the U.S. In
addition to that, right after the war a coalition of oil producing Arab countries headed by Saudi
Arabia abruptly reduced their oil production as Saudi’s Faisal had promised Anwar Sadat to do
so. Saudi Arabia (with Emirates accounted for 40 percent of the OPEC resources by that time)
alone lowered its oil production by almost 30 percent in October which triggered widespread
speculation in the oil market that led massive oil price rise in the world (Alhaji, 2005: 228). High
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oil prices devastated oil consuming economies, planted distortion between the U.S. and its
Western allies and transferred billions of dollars to Arab oil producing countries particularly
Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia Oil
Revenue (1969-1974)
million dollar
1969
949
1970
1.149
1971
1.944
1972
2.779
1973
4.195
1974
22.375

Table 2 Saudi Arabia Oil Revenue (1969-1974)
Sources: Saudi Arabia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources,
Statistical Survey 1977

It is important that when the U.S. Defense Secretary

mentioned that he wanted to see the oil fields under the U.S. military control, the Saudi Arabia
administration threatened to light fire to all Saudi oil installations and widening the embargo to
the whole world (Alvarez, 2004; Frankel 2004). While many U.S. top officials denounced Saudi’s
use of blackmail, Saudi Arabia on the other hand leveled complete opposition against the U.S.
Months after the war, Saudi Arabia made several contradictory announcements about the
embargo, claiming they agreed to lift it one moment and then postponing their decision the
next; this led to a lot of speculation over oil prices (Sher, 36).
The situation brought important opportunities to Saudi Arabia that they were able to make
money (their oil revenue jumped from $4 billion to over $ 22 billion within a year) and at the
same time they pretended to be resilient defender of Muslim’s right in the region. From that
point the crises and the embargo helped Saudi Arabia to expand its state capacity, modernize its
economy and rise its power to a position that they could play a leadership role in the Middle
East. On the other hand, the U.S. entered a recession not seen since the Great Depression. GDP
plunged 6 percent between 1973 and 1975, unemployment doubled to 8 percent and inflation
rose over 11 percent.
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The embargo threatened not just the stability of the U.S. economy, but the economic and
political sustainability of the entire Western bloc. In that respect, Saudi led oil embargo seriously
weakened country’s confidence and challenged the U.S.’s position in the world which
undermined the ability of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its own
interest.
It is important that Saudi Arabia which was thought to be one of the closest U.S. allies in
the region played a pivotal role for the events that leading up the Yom Kippur War or October
War in 1973. Once the war started Saudi Arabia again played a serious role that deliberately
crashing oil prices and imposing embargo to the U.S. and some other Western countries in order
to inflect damage on their economies. It is important that Saudi Arabia was one of the poorest
countries in the world that craved for establishing relationship with the U.S. when it was
founded in the 1930s. The situation was almost the same in the 1940s. Saudi’s economy was
undeveloped and mostly depended on the revenue that generated from pilgrims who visited
holy cities Mecca and Medina. After Axis Powers’ attacks on Saudi Arabia in the WWII, Saudis
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King decided to grant exceptional concessions to U.S. for exploring oil in his country in order to
build stronger military and political relationships with the U.S. From the same point, when
Egyptian and Yemeni forces attacked Saudi Arabia due to Saudi’s anti-revolutionary polices in
the early 1960s, Saudi’s King desperately sought the U.S. support. In 1963 U.S. government sent
war planes to Saudi Arabia in order to protect the Kingdom from Egyptian and Yemeni assaults.
It is important that almost a decade later the same country played a leading role in the oil crisis
that caused the U.S. have the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. The U.S.
faced similar challenges in the following decade. However, this time, countries that challenged
U.S. leadership role in the world were its closest allies in Europe and Japan.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the U.S. - the European Communities
(EC) – Japan Triangle
In 1947, twenty-three countries, led primarily by the U.S., created the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (World Trade Organization, 1998). The reason for this agreement
was to increase economic recoveries of the countries after WWII by reducing tariffs and
removing non-tariff barriers such as quotas, standards, licenses, and administrative and
technical barriers (WTO). The purpose behind that was to avoid a repeat of the mistakes
(adopting protectionist policies) of the previous decades. It was critical that at the end of WWI,
countries increased non-tariffs barriers and imposed higher tariffs on each other. This was
completely different than the previous period’s trade structure. Before WWI, international trade
relations centered on a network of bilateral trade agreements that also contained the mostfavored-nation (MFN) clause. In this period countries were free to set their tariff rate so long as
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it adhered to the MFN clause. This scheme was able to maintain very low trade barriers along
with very little trade discrimination without any monitoring mechanism (Irvin, 1995: 323-324).
Nevertheless, WWI ruined this scheme. An outbreak of even greater protectionism started
with the world economic downturn in the late 1920s and early 1930s. During this period, the
U.S., despite having a large trade surplus, raised the average tariff on dutiable imports about 20
percent in order to save its domestic industry and protect its own workers (Irving, 2010).
However, this action provoked retaliatory responses from many countries all around the world,
and eventually the combined effect of all these anti-trade policies led to a collapse of

Foreign Trade (1929-1932)
(millions of dollars)
1929
1932 % Change
U.S.
9.788
2.967
-69.7
U.K.
8.956
3.555
-60.3
Germany
6.415
2.471
-61.4
France
4.247
1.945
-54.2

international trade.
Table 3 International Trade from 1929 to 1932
Source: Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, and Thomas G. Barnes,
A History: The European World (Boston, 1966), p.842 and
W.S.and E.S. Woytinsky, World Commerce and Governments
(New York, 1955), p. 48-50.

This situation seriously worsened the economic problems of the countries and contributed to
political conflicts between countries in the second half of the same decade which finally led to
the outbreak of the WWII. After experiencing the heavy cost of protectionist policies for more
than a decade, the U.S. government officials decided to create rule-based liberal trade policies
that reduced trade barriers and increased international trade after the Second World War. The
reason behind that policy was about a belief in the U.S. that said trade binds nation together
and makes war unthinkable (World Trade Organization 2004).
As the prime designer of the GATT, the U.S. played a leadership role by pushing other
countries to keep the GATT moving forward. From that point, first five rounds of GATT
negotiations that covered from Geneva to Dillon (1947-61) were highly dominated by the U.S. In
these rounds the U.S.’s focus was on reducing import barriers in countries where it wanted to
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export. It is important to note that during this period the U.S. was able to convince many
countries that international trade was not a zero-sum game. In that respect, other countries had
no rationale to build national economic barriers that restrict international trade. Besides that,
the U.S. used the trade-off of expanded market access abroad for its exporting industries against
increased market access granted for its home markets to foreign industries (Grossman, 2016:
41). These negotiations mostly occurred between the U.S. and other developed countries. In
other words, in these GATT rounds the U.S. asked other developed countries to reduce their
tariffs. By that time developing countries’ world import and export shares were little. Therefore,
little was asked of them in terms of their own trade liberalizations.

GATT Trade Rounds
Year
1947
1949
1951
1956
1960-1961
1964-1967
1973-1979

1986-1994

Place/name
Geneva
Annecy
Torquay
Geneva
Geneva
Dillon Round
Geneva
Kennedy Round

Subjects covered
Tariffs
Tariffs
Tariffs
Tariffs

Geneva

Tariffs, non-tariff measures, “framework”

Tokyo Round
Geneva

Agreements
Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services,
intellectual property, dispute settlement,
textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO.

Uruguay Round

Countries
23
13
38
26

Tariffs

26

Tariffs and anti-dumping measures

62
102

123

Table 4 GATT Trade Rounds
Source: WTO website, “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh”

Starting with the Kennedy Round of negotiations in the middle of the 1960s through Tokyo
Round in the 1970s and Uruguay Round in the 1980s, more and more countries joined to trade
negotiations. In the Kennedy Round, for example, member countries more than doubled (62
countries). Most of these countries were developing countries that played only a minor role like

89
in previous trade negotiations. Primary concern of the Kennedy Round was further reducing
tariffs in developed countries’ markets. Besides that, this round brought about anti-dumping
measures. Overall the Kennedy Round went well, tariff reductions worth more than $40 billon
(Norwood, 1969: 314). The U.S. was able to demonstrate Washington’s leadership role in
Kennedy Round by organizing, leading and controlling most of trade issues. However, at the end
of the round it became obvious that a more comprehensive perspective was needed for the next
round in order to deal with the emerging challenges such as high economic growth of Japan and
European Community (EC), formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), and EEC’s
protectionist and inward looking policies in some sectors. The Tokyo round in the 1970s
continued the GATT’s efforts to reduce tariffs to a very low level. In this round $33 billion worth
of trade reductions made (Krasner, 1979: 514). However, it is important to note that Tokyo
Round had mixed results for the problems that affecting agriculture and emergency import
measures known as “safeguards.”
Before the Uruguay round, a series of economic recessions in the 1970s and the early
1980s caused high inflation and high unemployment rates in many countries which eventually
made these countries use protectionist economic policies in the following decade. Besides that,
high growth rates in Japan and countries in the European Community (EC) turned these players
into major global traders over the last few decades. It is important that a few decades earlier
these countries lay in ruins at the end of the WWII. Cities and towns in these countries were
devastated by ground battles and aerial bombings. Homes, ports, bridges, railroads, factories
and many other key infrastructures essential to economic commerce were completely
destroyed. Economic cost of the war was also huge for these countries since WWII was the most
expensive war in human history. WWII had taken a huge toll in people lives. It caused 40 million
deaths in Europe alone. Total cost was around 60 million lives in the world (United Nations,
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2010). People who survived from this war in these countries suffered heavily from the shortage
of food, water, fuel and all kinds of consumer products at the end of the war. These countries
basically could not produce enough goods for their people. In total, they were desperately
seeking help for their reconstruction at the end of the war.
From that point, the U.S. started to provide aid to these war-torn countries with various
programs after WWII. From the end of the war to 1952 the U.S. invested $22 billion (over $180
billion after adjusted for inflation) for rebuilding post-war Europe (U.S. News, 2014). Besides
that, the U.S. invested $2.2 billion ($18 billion after adjusted for inflation) in Japan for their
reconstruction efforts (U.S. News). In addition to that, the U.S. opened its market to these
countries for many decades after WWII. Finally, for their security concerns in post-war era the
U.S. stationed hundreds of thousands U.S. troops in these war-torn countries.
After all this U.S. assistance, Europe and Japan reacted favorably to U.S. requests and its
initiated programs in the early GATT negotiations. For example, Japanese government was
submissive in terms of responding to trade actions against Japanese import surges, and agreed
to voluntary export restraints. Rather than resisting the U.S.’s trade restrictions against Japan in
a confrontational manner, the Japanese government generally looked for ways to adjust these
trade restrictions. From the same perspective, in the following decades after the WWII, the EC
major concern was to achieve its post-war construction. After its establishment of EEC at the
end of the 1950s, Europe focused mostly on its integration, pursued an inward-looking approach
for their trade interest, and desired to have as little trade disagreements outside of Europe as
possible. It was also clear that in the post-war period individual European countries were
relatively small and had no power to significantly influence global trade negotiations.
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Nevertheless, this changed dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s. First of all, the
process of EC integration progressed further in Europe. In the 1970s, the U.K, Denmark and
Ireland and in the 1980s Spain, Greece and Portugal joined the EC. It was important that
countries in the EC significantly benefited from this integration. They stimulated their
agricultural and industrial production, increased their trade with other countries, improved their
balance of payments, and promoted their political and economic stability. In total, they
experienced high growth rates in this period.
Figure 7 EU – Japan GDP
(1960-1986)
Source: Derived from FRED,
IMF and World Bank

Meanwhile, Japan also
experienced a rapid
economic growth
through the 1960s, and
70s, and still high in the
1980s. It became clear
in the 1980s that due to
rising economic power and growing importance in the world economy, Japan and EC countries
started to pursue more assertive trade policies in the GATT Uruguay trade negotiation that was
very much different than the approach they had followed in previous periods.
Starting from the 1980s, Japan and the EC supported policies that were mainly focused on
their economic interests in the GATT negotiations which include more aggressive export and
more defensive import policies. Due to that, GATT Uruguay trade negotiations between the U.S.
and Japan and the U.S. and the EC became more tension-ridden. For example, European
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countries started to use strong and increasingly protectionist policies in the 1980s due to serious
recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s. Rather than further liberalizing multilateral trade, these
countries focused on their regional market and restricted their international trade by using nontariff barriers such as unjustified packaging, labelling, and product standards, complex
regulatory environment, unreasonable safety and health regulations and discriminatory rules of
origin in order to preserve their jobs and protect their employees and their sectors from the
U.S., Japan and the newly industrialized countries.
On the other hand, after the turmoil of the crises in the 1970s, the Reagan administration
tried to re-establish the U.S. leadership role in the international economy under the rules of free
trade and free market (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Achieves, 1985). From that point, the
EC’s protective measures and restrictive trade practices strained its relationship with the U.S. in
the GATT Uruguay trade negotiations. In addition to that, the tensions also arose in the GATT
negotiations between the U.S. and the EC over some specific sectors such as agriculture and
steel. In these conflicts, the U.S. aimed to extend world trade principles to these sectors, on the
other side, the EC strongly resisted to U.S.’s request and continued to use agricultural and
industrial subsidies for these sectors.
From the same perspective, after experiencing decades of rapid economic growth, Japan
became one of the major powers in the world in the 1980s. This played significant role on Japan
to transform its submissive and passive trade policy to a more assertive policy against the U.S.
From that point, following the 1970s trade relations between the U.S. and Japan became very
problematic. Japan’s predatory business practices and its industrial policies triggered serious
conflicts between Japan and the U.S. over semiconductor, steel, aerospace, automobile, service
and agriculture sectors.
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In all, it is clear that with their growing importance in the world economy both the EC and
Japan insisted on setting their own economic priorities without considering U.S. designed liberal
economic disciplines. This major policy change was obvious in the Uruguay Round trade
negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s. Contrary to previous trade negotiations, in the
Uruguay Round both the EC and Japan became more assertive for their interest, more
aggressive for their export and more defensive for their import against the U.S. even though
these countries were the closest allies of the U.S. and shared a strong bond of friendship with
the U.S. for decades after WWII. It is quite interesting that only few decades earlier, these
counties were desperately seeking for U.S. assistance following the devastation of WWII. By that
time, the U.S. provided billions of dollars to help finance rebuilding efforts in these countries. In
addition to that, the U.S. was able to force these countries to reduce their tariff and non-tariff
barriers. However, there was a significant change in the Uruguay Round negotiations that these
countries significantly resisted U.S. led trade negotiations. From that perspective, this is another
example that demonstrates the U.S., as the world’s largest economy, had no capacity to coerce,
deter or punish countries that endanger its interest or behave in a way that violate norms, rules,
and principles of U.S. designed world liberal trade principles. In addition to that, this action also
weakened U.S. confidence and challenged its position in the world that undermined the ability
of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its own interest.

World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Relationship between the U.S. and the Developing
Countries
It is important that around the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s, the EC started
to provide a joint leadership for further trade negotiations. From that point, the U.S. and the EC
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had combined their forces and established the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reason of
the establishment of the WTO was because of the weaknesses of the GATT. Starting with the
last decades of the 20th century, the GATT failed to achieve its goals. During this period,
international economic system became more complex after it experienced rapid quantitative
and qualitative changes due to dynamism of the world economy. As a result of that, there were
many issues, fields, and sectors in the world trading system that were not covered by GATT
rules. In addition to that, the GATT was believed to always be in favor of the developed
countries (Page, 2002: 6-7).
It is crucial that 123 countries were participated the Uruguay round trade negotiations and
almost a hundred of them were developing countries; however, developed countries specifically
the U.S. dominated most of the trading process. Even though an increasing number of
developing countries joined round negotiations, they were not powerful participants in the
functioning or governance of the GATT system. For example, most of the developing countries
had comparative advantages in textile, clothing, and agriculture sectors. Therefore, if these
sectors were liberalized under the GATT system then these countries would reap benefits.
However, many times these sectors were not even on the discussion table of GATT and the
major industrial countries particularly the U.S. had no interest in liberalizing these sectors. U.S.’s
focus was on the tariff reduction for the fast-growing industries. With the implementation of
tariff cuts in these sectors, trade among the developed countries significantly increased. In all,
due to the rising trade, developed countries particularly the U.S. experienced an exceptional
rate of economic growth in this period. Meanwhile developing countries were struggling to
protect their infant industries from developed countries’ industries. They criticized the nondiscrimination concept of GATT and asserted that unequal countries can not be treated equally.
They worked for a legal foundation that allow special treatment in their favor. Besides that, they
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were also trying hard to make their voices heard for the issues such as fluctuating commodity
prices, rules on GATT trade negotiations and protectionist policies of the developed countries
(Shukla, 2000: 7). However, most of these efforts were largely ignored by the U.S. and some
other developed countries due to developing countries’ lack of bargaining power. For example,
developed counties pressured developing countries and introduced Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the Uruguay round trade negotiations
(World Trade Organization, 2021). However, developing countries could not able to do the same
for GATT’s Multi-Fiber Agreement which limited imports from the developing countries in order
to protect developed countries’ domestic textile industries. In this case, developing countries
only had little concessions that included gradually dismantling of textile quotas which was
completed in the middle of the 2000s (World Trade Organization, 2020).
It is important that, this situation considerably changed at the end of the 20th century with
the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and the WTO Doha Development Round in
2001. In these negotiations developing countries became more assertive in demanding that
their issues need to be addressed. Some revolutionist developing countries even insisted that
they would not support another round of trade negotiation unless they noticed the negotiation
program included their interests such as reduction of agriculture tariffs and subsides in
developed countries, non-reciprocal market access for manufacturing sectors and finally
protection for their service sectors from powerful counterparts in developed countries (CiminoIsaac, Fefer and Ferguson, 2015: 1-2).
On the other hand, developed countries, particularly the U.S., aimed to increase access to
developing countries’ industrial and service sectors while protecting their agriculture, textile and
clothing sectors from developing countries that have comparative advantages. It is clear that
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countries in the WTO divided between these two diametrically opposed thoughts. The strict
philosophical divergence in the Doha Round was the main reason of deadlock.
After more than a decade from its first meeting, a report from the General Council of the
WTO indicated that after many years of solid multilateral work, countries in the WTO still fail to
narrow down their differences (The New York Times, 2016). That shows that in the
contemporary world there is a shift in balance of trade power with the rise of many emerging
economies. Developing countries now, like Japan and the EC in the 1980s and 1990s, pursued
more assertive and reactionary policies. Unlike previous negotiation rounds from Geneva to
Uruguay, developing countries played a much bigger role in the Doha Round. They set their own
priorities and supported polices that were truly based on their economic interest which aimed
to maintain a fair unemployment rate and protect their jobs and their sectors from the
competition of developed countries. It is fair to say that all these policies limited the capacity of
the U.S. and some other developed countries to shape the WTO and its rules in the 21st century.
In other words, contrary to previous trade rounds, developing countries successfully challenged
the U.S. and other developed countries’ hegemony in Doha Round and pushed these countries
to seek bilateral trade agreements in order to expand their market access. In total, this is
another case that weakened U.S. confidence and ability to control and influence the behavior of
other countries.

Conclusion for the First Part (Case Studies)
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, power is the capacity of a country to
influence another country, or countries, in line with its own interest (Organski, 104). Therefore,
an economically powerful country has the ability to make decisions that benefit itself; at the
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same time reduce the capacity of other countries that aim to threaten its interest or decrease its
freedom of movement. In that respect, scholars believe that the U.S., as the most powerful
country in the world, took a dominant role in the world economy after WWII. With this
dominant role, these scholars state that the U.S. punished countries that threatened its interests
and its special position in the world economy, and, at the same time, rewarded others that built
positive and cooperative relations with it. However, at the end of the first decade of the 21st
century, some (declinist) scholars started to argue that the financial crisis of 2007-09 eroded the
legacy of this success. They think due to the financial crisis there were many power changes that
occurred in the world and these power changes significantly reduced the ability of the U.S. to
set global economic rules, provide solutions for world economic problems and punish some
countries that challenge and reward others that promote its interests. From that point, they
think the U.S. will never experience its dominant position in the world economy that it enjoyed
from WWII to the financial crisis of 2007-09 again.
Nevertheless, after analyzing cases above, this section of the paper finds that contrary to
declinist intellectuals’ argument there is no major difference between U.S.’s economic power
after the financial crisis of 2007-09 and its economic power in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s
and 2000s. Like in the period after the financial crisis of 2007-09, the U.S. was not able to direct
or influence the behavior of other countries in line with its own interest for every economic
(including major) issues in the period before the financial crisis. Therefore, it is important to
make a distinction between declinist intellectuals’ perception of indisputable and undeniable
power like the deities in Greek mythology and actual, tangible exercise of that power, like we
see in the U.S.’s economic influence over other countries in the post-financial crisis world. There
is no country in today’s world and there never was in the past that has/had capacity to get what
it wants on every single economic issue that included even major global economic issues. For
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example; in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s France played a major role in breakdown
of the U.S.’s designed international monetary system, Bretton Woods. It is important that in this
case France, one of the closest allies of the U.S., was in a constant decline. It was in desperate
need of U.S. assistance for both world wars. Its economy was on the verge of collapse before,
during and after WWII. From that point, France, as a middle power country, in this period had
no capacity to follow solid and stable policies to get its way for most of international economic
and political issues. On the other hand, the U.S. rose as a major economic power of the world
around the same time. Nevertheless, it is quite important that not even a decade later, France
pursued completely effective and efficient policy against the U.S.’s designed global monetary
system. French policies (include pulling themselves from the Gold Pool, opposing for creation of
an international currency reserve unit, following uncooperative policies and aggressively and
purposely converting its dollars holding into gold that aimed to deplete U.S. gold reserve)
intended to undermine U.S. economic leadership position in the world. It is crucial that after a
decade of steady and consistent effort, France successfully challenged the U.S. leadership role in
the world by playing a key role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international monetary
system.
From the same perspective, one of the other closest allies of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, played
a similar role for an event in the 1970s that seriously threatened the stability of U.S. economy
and undermined the ability of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its
own interest. It is important that from its independence to the event of Oil Crisis in the 1970s,
Saudi Arabia sought assistance from the U.S. in order to address its economic and security
challenges. For example, Saudis desperately sought the U.S. support when Saudi’s oil facilities
were bombed in WWII and when Egyptian forces attacked Saudi Arabia from Yemen. The U.S.
responded to these and many other Saudis’ requests by sending U.S. troops to the region to
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help maintain order. However, like France a decade ago, Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s started
to play a key role for the events that ultimately hurt U.S. interest and threaten its leadership
position in the world. Saudi Arabia followed policies that made major contributions to the
causes of the Yom Kippur War. Once the war started Saudi Arabia played a pivotal role that
deliberately crashing oil prices and imposing embargo to the U.S. that caused the U.S. to
experience the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. In addition to that Saudiled oil crisis created serious challenges to the U.S. designed world economic and political
system. Many of U.S. allies reexamined their alliance with the U.S. during the oil crisis and
started to pursue more independent policies afterwards. On the other hand, due to worsening
economic conditions of the developing countries in this period there was a serious demand for
the new international economic order. In sum, contrary to declinist intellectuals’ argument the
U.S. in this period had not enough power to get what it wanted on this issue. In other worlds,
the U.S. was not able to influence Saudi Arabia’s policies accordance with its own interest.
U.S. capacity to control policies of other countries was almost the same in the next
decade. After experiencing rapid economic growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, Japan and the
E.C. countries increased their importance in the world economy in the 1980s. It was important
that after WWII, these counties lay in ruins. Cities and towns were all devastated. Homes, roads,
bridges, factories and many key infrastructures were destroyed. They were like France and Saudi
Arabia in the previous cases desperately seeking assistance from the U.S. Therefore, the U.S.
started to rebuild these war-torn countries with various programs. In addition, the U.S. opened
its market to these countries and stationed hundreds of thousand U.S. soldiers in these
countries for their security reason in the post-war period. Meanwhile, these countries acted
favorable to U.S. requests and its initiated programs in the early GATT trade rounds. However,
with their increasing importance in the world economy, these countries started to set their own
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economic priorities without considering U.S.’s requests and its initiated programs. From that
point, contrary to earlier trade negotiations, Japan and the EC countries became more assertive
for their interests, more aggressive for their export and more defensive for their import in the
Uruguay Round. In addition to that, they strongly resisted the U.S.-led GATT trade principles. In
all, this is like previous cases that the U.S., as the world’s most dominant economic power, in the
1980s and early 1990s was not able to punish Japan and EC countries that threaten its interests
and violate rules and principles of U.S. designed world liberal trade principles. From that point,
in opposition to declinists claim the U.S. was not capable of affecting behaviors of other
countries in line with its own interest not only in the post-financial crisis period, but also in the
1980s and early 1990s.
Finally, U.S. power and its ability to influence other countries’ policies did not change that
much in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this period developing countries, like Japan and EC
countries in previous decades, pursued more aggressive policies that challenged U.S.’s interests.
It is important that in the early trade negotiations these countries’ requests were not even in
the GATT’s agenda. In that period, the U.S. had simply no interest in responding to developing
countries’ claims. However, in the late 1990s this situation dramatically changed. Unlike
previous trade negotiations, developing countries set their own priorities and supported policies
that were truly based on their economic interests in the Doha Round trade negotiations.
Developing countries’ assertive, aggressive and reactionary policies in Doha Round significantly
reduce the capacity of developed countries, particularly the U.S., to shape the WTO and its rules
in the 21st century. Ultimately, this case like previous cases that weakened U.S. confidence and
its ability to control and change the behavior of other countries that aimed to threaten its
interest and its freedom of movement.
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After scrutinizing all these cases, it can be said that contrary to declinists’ arguments, the
U.S. was not able to control and influence behavior of other countries in line with its own
interest (even for the most significant world economic issues) not only in the period after the
financial crisis of 2007-09, but also in the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 2000s. In that respect, it can
be said that there is no change on U.S.’s status or power before and after the financial crisis.
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Chapter 6
Economic Power of the United States
Introduction
As this study mentioned earlier, many intellectuals (both declinists and Americanist)
believe that the U.S. was the most economically powerful country in the world after WWII.
These scholars indicate that as the leading economic power of the world, the U.S. produced
around half of the world’s industrial output, supplied almost a third of world total export and
possessed over 70 percent of the world’s total gold reserves in the post-WWII era. However,
starting a few decades after the 1950s some of these scholars (declinists) started to debate
about declining economic power of the U.S. They argued that due to some significant changes in
the U.S or in the world, the U.S. lost a relative share of the world industrial production, trade
and wealth. From that point, they interpret these changes as sure signs of the decline of
American economic power. It is important that the reason why U.S. economic power is in
decline changes for each intellectual. According to some intellectuals, the U.S. power was in
decline because of domestic and international economic policies that were used in the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations. For some, it is because of the financial and economic crisis in the
Nixon and Carter administrations. Some find massive debt and deficit that were created in the
Reagan administration brought the U.S. to its knees. Finally, some contemporary scholars
believe that financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century is the main reason of U.S.
economic power decline. They also argue that the latest decline is something different than
previous economic power declines. They believe the decline is real this time. The overall
discussion made the question of “is U.S. economic power in decline?” necessary to reexamine.
In order to answer that question correctly, properly and efficiently this research study collects
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and scrutinizes different economic power indicators (GDP, consumer price index, debt, saving
and productivity) in the following section.

The Truth About U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth
At the end of the World War II, there was an expectation that due to sharp decline in
defense expenditures the U.S. would go back the days of Great Depression. However, the U.S.
economy experienced a steady economic growth till 1960. The Gross National Product (GNP)
rose from $300 billion in 1950 to $500 billion dollars at the end of the 1950s (Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis, 2019). The GDP average growth rate was more than 4 percent in the 1950s
even though there were negative economic growths in two years in 1954 and in 1958 (Yarrow,
2010: 7).
It is important to know that these figures represent the market value of all goods and
services. Market value depends on output of all goods and services and their respective prices.
From that point, reason of the U.S. GDP growth could be only about price increases in the 1950s.
In order to fix that, real GDP is used. Real GDP is the total value of all goods and services in a
county during a given year (Callen, 2018). In real GDP, prices have been adjusted for inflation
and deflation. Therefore, in real GDP if there is an increase in GDP that definitely means this
particular country produces more output from a year earlier. In order to calculate real GDP,
there is a need for a base year and GDP deflator. The following tables show real GDP of the U.S.
from 1950 to 2018 based on 2010 price index. In terms of real GDP, American economy overall
grew from $2.289 billion in 1950 to $3.178 billion in 1959 which means U.S. GDP increased by
more than 38 percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).
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There were many factors that played significant role on the economic boom in this decade.
First of all, most parts of the world, especially countries that used to be industrialized were
destroyed in WWII. From that point, after the war, these countries struggled very hard to
rebuild themselves. These countries such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and
Japan used to be the potential competitors of the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. benefited a
lot from wartime production. Wartime production not only pulled U.S.’s economy out of
depression, but also helped individuals in the U.S. to accumulated significant amount of
resources during the War. When the war ended, the consumer goods became available to
people who were already very willing to spend for these goods. It is important to mention that
some factors significantly increased customer demands in that period. For example, there was a
new way of spending mentality “buy now and pay later” that created first time in the 1950s
(Constantine, 2017: 14-16). People began to use credit and club cards to buy goods and services.
On the other hand, industries answered these huge consumer’s demands accordingly. With the
advances in science and technology many new products were created in this decade such as
television, dishwashers, washing machine, dryers, vacuum cleaners and air conditioner. Besides
that, construction and automobile industries significantly benefited from huge consumer
demands of the 1950s (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006: 21-26). Many people in the U.S. had
never owned the products mentioned above. President Eisenhower and his administration on
the other hand believed that government has a duty to stimulate economic growth (Public
Broadcasting Service, PBS, 2018). From that perspective U.S. government directly or indirectly
supported stimulus programs such as providing affordable mortgages for members of the
military, constructing interstate highway system, or enacting the new way payment system such
as club and credit cards. Other than providing access to low-interest mortgages, extended G.I.
Bill also gave military veterans affordable access to education and work force which played
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important role on the economic boom in the 1950s. In addition, cheap domestic energy
resources such as oil help industries to produce their products efficiently. Meanwhile, due to the
communism threats in many parts of the world, the U.S. continued to spend billions of dollars
for war supplies which created a huge military-industrial complex in the U.S. Finally, recreation
of international monetary system opened the world markets to U.S. exports. The privileged
status of the U.S in this system helped the U.S. economy to grow faster in this decade.
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The average GDP grew by 3.3 percent each year in this decade. Finally, in nominal term the U.S.
accounted for 38.1 percent of the world GPD and with 2010 prices the U.S. made up 30 percent
of the world GDP in this decade.
In nominal term GDP in 1960 was little bit over $500 billion. At the end of the decade it
became over $ 1 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019; World Bank, 2018). And in real
terms the GDP increased from $3.2 trillion in 1960 to $4.8 trillion in 1969 based on 2010 price
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index (World Bank, 2019). That means U.S. economy grew by little bit more than 50 percent in
this decade. It is crucial that the economy was in recession when the President Kennedy took
the office in 1961. Due to the recession, the GDP growth rate were around 2 percent in the
beginning of the 1960s (Davies et al. 2011). In order to end the recession and stimulate
economic growth Kennedy administration implemented an economic growth and recovery plan
that consisted of increasing government spending with social programs and cutting taxes for
business. These programs seemed to work out; the economy grew by 5 percent over the next
two years (Emmons, 2012). However, president Kennedy believed that the economy needed
additional stimulation packages in order to grow faster. After his assassination government role
in the economy continued to grow. President Johnson used expansive economic programs that
aimed to spread benefit of economy to all society. Federal government spending increased
drastically with his “Great Society” programs. In this period government pumped billions of
dollars into the economy with new programs such as Medicare, Food Stamps, several education
programs, infrastructure and research and development programs. Military spending also
increased dramatically in this period due to funding the Vietnam War and other proxy wars
against communism all around the world. Federal revenues by that time were high enough to
pay all these expenditures. All of these caused GDP growth to rise above 6 percent for few
years. However, at the end of the decade things turned around and economy suffered heavily
from all these large-scale government spending. Meanwhile, government was not able to raise
taxes to pay for the war in Vietnam, the war on poverty and other social programs. From that
point, at the end of the 1960s the economic growth that had flourished in the previous decade
began to wane. The constraints in the international monetary system worsened the overall
situation. In this decade consumer expenditures and government spending had major effects on
overall GDP growth. They made up almost 80 percent of GDP growth (Patton, 2014). The GDP
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growth rate was dropped by almost 3 percent at the end of this decade. However, throughout
the 1960s real GDP growth rate in the U.S. averaged 4.2 percent. The U.S made up 38.5 percent
of the world nominal GDP and in 2010 prices U.S.’s share of the world GDP was 27.1 percent in
this decade.

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

U.S. - World Nominal and Real (2010 Prices) GDP 1960-1969
US (nom) World(nom) percent US(2010) World(2010) percent
542
1369
39.4
3173
11356
27.9
562
1425
39.4
3246
11849
27.4
604
1530
39.5
3444
12499
27.5
637
1648
38.6
3596
13168
27.3
684
1806
37.9
3804
14053
27.1
742
1966
37.7
4048
14825
27.3
813
2133
38.1
4311
15675
27.5
860
2271
37.9
4418
16386
27
941
2451
38.4
4630
17428
26.6
1018
2705
37.6
4774
18500
25.8

Table 5 U.S. –
World Nominal
and Real GDP
(2010
Prices)19601969

Source:
Compiled by
Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis,
BEA and World
Bank current
and 2010 GDP database, U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Michael Roscoe, US
Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank

In the early 1970s GDP growth rate slowed down to 2 percent from its previous rate. In the
middle of the decade U.S. economy had negative growth. Country by that time entered a period
of stagflation. Second half of the decade economic growth rate was little bit better than the first
half. The average GDP growth rate in this decade was around 3 percent. Nominal GDP increased
from $1 trillion at the beginning of the decade to $2.6 trillion in 1979 (U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012: 183). It seemed that there is a fair growth in
GDP; however, that growth included the price hikes of this decade. In real term there was a
moderate U.S. economic growth. U.S. GDP rose from almost $4.7 trillion in 1970 to $6.5 trillion
at the end of the decade with 2010 prices (World Bank, 2018; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis,
2018). The overall economy grew by 36 percent in the 1970s. In other words, the economy
slowed down 15 percentage point from the previous decade. There were many reasons that
could explain that. First of all, the U.S. faced serious economic problems in the 1970s. Some of
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these economic problems were the results of policies that followed by Kennedy and Johnson
administrations. For example, funding the war in Vietnam and social welfare programs created a
situation in the 1970s that increased the inflation and government deficit. Vietnam War
continued till 1975 that increased military spending in the first half of this decade. In addition,
President Nixon maintained and even increased social programs that were created in previous
decade. The war between Israel and Arab countries worsened the overall picture. After the war
the OPEC imposed an embargo to the Western countries which had helped Israel during the
war. Due to the embargo the U.S. faced oil shortages that rapidly raised oil prices first and
increased the prices of everything else later which pushed inflation to record high. In order to
decrease the inflation Nixon administration mandated wage and price controls (Yergin and
Stanislaw, 2008: 60-63). However, wage and price control lowered overall demand in the
markets that slowed down economic growth even further in the U.S. For stimulating growth
Nixon administration aimed to protect domestic industries by imposing tariff on imports.
However, a few months after the imposition of tariff, the Smithsonian agreement was signed
which lifted the import surcharge (Irwin, 2012: 40). Besides that, U.S. companies couldn’t lower
wages due to the power of the Unions; at the same time, they couldn’t raise prices either to be
profitable. One thing was clear that rising import prices slowed economic growth even more. In
all, as it mentioned that the GDP growth rate fell to negative numbers in the middle of the
1970s. Meanwhile Federal Reserve aimed to implement two contradictory objectives in this
decade. At first, Federal Reserve raised its rates to decrease inflation and then lowered their
rates to increase economic growth and employment. But these “stop-go” policies confused
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businesses and mostly worsened the economic growth.
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In sum, U.S. real GDP growth rate averaged 3.2 percent in the 1970s. Like previous decade
consumer and government expenditures were responsible for 80 percent of GDP growth
(Patton, 2014). This was the first time that net export had a negative impact on economic
growth. Finally, the U.S. GDP as a percentage of world GDP declined from 36.2 percent in 1970
to 26.3 percent in 1979. However, in real terms (2010 prices) the decline is just 1 percentage
point. Throughout decade the U.S. represented 23.7 percent of the world GDP.
Crises in the previous decade passed into the 1980s. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s
there were high levels of government spending for the Vietnam War and social programs. On
the other hand, OPEC’s oil embargo and second oil price shock in the second half of the 1970s
pushed oil prices record-high that caused U.S. economy to slow down (Kilian and Vigfusson,
2014: 6). Meanwhile, in this and previous decade European countries and Japan finished
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reconstructing their economies from World War II. They strongly entered into the world market
and gained a big share of world trade.
Export of Goods and Services (2010 Prices) Billion Dollars
U.S.
U.K.
France
Japan Germany
1970
187.6
141.5
95.7
80.1
175.2
1975
262.2
178.9
141.3
124.2
221.3
1980
377.1
219.8
193.4
197
289
1985
383.8
254.9
229
289
373.6

Table 6 Export of Goods and Services from 1970
to 1985
Source: World Bank selected countries export
of goods and services, IMF, OECD trade in

goods and services (2020).

Due to fierce competition and changes in the world economic system, the U.S. lost some its
advantages that it had enjoyed in post-WWII. All of these resulted in decreasing economic
growth more down and increasing prices of goods and services more up. The Federal Reserve
used restrictive monetary policies in order to fight with inflation. The GDP growth rate turned
negative and the U.S. entered into a recession at the beginning of this decade. Due to economic
slowdown the Fed backed off its restrictive monetary policies for a while and then it tried its
second attempt to lower the inflation and expectation of inflation with its more restrictive
policies (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992: 172-184). These policies made U.S. economy enter another
recession which was more serious than earlier one. U.S. economy was decreased by 2 percent in
1982 (Federal Reserve History, 2013). However, this attempt was more successful than the first
attempt. Conditions began to improve at the end of 1983. The U.S.’s economy rebounded and
then grew significantly till 1987 with an average of 4.6 percent. Reasons that explained this
economic turnaround were various. President Reagan’s economic policies “Reagonomics”
played important role on this economic comeback. First of all, he supported the supply-side
economic theory for economic growth. In that theory it is believed that large tax cuts for
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individuals and businesses result in more savings, investment and production which at the end
stimulate overall economic growth (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992: 248-249).
From that point, President Reagan reduced the taxes at first. On the other hand, he
thought the federal government has been too large and too interfering. Failed Keynesian
economic policies in the 1970s played important role on that decision. He cut government
spending on some domestic programs: however, military spending in this period increased
significantly. In addition to that, he reduced regulations that affecting consumers and
businesses.
Other than Reagan administration policies, there were some factors that played important
role on this economic growth. One of them was the falling oil prices. Annual average oil price
dropped from $36-37 at the beginning of the decade to $16-17 dollars in the second half of this
decade (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The sharp decline in oil prices push the
cost of production down and stimulate the economic activities not only in the U.S. but all around
the world. After many years of discussion between Japan and the U.S., Japan agreed to impose
voluntary quota on its products to the U.S.by that time. Besides that, stock market was one of
the key indicators that stimulated the economic growth in that period. The stock market tripled
itself from 1983 to 1987 (White, 2006: 193-195). During this period rising returns of the stock
market created unique opportunities for investors in the U.S. However, stock market later in this
decade suffered heavily when it lost 22 percent of its value in a single day (Carlson, 2017). As a
matter of fact, economic growth continued till the end of the decade. Average annual growth of
real GDP was 3.1 percent in this decade. In nominal term the GDP increased from 2.8 trillion
dollar in 1980 to 5.6 trillion dollars in 1989 and in real term GDP rose from $6.5 trillion to $8.8
trillion during the same period. Overall the U.S. economy grew by 35.9 percent in this decade.
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Consumer expenditure was responsible for almost two-thirds of GDP growth. Investment and
government spending made up the rest. Like previous decades net export had negative impact
on economic growth (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001).
Table 7 U.S. and
World Nominal
and Real GDP
(2010 Prices)
1980-1989
Source: World
nominal and
constant GDP
Collected from
World Bank (from
1980 to 1989),
IMF, and Federal
Reserve Bank of St
Louis; U.S. current
and real GDP
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and
BEA database

In total, the GDP value of the U.S. represented 28.8 percent of the world GDP in this decade.
And in 2010 prices the U.S. made up 23.7 percent of the world GDP which was the same with
previous decade average.
Like the beginning of previous decades, the economy of the U.S. had a relatively poor
performance in the early 1990s. The economy fell into a recession in 1990. The growth rate was
over 1 percent in 1990 but the next year it fell into negative number (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2018). However, starting from 1992 to the end of the decade there was a completely
different scenario. There was a constant economic growth that counted as one of the longest
economic expansion in the U.S. The economy grew by an average of 4 percent per year from
1992 to 1999. Overall U.S. economy grew by 34.6% in this decade. Globalization and technology
played important role on this economic expansion. Globalization by that time dramatically
increased trade between countries. Technological developments, on the other hand, worked as
an engine of 1990s growth. Expansions in the production of important technologies such as
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personal computer, cell phones, software and telecommunication components were the main
drivers of this economic boom. Economic policies also played crucial roles in this growth. Most
of times in this period, legislative and executive branches worked together for adopting the right
economic policies. For instance, government eliminated many regulations in order to give
flexibility for the private firms to function. Discretionary programs such as military spending,
were decreased and resources transferred to other programs such as infrastructure and
research & development that created more jobs encouraged economic growth. (Congressional
Budget Office, 2019: 20-25). The Federal Reserve also played a crucial role for the growth. It
raised interest rates when inflation threatened the economic expansion. On the other side, it
lowered rates in order to stimulate economic activities and growth when there was a risk of
recession. Free-trade zone –NAFTA- was another factor that accelerated trade and economic
activities in the North America by that time (Dixon and Rimmer, 2014: 34). Oil prices fell sharply
in this decade that helped to increase economic activities in the U.S. and in the world. Stock
prices on the other side increased dramatically in the 1990s. It was also one of the key factors
that stimulate the economic expansion by providing funds for investors. Besides that, relatively
peaceful international environment made people more confident for the future of the economy.
The fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communism in the late 1980s expanded trade
and economic opportunities between East and West in the 1990s. Due to all these causes U.S
economy in real term increased from 9 trillion dollars in 1990 to 12.1 trillion dollars in 1999
(World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2018). GDP grew by an average of 3.2
percent per year in this decade. Consumer expenditures made up over 67 percent of GDP
growth. Investment and government spending share were over 15 percent in this decade. Like
previous decade net export had negative impact on GDP growth in the 1990s (Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2001). Finally, the GDP value of the U.S. in the 1990s represented 26.6

114
percent of the world total GDP in nominal terms, and in real terms (2010 prices) U.S. GDP as a
percentage of world GDP averaged 24.3 percent.
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The public in the U.S. was in full of economic confidence at the beginning of the decade.
The U.S GDP for the first time passed 10 trillion dollars in 2000 and GDP growth rate was over 4
percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis). However, in 2001, the first recession of the decade
started. Due to the recession many software firms went to bankrupt. Meanwhile the Federal
Reserve ignored the market and kept the interest rate high which made the cost of borrowing
high. The September 11 attack worsened economic downturn. The stock market closed for
almost a week after the attack. When the market reopened again the shares of the stocks
dramatically fell down. GDP growth dropped from 4.1 percent in 2000 to 1 percent in 2001 (U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004). In order to end the recession and boost the economic
growth Bush administration used expansionary fiscal policies. From that point, Bush
administration cut the taxes and increased the spending. These policies increased consumer
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demand little bit. In addition, Federal Reserve used monetary policies for expanding economic
growth more. The Fed decreased interest rates which made homes, buildings, auto purchases
available. Due to these policies the recession was ended at the end of 2001. However, Bush
administration and Federal Reserve maintained low interest rates till middle of this decade
which contributed one of the most important causes of Great Recession in 2007-09.
There were other events that adversely influence economic growth in this decade.
Hurricane Katrina was one of them. Estimation for the cost of this hurricane was around 180
billion to 250 billion dollars which had serious negative impacts on economic growth (Blanchard,
2008: 1-2). Beside that due to Hurricane Katrina, many oil facilities in the Gulf of Mexico
damaged which caused oil prices to increase. The average annual price of one barrel of crude oil
was $19 dollars in 1999 and a year later it rose up to $30 dollars. The oil prices constantly
increased till the new decade. At the end of the 2000s the average price of oil reached $90 a
barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The sharp increases in oil prices had a
negative impact on the economic growth. On the other hand, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
consumed vast financial resources (over 800 billion spent for two wars) in this decade. From the
same point, Bush administration increased federal spending in areas of health care and
homeland security. All these dramatically raised the federal budget deficit which created
pressure for economic downturn.
In order to encourage consumer spending and economic growth, Bush administration used
more federal spending and enacted larger tax cuts. At the same time Federal Reserve cut
interest rates to historic low. However, due to these policies average home prices in the U.S.
raised continuously. Meanwhile the financial institutions were supplying high-risk and highinterest mortgage loans to consumers who had no ability to make required payments.
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Everything was fine; however, when the housing prices started to decline in 2006 then the
situation turned upside down. People started to default on their loans. Corporations, hedge
funds, mutual funds and many other investors that invested in this field found themselves in
danger. Banks stopped lending to each other. Some big prestigious financial institutions such as
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac filed for bankruptcy. However,
President Bush, congress, treasury secretary and federal reserve chairman agreed to use $700
billion federal funds to bail out troubled financial institutions in order to prevent banking and
financial system from collapsing. Nevertheless, the bailout couldn’t prevent a recession in the
U.S. economy. Stock market fell sharply. The Down Jones Industrial Average lost more than half
of its values (Blumenthal, 2013). On the other hand, financial institutions were unable to lend
money which made businesses unable to pay suppliers and employees. Due to growing
economic uncertainties people stopped spending. The production and trade slowed. Millions of
people lost their job. In sum, GDP fell more than 2 percent at the end of this decade. This crisis
has been the worst and longest financial crisis in the United States since the Great Depression.
The energy, confidence and optimism about economic expansion at the beginning of the decade
completely vanished at the end of decade. The U.S. experienced serious of economic shocks
from beginning to the end of this decade that made this decade maybe the most tumultuous
decade for the U.S.
In total, nominal GDP increased from $10.2 trillion at the beginning of the decade to $14.4
trillion in 2009 (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2018). Real GDP rose from
$12.6 trillion in 2000 to $14.6 trillion at the end of the decade (World Bank). In this decade
consumer expenditure was responsible for 70 percent of GDP growth. Net export’s negative
impact on GDP growth increased almost 5 percent. Government expenditure and investment
contributed 15 and 19 percent to GDP growth. Real GDP grew by 15.8 percent in this decade
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which is the slowest economic growth of the U.S. since WWII. The average GDP growth rate was
1.9 percent in this decade. U.S. GDP represented 27.7 percent of the world GDP in this decade.
And in 2010 constant prices the U.S. made up 24.2 percent of the world GDP which was almost
the same with previous decade average.
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Due to crises in the previous decade the U.S.’s economy bottomed out. The GDP was
around $15-16 trillion in the first half of the 2010s (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). GDP
growth averaged 2 percent during the same period. That means the U.S. economic growth
stayed weak during the Obama administration. There were some reasons behind this sluggish
recovery. First of all, the Great Recession was not an ordinary recession and it hasn’t looked like
any of recession that occurred earlier since Great Depression of 1929. The effect of this
recession was huge. Many households and businesses were not confident about the future of
the economy even years after the shock, so they deferred their spending or investment
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decisions. There were also many uncertainties over financial regulations and taxes that also
curtailed business activities in the U.S. From many perspectives, the fiscal policies were poor.
Government budget cuts stymied economic growth. On the other hand, monetary programs
were also too slow to provide necessary monetary stimulus. Uncertainties in both financial
market and the real economy forced Federal Reserve to used “wait and see” policies many times
which caused a slow recovery. Factors outside of the U.S.’s government and Federal Reserve’s
control such as global and financial crises in Europe and elsewhere lowered the demand for U.S.
products by that time which had negative impact over economic growth in the U.S. Another
factor that had negative impact on economic expansion in the U.S. was high oil prices. Average
crude oil prices in the first half of 2010s remained around $90 dollars (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2018). However, consumer confidence and economic optimism gradually
increased after the first half of this decade. The Trump administration aimed to increase
economic expansion through tax and spending programs (Timiraos, 2017). For fast and strong
economic growth, the administration tried to increase consumer demand and economic
capacity by stimulating investment and supporting labor force participation (Baily, 2018). On the
other hand, Europe and many parts of the world began revive from the financial crises at the
beginning of the 2010s which have positive impacts for the U.S. economic growth. From the
same perspective, the sharp drop in oil prices since 2015 expanded business activity. Overall,
the GDP growth rate in the second half of the 2010s increased by almost 1 percentage point. In
2018 GDP growth rate almost reached 3 percent and in nominal terms the U.S. economy was
over $ 20 trillion which was about $5 trillion more than the 2010’s GDP of $15 trillion. In real
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terms the U.S. had $17.9 trillion economy in 2018. GDP growth rate averaged 2.2 percent from
2010 to 2019.
In this decade consumer expenditure like previous decade is responsible for around 70
percent of GDP growth. Net export’s negative impact on GDP growth passed over 5 percent.
Government expenditure and investment, both contributed between 17 and 18 percent to GDP
growth. In all, in nominal terms U.S. GDP represents 22.9 percent of the world GDP until at the
end of 2018 and in real terms it is 22 percent of the world GDP.
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The Evolution of U.S. Inflation - Consumer Price Index (CPI)
The table below shows annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1950 to 2019. The base
years for this index are 1982-1984. In other words, price of (market basket) consumer goods and
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services is 100 dollars in 1982-1984. From the table, it is clear that except a year at the
beginning of the decade, there was relative price stability in the 1950s even though the U.S.
experienced two recessions. First recession was mostly about the effect of Korean War. After
the Korean War, annual prices of goods and services increased to almost 8 percent which
generated pessimism toward the economy (Achinstein, 1958: 3). Federal Reserve stepped in and
tightened money supply in order to curb the inflation. Inflation slowed down and stayed 0-1
percent for the next four years (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019); however, Fed’s
contradictory monetary policy caused U.S. to enter into another recession in the second half of
the decade which was more intensive than the first one. Besides that, there was a downward
pressure on production which reduced overall economic activities in the U.S. By that time, the
world also suffered from a heavy recession; a strong dollar and a dollar shortage in the
international markets by that time limited not only U.S.’s but also the world’s trade. At the end
of the decade, government increased spending for social programs, military expenditures, and
major infrastructure projects such as Interstate Highway System in order to supply dollars to
markets. However, these policies pulled prices little bit higher. Overall, throughout this decade
the U.S. experienced relatively modest increases in inflation. This was definitely different than
previous decade that the U.S. exposed to sharp inflation and drastic deflation (Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). Due to drastic price changes in previous decade, inflation-deflation
still caused a lot of fear in the minds of policymakers in the 1950s. The total averaged price
change for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $5 in this decade (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). There was 20.7 %
increase for the prices of market basket goods and services. In other word, the U.S. had average
1.9 percent inflation in this decade.
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Recovery from the recession in 1958 was very slow. Besides that, the Federal Reserve
started to tighten monetary policy in 1959 even though the prices of goods and services were
not that high (Bordo and Humpage, 2014: 12). The major reason of this policy was about the
psychology of the Fed’s members. The Fed’s members had experienced high inflation after the
World War II which made them very fearful of any kind of inflationary rise (Reed, 2014). In the
late 1950s and early 1960s they believed that the prices were running high which would create
inflation in the future (Reed). Therefore, they acted to control it by tightening money supply. On
the other hand, in the previous decade there was a dollar shortage in the international markets;
however, starting from the early 1960s this turned into dollar glut that seriously threatened the
Bretton Woods monetary system. In order to protect the dollar-gold exchange system, the U.S.
used restrictive monetary policies. These policies lowered the inflation about 1-2 percent
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). However, it caused a recession at the beginning of the
decade. Recession ended after President Kennedy economic growth and recovery package that
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consisted of twelve measures. The prices were modest, rising at a very slow rate till the middle
of the 1960s. The average annual increase of inflation was 1.3 percent from 1960 to 1965.
During this period, government officials and economic planners implemented policies that
increase economic expansion at the same time limit inflation. From that point, for example, in
order to curb inflation, President Kennedy put pressure on industries and unions to keep wages
and prices down (Raskin, 1986). However, things started to change in the middle of this decade.
From 1965 to end of this decade the prices rose at an increasing rate. Prices of all components
of market basket surged by more than 20 percent. The annual inflation was 4.25 percent during
this period (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis). Many factors played role on this surge. First of all,
President Kennedy and then Johnson aimed to accelerate economic expansion by using
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies which helped the economy grew faster than previous
periods; however, on the other hand these polices created inflationary pressure in the second
half of this decade. President Kennedy performed his twelve measures package include funding
for poor, farmers and disadvantages people. He also created programs that gave medical help
for elderly and aid for inner cities. His successor President Johnson expanded these programs
and added new ones. His “Great Society” programs that included medicare, food stamps,
elementary, secondary and higher education and public work and development programs
dramatically increased federal government spending (Brown-Collier, 1998: 26). Meanwhile
military spending grew drastically due to the Vietnam War. Most of these programs and
spending were funded by deficit spending without raising taxes. Therefore, rising cost of these
programs resulted in domestic inflation. On the other hand, wage and price control started to
break down in the second half of the 1960s which also increased inflationary pressure in the
economy (Bryan 2013). Finally, the constraint of the international monetary system was another
factor that exacerbated economic situation in the U.S. Overall the U.S. experienced high
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inflation in the late 1960s, that means the demand exceeding the supply which mostly the case
in heavily stimulated booming economies. The total amount of price change for the market
basket of consumer goods and services was $7.1 in this decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). That means prices of goods and services increased
23.9 percent in the 1960s. U.S. average annual inflation rate was 2.1 percent in this decade.
At the end of the 1960s the federal budget deficit grew rapidly due to social and economic
programs. Military spending also increased sharply because of the Vietnam War and some proxy
wars against the Soviet Union. Government aimed to close the budget deficit. Federal Reserve
tightened monetary policies by raising interest rate in order to slow down the economy. On the
other hand, Bretton Woods international monetary system by that time was in trouble. In order
to defend the gold standard, the Fed raised rates again. These policies in the early 1970s created
a recession which lasted about a year. However, it was important that even though high interest
rates and recession, prices continued to rise (stagflation) by that time which cannot be
explained by Keynesian economic principles. High inflation, high unemployment rate and high
budget deficit played important role on rising prices in this period. Beside that escalation of the
Vietnam War and taking the U.S. off the gold standard worsened the overall situation. For
turning the trend around, President Nixon imposed wage and price control (Ghizoni, 2013).
However, that didn’t work well. It slowed the rise in prices temporarily. On the other hand, it
caused food and energy shortages that created serious inflationary pressure. In 1973 the first oil
shock arrived. Sharp increase in energy prices pushes prices of goods and services record high.
President Ford’s “Whip Inflation Now (WIN)” program which encouraged thrift also failed (Bryan
2013). The second shock came in the late 1970s. This shock was even bigger than the first. All
components of the CPI soared dramatically. It is crucial that no matter what the recovery
programs were, the prices continued to rise in this period. From that perspective, in terms of
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price stability the 1970s was different than earlier decades. Other than the contributors that
mentioned above, there were also some serious other reasons that played significantly role on
price hike in this decade. First of all, the wage and price control program started to break down
at the end of previous decade. Unions in this period started to have power and with that power
they were able to increase wages. Due to wage increase, the unit cost of output raised which
pushed companies to increase their prices. This is like a spiral that once it’s started, wages and
prices chase each other up and up. In addition to that, expectation about future of the economy
played important role on the creation of wage and price spiral (Yellen, 2006). During the 1970s
workers and investors had expectation for higher prices for the future. This situation created
another spiral in this decade that higher expectation led to higher prices and higher prices
required ever higher expectations. From that point, the impact of tightened monetary policies in
this decade was felt on employment and output instead of prices. Complicated polices that were
used by Federal Reserve confused workers and investors by this period. During this decade the
Fed repeatedly raised its rates to decrease inflation and then lowered their rates to increase
economic growth and decrease unemployment rate. However, these policies (which is called
stop-go policy) created an unpredictable environment in the economy that caused the prices
rise. Besides that, Federal Reserve by that time was very skeptical to use restrictive monetary
policies to control inflation. It was crucial that till the end of this decade curbing inflation was
not a high priority of many politicians and Federal Reserve (Nelson, 2004: 8-9). At the end of the
decade the average price for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $33.8
higher than the price of the same goods and services at the beginning of this decade (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The total increase for the
prices of market basket goods and services was 87% in the 1970s. U.S. average annual inflation
rate increased to 6.5 percent in this decade.
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The early 1980s was the continuation of the 1970s. Prices remained relatively high in the
early 1980s. However, one thing seriously changed which was the policy shift in Federal Reserve.
In this new period Federal Reserve quickly signaled that inflation reduction became the highest
priority of Fed (Medley, 2013). From that point Federal Reserve tightened the monetary policies.
High interest rates caused a recession. Inflation fell down little bit during the recession, but it
was still relatively high (around 10 percent) (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). From
that point, Federal Reserve started to use expansionary policies that reminded investors its stop
and go policies that had used in previous decade. However, Federal Reserve pushed its
tightening policies second time. The Fed started to raise its rates again this time above 15
percent (Sablik, 2013). They kept interest rates high till 1982. The economy entered into another
recession which was more severe and more extended than previous recession. As the recession
worsened government pushed Federal Reserve to loosen monetary policies. However, Federal
Reserve continued to use high interest rates and tight money supply to bring down inflation and
inflation expectations that had created in previous decade. Finally, this persistence paid off and
inflation rate got down to 6 percent in 1982 and 4 percent in 1983 (Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis, 2019). Other than Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policies, declining oil prices by that
time also caused inflation rate to fall. Oil price which was the main contributors to inflation in
the 1970s fell sharply from $37 dollars in 1980 to $15 in 1986 (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2018). This severe drop in oil prices pushed overall inflation down. Therefore,
the inflation was under 2 percent in 1986 (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). However, a
year later energy prices recovered and inflation rate returned to around 4 percent till the rest of
the decade. Throughout the decade the prices of CPI increased from $82.4 to $124 which means
the prices increased by 50.4 percent and first few years of this decade made big part of this
increase (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). It is
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important to know that during this decade inflation dropped from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 4.8
percent in 1989. Finally, the average annual inflation rate was 4.1 percent in the 1980s.
Like previous three decades, there was a recession at the beginning of the decade.
Reasons of this recession were various. First of all, President Reagan’s economic programs
resulted in both an economic expansion and huge budget deficit. Investors at the beginning of
the 1990s started to believe that large U.S. budget deficit might cause a serious inflation in the
future. Beside that a large number of savings and loan institutions in the second half of the
1980s went bankrupt due to the deregulation of this industry in the 1980s (Robinson, 2013). The
collapse of savings and loan institutions negatively impacted the economy. Government spent
billions of dollars in this period to save some of these institutions which placed further strain on
the government budget. On the other hand, the Gulf War increased the price of oil. Due to the
Gulf War energy prices was raised by 20 percent (Lieber, 1992: 163). Inflation rate at the
beginning of the decade stayed around 5 percent which was relatively higher than the rest of
the decade. The Federal Reserve like previous decade focused strongly on its role in promoting
price stability. From that point, the Fed used restrictive monetary policies. When the inflation
rate dropped to 3 percent, this time the Fed used low interest rates in order to protect the U.S.
economy from serious international financial crisis; such as the Mexican Crisis in 1995, the Asian
Financial Crisis in 1997, and the Russian Crisis in 1998 without causing price increases in this
period. Second half of this decade the average annual inflation rate was 2.36 percent (Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis 2019). During this period employment rose, national deficit decreased,
wages increased and inflation fell at the same time. In terms of inflation and prices the decade
of 1990s was an exceptional quiet and stable decade. Except 1990 and 1991, throughout the
decade all-items CPI increased between 1.6 to 3.0 percent per year. Total price of CPI goods and
services increased from $130.7 in 1990 to $166.6 in 1999 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and
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Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). That means the prices grew by 27.4 percent in this
decade. Annual average percentage change in prices was 2.4 percent.
Price stability in the 2000s was very much a continuation of previous decade’s price
change even though the U.S. faced many tumultuous events in this decade such as dot.com
crisis, September 11 terrorist attacks, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and finally Great Recession. It
is important to know that Federal Reserve and its focus on price stability played a major role on
that. Consumers and investors’ confidence for the future of the economy boosted at the
beginning of the decade. However, this created a situation that encouraged excesses, then
these excesses caused bubbles and finally bubbles turned into crisis. That’s known as business or
economic cycle and that’s what started to happen in 2001. Sharp increase in computer and
software industries in the 1990s increased the stock price of many software companies.
Investors bought a lot of shares of these companies without knowing whether they are doing
well. When the computer and software business slowed down “dot.com boom” turned into a
bust which sent the U.S. economy into a recession. Sharp increases in oil prices from $19 in 1999
to over $30 dollar in 2000 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018) and September 11
attack just worsened the recession. Meanwhile, the Fed just ignored the market and raised its
funds rate. This act showed that the Fed was willing to bear recession in order to reduce
inflation in the future. However, after 2002 for the purpose of increasing economic growth,
Bush administration used expansionary fiscal policies and on the other hand, Federal Reserve
lowered the rates and increased money supply. From many points, these policies were the main
factors that contributed to another recession in the second half of the same decade. Due to
easy money policies, house prices rose continuously. Meanwhile, because of the structural
changes in the financial sector in the 1990s and the early 2000s financial institutions were able
to make high-risk and high-interest mortgage loans to consumers who had no ability to make
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required payments (Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2010). Everything seemed under
control; however, things turned around when house prices started to decline. Wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, low consumer confidence and high budget deficit worsened the economic
downturn. Eventually the U.S. entered into the worst economic recession since the Great
Depression. Market basket consumer goods and services remained around 2-3 percent (Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). Meanwhile, oil prices rose dramatically. The average
annual price of one barrel of crude oil was $72 dollars in 2007 and the next year it increased to
$99 dollars a barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). This pulled the CPI rates
little bit up to almost 4 percent. However, in 2009 the price of oil dropped almost by 40 percent
to $61 a barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Low confidence for the future of
economy, low demand and low investment dropped the CPI rates even in negative numbers at
the end of the 2000s. Easy money and easy credit policies could not stimulate overall demand in
this decade. People lost their willing to buy goods and services. Investors lost their enthusiasm
to invest for new projects. This situation created fears in this period that the U.S. might
experience the same thing that Japan had recently suffered in their lost decade (1990s). Overall
all-items CPI grew 24.6 percent throughout the decade. In other words, at the end of the decade
the average price for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $42.3 higher than
the price of the same goods and services at the beginning of this decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). U.S. average annual inflation rate was
2.17 percent in this decade.
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During the recession the Fed and government took many actions such as lowering interest
rates, making regulatory reforms and giving out hundreds of billions of dollars through stimulus
packages. This generated fears in the economy that these policies would lead to a serious
inflation. Despite that fear, after years from the recession the predicted inflation has not
emerged. Economic growth has been slow and inflation has stayed around 2 percent (Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). There were some reasons behind that. First of all,
catastrophic consequences of recession in the U.S. and also in the world prevented consumers
and businesses from spending and investing. Less spending and less investing pulled down the
overall demand and supply of the economy. Investors’ expectation for the future of the
economy is another reason. In the past, it was usual that investors demanded an interest-rate
premium for the risk of inflation. However, since the financial recession investors have been
confident that the Fed will keep the inflation low. Therefore, investors don’t need that premium.
This is the situation exactly opposite from the one in the 1970s. In the 1970s, expectation about
higher inflation led to higher prices and higher prices caused even higher expectation. However,
in the 2010s both consumers and investors don’t have expectation for higher inflation. Due to
the Fed’s success at eradication expectation of inflation, prices remained stable around 2
percent in this decade. Besides that, due to the Fed and government expansionary monetary
and fiscal policies,
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prices of stock and real estates in many cities (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System). It is important that as prices raises their returns decline. That creates a situation in this
decade that there is no incentive to lend or invest for these assets. In other words, expansionary
policies of the Fed and government could not stimulate spending in this period. Finally, the
economy in the U.S. has changed in ways that diminish its capacity in reaction to price changes.
Evolution from more manufacturing economy (more price sensitive) to more financial and
services economy (less price sensitive) create an environment that can only allow a sluggish
growth with price stability. In all, price of the market basket of consumer goods and services
increased from $218 in 2010 to $251.1 in 2018 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). That means prices of goods and services increased 15.2 percent
in the in this decade. All components of CPI increase 1.6 percent annually from 2010 to at the
end of 2018 which means prices of goods and services remained stable.
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The Long Story of U.S. Debt
The U.S. involved with the Korean War in the early 1950s. However, unlike previous wars
in the history the Korean War didn’t significantly increase the deficit. There was an increase in

132
military spending for this period but the debt only grew a small amount. $257 billion dollars
government debt rose to $274 billion debts in the middle of the decade (U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers, 2019). During the same period federal debt as a percentage of GDP fell from
86 percent to 55 percent. In the second half of the 1950s President Eisenhower aimed to
balance the federal budget. From that point, there were surpluses in 1956 and 1957. However,
till the new decade in order to end the recession in the second half of the 1950s and to
stimulate economy growth, President Eisenhower allowed deficit to grow though government
spending. Interest rates were lowered during this period. Meanwhile, people in the U.S. started
to use credit and clubs’ cards which also induced Americans to spend more for the new products
such as televisions, washing machines and air conditioners. In total, the household debt in this
decade rose significantly from $51 billion in 1951 to $141 billion in 1959 (U.S. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). That means household debt as a percentage of
GDP rose from 16.6 percent to 27 percent of GDP. It is essential to know that providing access to
low interest mortgages through GI Bill was one of the main players of this households’
borrowing hike. Besides that, during this time the international monetary system was in serious
trouble. The world at the end of the 1950s was experiencing dollar shortage. Countries in the
Europe and Japan wanted to increase their imports for recovering from war damage; however,
by that time the dollar was the only internationally accepted money. That means these
countries had to have foreign reserves denominated in the U.S. dollar for importing goods and
services (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2017: 49). From that point, the U.S. increased its deficit in
order to provide liquidity to allow these countries’ economies to recover. Throughout the 1950s
federal budget debt grew from $257 billion in 1950 to $288 billion in 1959 (U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers, 2019). It is important to know that strong GDP growth in this decade
compensated the effect of increase in government spending. Therefore, federal budget debt as
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a percentage of GDP decreased from 85.7 percent in 1950s to 55.1 percent in 1959. Average
annual government debt grew by 1.1 percent in this decade. Corporate debt on the other hand,
rose from $70 billion in 1950 to $133 billion in 1959 (U.S. Boards of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2019) which means an average of 6.6 percent increase for each year in this
decade. However, in this decade the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP decreased from 26.6
percent in 1951 to 25.5 percent in 1959. Overall, the total debt increased from $378 billion in
1950 to $562 billion in 1959. Even though total debt rose by 170 billion in this decade, it
declined in ratio-to-GDP. During the 1950s GDP annual growth rate (4.6 percent) was higher
than total debt annual growth rate (4.0 percent). From that point, the ratio of total debt-to-GDP
declined from 126 percent in 1950 to 107 percent in 1959. Finally, at the end of the decade the
U.S. made up over 40 percent of world total debt (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; World
Bank, 2019)
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At the beginning of the 1960s the economy was in recession due to mostly Fed’s monetary
policies. During this period Fed believed that CPI was high that would create serious inflation in
the future. The experiences after WWII played important role on that belief. However, President
Kennedy aimed to growth the economy by increasing government spending and cutting taxes.
From that point, he launched many ambitious programs to help poor and elderly people and
improve education and transportation. On the other hand, relationship between the U.S. and
Soviet Russia became very dangerous by that time. Serious confrontations brought two
countries close to war. In response to that, U.S.’s military spending reached 9 percent of the
GDP (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, 2019). In addition, in the middle
of the 1960s the U.S. engaged in a proxy war in Vietnam which made military spending remain
around 9 percent of GDP (SIPRI). Overall discretionary spending was 12 percent of GDP in this
period (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Meanwhile, President Johnson continued
and expanded Kennedy’s social programs. He also created new programs such as Medicare and
Food Stamps in order to spread the benefits of the U.S. economy to more people. Besides that,
he designed social programs to fight crime and end racial and gender discriminations Thus, in
the second half of the 1960s mandatory expenditure increased by 1 percent to over 5 percent of
GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget). However, these programs had positive effect on
household debt. In previous decade 10.5 percent of annual household growth rate dropped to 7
percent in the 1960s. Throughout the decade household debt rose from $155 billion to $308
billion (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019) and its share of GDP
increased from 28 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1969. It is important to know that during this
period for establishing a presence in the international political and economic environments, the
U.S. maintained a high level of overseas spending. Most of the programs and spending were
funded by deficit spending. After all of these expenditures that included mandatory and
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discretionary expenditures, federal budget debt increased from $290 billion in 1960 to $366
billion in 1969 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). However, like in precious decade
strong GDP growth in this decade led to decline in debt as a percentage of GDP. Government
budget debt as a percentage of GDP declined from 53.6 percent in 1960 to 35.9 percent in 1969.
Annual federal debt increased by 2.3 percent each year in the 1960s. Kennedy and Johnson
administrations fiscal and the Fed monetary policies induced corporations in this decade to
increase their borrowing. During this decade like previous decade they heavily invested in
foreign countries. Their debt grew by 7.8 percent each year in the 1960s reached to $307 billion
in 1969 from $142 billion in 1960 (U.S. Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
2019). Therefore, their debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 26.3 percent at the
beginning of the decade to 30.2 percent at the end of the decade. The total debt rose from over
a half trillion ($588 billion) in 1960 to almost a trillion ($981 billion) in 1969. U.S.’s debt
accounted for 36.2 percent of global debt (World Bank, 2019: Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20).
However, total debt decreased in ratio to GDP. Total debt in this decade fell more than 10
percent from 108.5 percent in 1960 to 96.4 percent in 1969.

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Government
290
293
303
310
316
322
328
340
369
366

U.S. Debt 1960-1969
Corporate Household
142
155
149
166
158
181
169
200
182
220
200
241
225
253
248
271
274
289
307
308

Total
587
608
642
679
718
763
806
859
932
981

and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

GDP
542
562
604
637
684
742
813
860
941
1018

Table 9 U.S. Debt 1960-1969
Source: Derived from U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers
for federal debt and
household debt; Boards of
Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for corporate
debt and nominal GDP from
Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis. For calculating 1960s
household debt, nonprofit
organization and household

136
There were some attempts to lower federal budget deficit at the end of the 1960s. From
that point, Fed raised its interest rates; however, that caused a recession. The budget debt
continued to grow in the 1970s. Kennedy and Johnson administration welfare programs in
previous decade played the major role for government budget deficit. When these programs
were created they consumed less than 1 percent of GDP. However, at the end of the 1960s
more and more people began to benefit from these programs. Their share of GDP rose to 5
percent quickly before the new decade (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2019). These
programs in the 1970s also created government obligations that caused deficit to grow. On the
other hand, the war in Vietnam continued in this decade which generated higher level of
military spending in the first half of this decade. Government budget deficit was $15 billion in
1973, but it dramatically increased to $53 billion in 1975 and $74 billion in 1976 (U.S. Office of
Management and Budget, 2009). The sharp rise in oil prices due to the OPEC embargo was
another main player of this debt. By 1979, federal debt reached almost $830 billion. It was little
bit over $380 billion at the beginning of this decade which means government debt more than
doubled in this decade (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). However, like previous
decades debt as a percentage of GDP decreased from 35.5 percent to 31.6 percent. Moderate
GDP growth (36.8% percent throughout the decade) in the 1970s was the reason of this fall.
Averaged annual federal deficit was over $35 billion dollar and annual government debt
increased by 8.1 percent each year in the 1960s. On the other hand, due to sharp rise on home
mortgage and auto loan in this decade, household debt increased higher and faster than
government debt. In this decade household debt was almost tripled. It rose from $317 billion in
1970 to $890 billion in 1979 which means there was 10.9 percent increase each year in the
1970s (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). Household debt as a
percentage of GDP increased from 29.5 of GDP in 1970 to 33.9 percent at the end of the decade.
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There were many economic, political and social challenges and uncertainties in the 1970s that
undermined the confidence of corporations. On the other hand, the U.S. government expanded
business regulations in this decade in order to defend employee’s and consumers’ right and
protect the environment. In total, businesses held or cancelled their investment projects and lay
off hundreds of thousands of workers. From that point, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP
dropped 1.5 percentage points from 32.8 percent to 31.3 during the 1970s. However, the
amount of corporation debt increased from $352 billion to $820 billion (U.S. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System). The amount of total debt in this decade rose from $1.050 trillion
in 1970 to $2.541 trillion in 1979 and its share as a percentage of GDP decreased just 1 percent
from 97.8 to 96.7 in the same period. U.S. total debt made up a quarter of the world total debt
(Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20).

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

Government
381
408
436
466
484
542
629
706
777
829

U.S. Debt 1970-1979
Corporate Household
352
317
382
338
417
375
472
419
534
460
565
497
595
557
659
644
738
758
822
890

Total
1050
1128
1228
1357
1478
1604
1781
2009
2273
2451

GDP
1073
1165
1279
1425
1545
1685
1873
2082
2352
2627

Table 8 U.S. Debt 1970-1979
Source: Collected from U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers
for federal debt and household
debt, Boards of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System for
corporate debt and nominal
GDP from Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis. For
calculating 1970s household
debt, nonprofit organization
and household and motor
vehicle loans data derived

from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

President Reagan had criticized debt and deficit spending before his presidency. However,
federal budget deficit grew even faster under his administration. In response to serious
recessions in the early 1980s, President Reagan reduced the taxes and increased government
spending to stimulate the economy in an attempt to create growth and incite a recovery.
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Meanwhile, spiraling cost of programs that were created in previous decades such as Medicare,
Medicaid, Food Stamp and Social Security continued in the 1980s. Therefore, mandatory
expenditure increased to over 9 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2019).
In addition to these programs, there was a massive military buildup in this period. From 1982 to
the end of the decade annual defense expenditures remained about 6 percent of GDP (SIPRI,
2019). From that point, the total of discretionary expenditure stayed around almost 10 percent
of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). In order to finance all of these spending
the U.S. faced with higher interest costs. From beginning to the end of this decade the interest
payment rose from 1.9 percent of GDP to 3.0 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and
Budget). President Reagan used several deficit reduction measures; however, to eliminate the
deficit in this decade was unsuccessful. The average federal budget deficit in the 1980s was
more than $150 billion each year (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Government
budget debt increased from $909 billion in 1980 to $2.868 billion in 1989 (U.S. Department of
the Treasury, 2013). In other words, throughout the decade government debt tripled. After
three decades of decline, debt as a percentage of GDP rose due to increases in spending such as
military and social programs and decreases in tax revenues in Reagan administration. The rise
was significant that the debt as a percentage of GDP increased by almost 20 percent from 32%
in 1980 to 51% in 1989. Total federal debt grew by 12.2 percent each year in 1980s. Due to
president Reagan’s expansionary monetary and fiscal policies Americans felt comfortable to
borrow in this decade. Therefore, household debt rose from $1.003 billion in 1980 to $2.465
billion dollars in 1989 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). There was
9.4 percent growth in household debt each year in the 1980s. Household debt as a percentage
of GDP increased from 35.1 percent in 1980 to 43.7 percent in 1989. The situation was the same
for corporate debt. President Reagan believed supply-side economics. Under this approach
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government cuts taxes, lowers interest rates and uses other easy money policies to encourage
businesses for more investment and production. That was exactly what happened in the 1980s.
Due to these policies business debt increased dramatically. The average annual corporate debt
growth rate was 10.4 percent each year. Corporate debt rose from $891 billion in 1980 to
$2.390 trillion in 1989 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). That means
corporate debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 31.2 percent in 1980 to 42.3 percent in the
1989.

Figure 22 U.S. Debt 1980-1989
Source: Collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For calculating 1980s
household debt, nonprofit organization and household and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis

In sum, the total debt rose significantly. It was $2.8 trillion in 1980 and it rose to $7.7 trillion in
ten years. U.S. total debt as a percentage of global debt decreased from 29.5 percent to 25
percent in this decade (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; World Bank, 2019). Annual total debt
growth rate was more than 10 percent (10.6%). Due to this massive debt hike total debt as a
percentage of GDP increased from 98.1 percent in 1980 to 136.9 percent in 1989.
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There were two different scenarios in the 1990s. Taxes were raised and extended by the
Bush administration in the first half of this decade. Despite tax’s hike in this period the federal
budget deficit rose. The annual federal deficit was 200-250 billion dollars from 1990 to 1995
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Government dept as a percentage of GDP rose
from 54 % in 1990 to 64% in 1995. The reasons of this hike were various that included spending
billions of dollars for military and social programs especially in Reagan administration, bailing
out a large number of saving and loan institutions due to financial and deregulations problems
at the end of the 1980s, rising oil prices caused by the Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait, and using
expansionary polices in order to protect the economy from serious international financial crises.
However, in the second half of this decade there was a strong economy and significant budget
surpluses. Federal government in this period decreased the spending growth for discretionary
programs. For example, military budget during this period fell from 5.2 percent to 3 percent of
GDP (SIPRI, 2019). Overall, discretionary expenditures declined from 9 percent to 7 percent of
GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Besides that, steady GDP growth and low
unemployment rate in this period increased government’s revenues. More people had jobs and
income in this decade that generated more tax revenues for government. On the other hand,
reliance in certain mandatory programs fell due to rising income of people. That further
decreased government spending. Due to budget surpluses the level of borrowing decreased in
the second half of the 1990s which caused interest spending to fell. Net interest spending
decreased from 3 percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s (U.S. Office of Management
and Budget, 2019). High spending cuts, strong GDP growth, high revenue increases and low
unemployment rates especially in the second half of the 1990s contributed to the reduction in
the national debt. Government debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 64% in 1995 to 58% ($5.6
trillion) in 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2013). Economic policies and prosperity
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especially in the second half of the decade increased wages and wealth of Americans. Due to
their rising income, people were able to slow down the speed of their household debt. During
this decade household debt as a percentage of GDP did not increase. It remained the same (45%
of GDP). However, its amount rose from $2.705 billion dollars in 1990 to $4.793 billion dollars in
1999 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). That means throughout
the decade annual growth rate of household debt was 5.9 percent each year. Corporations on
the other hand, in this decade heavily invested in technology, particularly in IT. This huge
investment led a dramatic improvement in IT producing sectors. Meanwhile, government
supported corporations with its economic and regulatory policies. Corporations increased their
earnings which made them invest in technology with their resources later in the decade. At the
end of the decade, corporation debt as a percentage of GDP had increased by just 0.6 percent to
43.3 percent. The total corporation debt increased from $2.548 in 1990 to $4.173 trillion in 1999
(U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).

Figure 23 U.S. Debt 1990-1999
Source: Collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis of St Louis. For

142
calculating 1990s household debt, nonprofit organization and household and motor vehicle loans data derived from
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

Total debt rose from $8.459 trillion in 1990 to $14.573 trillion in 1999. During the same period
the ratio of total debt-to-GDP increased from 141.8 percent to 151.4 percent. Finally, the ratio
of U.S. total debt-to-world total debt was 24.5 percent at the end of the 1990s (Mbaye, Badia,
Chae, 2018: 14-20).
The period of budget surpluses ended in 2001 and a completely different era started. In
order to end the recession at the beginning of the decade President Bush used expansionary
fiscal policies that included cutting the taxes and increasing the spending. These policies caused
the debt to grow again. Especially household debt increased significantly during this period.
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack worsened the situation. Due to the attack the economy
stalled which cost government to receive less revenue. On the other hand, this attack
dramatically increased the spending for homeland security. After the attack, the U.S. started the
War on Terror which included wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these significantly pushed
spending to higher levels. During this period the federal debt grew at a rate of $400- $500 billion
per year (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Hurricane Katrina was another tragic
incident that cost about $180 to $250 billion to U.S. economy in the middle of the 2000s
(Blanchard, 2008). Hurricane Katrina and international political and economic crises pushed the
oil prices almost $100 a barrel in the second half of this decade which increased government
spending substantially (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). Government’s
mandatory spending programs in this period also grew noticeably. Spending on Social Security,
Medicare and Medicaid was little bit over 7 percent at the beginning of this decade. However,
less than a decade spending rose over 9 percent of GDP. Total mandatory spending was 14.5
percent of the GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). From the same point,
discretionary expenditures significantly increased and reached almost 9 percent of GDP in this
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decade (U.S. Office of Management and Budget) Toward the end of 2007, the U.S. has entered
into the worst recession since Great Depression. Due to this recession GDP fell dramatically,
many businesses went bankrupt and millions of people lost their job. All these factors sharply
decreased government revenue. On the other hand, federal government used more than $700
billion federal funds to bail out some of businesses. During the recession in order to encourage
economic growth, the government created many stimulus packages. Government agencies such
as Federal Reserve also provided additional programs. On the other hand, spending in existing
programs like unemployment insurance also increased. The cost of all these programs caused
national debt to grow at an unprecedented rate. The growth of federal debt was more than $1
trillion per year at the end of the 2000s which roughly equaled to 10 percent of GDP (U.S.
Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). Throughout the decade the government debt increased
from $5.6 trillion in 2000 to almost $12 trillion in 2009 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers). In
other words, it more than doubled itself in this decade. From that point, federal debt as a
percentage of GDP rose dramatically by 27 percentage points from 55% in 2000 to 82% in 2009.
Annual growth on federal debt was 7.7 percent in the 2000s. On the other hand, household debt
grew significantly, following the same path that federal debt did. Easy money policies such as
lowering interest rate and supplying more money to the system made borrowing costs very
cheap that induced Americans to pick up their borrowing to a record level in this decade. $5.2
trillion U.S. household debt in 2000 grew by 9 percent each year till the end of decade.
Household debt rose to $12.3 trillion in 2009 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2019). During the same period the ratio of household debt-to-GDP increased more than
30 points from 50.9% to 85.5%. Corporations in this decade hold their investment due to
deteriorating economic conditions in the U.S. and also in the world even though government
used expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In the middle of the decade the ratio of
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corporate-debt-to GDP declined from 44.5 percent in 2000 to 39.5 percent. During and after the
financial crisis government aggressively expanded its incentives. Tax breaks, loans and subsidies
were effectively used in order to encourage economic activities. Corporate debt increased till
the end of the decade. It rose to $6.377 trillion at the end of the decade (U.S. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). That means business debt grew 1.8 trillion (3.4
percent each year) in the 2000s. In 2009 corporate debt as a percentage of GDP reached 44
percent. In total, like in the 1980s there was a massive debt accumulation in this decade. The
total amount of debt increased from $16.190 trillion in 2000 to $31.607 trillion in 2009. That
means total debt as a percentage of GDP grew by more than 60 percentage point from 157.9
percent in 2000 to 218.7 percent in 2009. Finally, the U.S. total debt made up 19 percent of the
world total debt (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; Adler and O’Sullivan, 2019: 12).

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

U.S. Debt 2000-2009
Government Corporate Household
5629
4565
5224
5770
4748
5997
6198
4809
6687
6760
4809
7548
7355
4926
8543
7905
5148
9627
8451
5500
11206
8951
6071
12077
9986
6557
12443
11876
6378
12354

Total
15418
16515
17694
19117
20824
22680
25157
27099
28986
30608

GDP
10252
10582
10936
11458
12214
13037
13815
14452
14713
14449

Table 11 U.S. Debt 1970-1979

Source: Derived from Council of
Economic Advisers for federal debt;
Boards of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for corporate and
household debts. Nominal GDP
from Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis. For calculating 2000s
household debt; nonprofit
organization, household and motor
vehicle loans data derived from
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.
Starting from 2001 consumer loans
added to household debt, and starting from 2006 student loans also added to household debt. Both data are collected
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Government continued to cut taxes and increase its spending in order to stimulate the
economy in the early 2010s. These policies kept the federal deficit above $1 trillion till 2013
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2019). Federal debt as a percentage of GDP increased
to 99 percent by this time. After 2012, the deficit gradually brought down to $440 billion dollars
until 2015. Meanwhile, the economy slowly recovered and unemployment declined. The deficit
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started to rise again in the second half of this decade due to president Trump’s tax breaks.
Trump administration, like Reagan administration more than three decades ago, believes that
the tax cuts would pay for themselves through stronger growth and stronger growth would lead
the budget deficit to decline. However, until the end of 2018 there was no sign of strong
economic growth. Besides that, federal debt increased to over 100 percent of GDP. It is
important that, in the second half of the 2010s President Trump keeps military budget almost
the same. Therefore, discretionary spending averaged over 7 percent. On the other hand,
spending for domestic programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare increased.
Overall, the mandatory expenditures rose to almost 13 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of
Management and Budget). It is crucial that all these spending caused interest on the national
debt to rise which increased the cost of financing the debt. In sum, federal debt increased from
$13.5 trillion in 2010 to over $21 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). In
other words, the federal debt as a percentage of GDP grew by 15 points from 90 percent in 2010
to 105 percent in 2019. Average annual debt growth rate was 5.3 percent in the 2010s. On the
other hand, household in this decade still taking advantages of low-interest rate environment;
however, total amount of household debt rises slower than in the previous decade. It is clear
that highly indebted households in previous decade do not spend the way they used to even
though all interest rates remain historically low. From that point household debt as a
percentage of GDP decreases 15 points from 82 percent in 2010to 67 percent in 2018. Total
amount of household debt in this decade grew by 1.2 percent each year. It rose from $12.3
trillion in 2010 to $13.7 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
2019). Meanwhile, some economic uncertainties in the previous decade were reduced a few
years after the financial crises which had a positive effect on business confidence in the 2010s.
Due to rising business confidence and future expectations, corporations started to invest again
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in this decade. Ultra-low interest rates, easy borrowing terms and broadly improving economic
conditions play important role on corporations’ investment decisions. From that point,
corporations boosted their debt at 5% annual pace in this decade. Total corporation debt
increased from $6.117 trillion in 2010 to $9.484 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System). The ratio of corporation debt-to-GDP rose from 40.8 percent in 2010
to 46.3 percent in 2018. The total debt increased from $31.923 trillion in 2010 to $44.638 trillion
in 2018. The ratio of total debt-to-GDP rose from 212.9 percent in 2010 to 217.8 percent in
2018. In all, U.S. total debt accounted for 18 percent of the world total debt (Adler and
O’Sullivan, 2019:12).

U.S. Debt 2000-2018
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Figure 24 U.S. Debt 2000-2018
Source: Derived from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For calculating 2010s
household debt; nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve Bank of
St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans added to household debt, and starting from 2006 student loans also
added to household debt. Both data are collected from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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U.S. Federal, Household and Corporate Debt as % of GDP
1950-2018
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Figure 25 U.S. Federal, Household and Corporate Debt as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Data derived from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for corporate and household debts; Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis of St Louis. For
calculating household debt from 1950 to 2001, nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data are
used which are derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans such as credit card
debt added to household debt. Starting from 2006 student loans added to household debt. Both data are collected
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Percent of Growth Rate
Government Household
1.1
10.7
2.3
7
8.1
10.9
12.2
9.4
5.7
5.8
7.7
9
5.3
1.2

Corporate
6.6
7.8
8.8
10.4
5.1
3.4
5

U.S. Debt as % of Global Debt
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Table 12 U.S. Debt Growth Rate. Figure 26 U.S. Debt as Percentage of World Debt
Source: Table 12, the data is collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System for corporate and household debts. Figure 26, data derived from Michael Roscoe, US Federal
Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and IMF (2018): Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018.
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U.S. Total Debt, as % of GDP 1950-2018
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Figure 27 U.S. Total Debt as Percentage of GDP from 1950 to 2018
Source: Data collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for corporate and household debts; Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.

Saving Trends of the United States
Two decades from 1950 to 1970, the U.S. was in a period of stability in terms of saving
rate. The U.S. gross saving rate as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) averaged 22.1
percent in 1950s and 22.9 percent in 1960s (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). The personal
or household saving made almost 40 percent of the total saving in this period (8.4 percent in
1950s and 8.6 percent in 1960s) (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). Households’ accumulation
of resources during and after the WWII played significant role on high personal or household
saving rate. Besides that, experiences of serious economic shocks since Great Depression made
people in the U.S. more likely to save for the future days in the post-WWII period. It is also
important that, starting from the second half of the 1960s there was a housing boom as babyboomers started to build their own household (Munnell and Cook, 1991: 17-18). This is another
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reason that explained high household saving rates in this period. Finally, rising household
income in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s substantially increased household saving rates.
On the other hand, corporations’ saving was also high in this period. Average corporate saving
rate was 10.3 percent in 1950s and 11.2 percent in the 1960s (Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2015). U.S. corporations in this period were very profitable due to lack of competition from
corporations in foreign countries. Many potential international competitors of U.S. corporations
by that time were struggling hard to recover themselves from WWII. Government saving rate
was 3.5 percent in the 1950 and 3.6 percent in the 1960s (Kliesen, 2005: 6). Government’s
expansionary economic policies, its military expenses and its spiraling cost of social programs
from education to health care were the main reasons of this low level of saving. Non-resident
saving in the 1950s was -0.1 percent and in the 1960s it was -0.6 percent (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2015). In all, total saving before the non-resident’s contribution was 22.2 percent of
GNI in 1950s and 23.4 percent of GNI in the 1960s. After non-resident’s contribution total saving
was 22.1 percent of GNI in the 1950s and 22.8 percent of GNI in the 1960s. In terms of GDP,
gross saving in the 1950s was 20.8 percent of GDP and in the 1960s it was 21.6 percent of GDP
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015).
Government saving rates declined in the 1970s. The Vietnam War, social welfare
programs, oil shocks and recession in this decade significantly reduced government saving. It is
also important that, in the early post-WWII period government branches tended to run budget
surpluses; however, in the 1970s government’ s tendency toward budget surpluses changed. In
this period, there was a mood in the government that was okay with having low level of budget
surpluses or even budget deficit. Therefore, in the 1970s government saving significantly
declined and averaged 0.5 percent of GNI (Kliesen, 2005: 6). Corporate saving rates which had
slightly increased past two decades continued to rise moderately in this decade. Corporate
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saving contributed 11.6 percent per year to total national saving (Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2015). On the other hand, household saving as a percentage of disposable income increased by
1 percent to 9.6 percent of GNI per year in the 1970s (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Economic
conditions and prediction about the future of the economy played important role on household
saving rates in this period. In addition to that, Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ social
policies were continued and even increased by Nixon administration that also played positive
role on household savings in this period. Finally, baby-boomers’ housing boom continued in this
decade which was another reason of the rise in household saving in the 1970s. In sum, U.S.
gross saving rate averaged 21.7 percent of GNI in this decade. After non-resident’s contribution
total saving in the 1970s was 21.6 percent of GNI. Finally, total saving averaged 22.5 percent of
GDP (World Bank, 2019).
Due to government spending policies in the 1980s, the effect of oil shocks and recessions
in the first half of the decade government saving rates continued to decline. Government saving
rate turned to negative numbers as deficit rose. On the other hand, after Reagan
administration’s business friendly policies, corporate saving rates slightly increased and
averaged 12.4 percent in the 1980s (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). It is essential that
starting from this decade business saving became the main component of gross saving. On the
other hand, household saving rate increased slightly in the first half of the 1980s and then
decreased steadily to below 8 percent in the second half of this decade. It is important that
housing boom in previous decades significantly increased real-estate prices in the U.S. Due to
rising house prices, many households in the 1980s significantly increased their capital gain from
their houses. However, later in the decade this situation caused household to reduce their
saving (Munnell and Cook). People in this decade also reduced their pension saving due to some
regulatory issues. Overall, household saving averaged 8.4 percent of GNI per year in the 1980s
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(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). After non-resident’s (1.6 percent) contribution total saving
averaged 22.2 percent of GNI and 22.5 percent of GDP in the 1980s (Bureau of Economic
Analysis; World Bank, 2019).
Government saving rate in the first half of the 1990s continued to decline. However, in the
second half government saving rate turned into positive numbers and climbed up almost 3% at
the end of the decade. On the other hand, household saving rate continued to fell sharply. It is
important that like government’s experience in two decades earlier, the household felt ok with
having low level of saving in this period. The average 7.4 percent of household saving in the first
half of the 1990s declined to 5.9 percent in the second half of this decade (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2015). The drop in household saving increased the importance of corporate saving
rates. During this period there was a sharp increase in investment for computer,
telecommunication and software technologies. Due to these investments, companies
significantly raised their productivity and then their profitability. In addition to that,
globalization in this period increased the trade between the U.S. and rest of the world. In sum,
corporations were able to keep their saving rate around 11-12 percent of GNI (Bureau of
Economic Analysis, 2019). After non-residents (1.4 percent) contribution, gross saving rate in the
1990s averaged 20.4 percent of GNI and 20.3 percent of GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis;
World Bank, 2019).
Government saving averaged 2% in the early 2000s; however, government monetary and
fiscal policies and its persistent budget deficit due to Hurricane Katrina and wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan especially in the second half the decade drastically reduce government saving to
negative 7.7 percent of GNI in 2009. Overall government saving rate was -1.1 percent of GNI in
the 2000s (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019). On the other hand, dramatic decline in
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household saving rates continued in this decade. Gross household saving declined to 5.5 percent
in the first half of this decade, and rose to 6 percent of GNI in the second half of the decade
(Bureau of Economic Analysis). It is important that corporate saving was above 12 percent of
GNI throughout the decade. From that point, corporate saving played a role in this decade that
offset the reduction in household and government saving. In order words, relatively high level of
corporate saving somewhat compensated the effect of decrease in government and household
savings in this period. Overall, after (4.4 percent) non-resident’s contribution total saving was
21.5 percent of GNI in the 2000s (Bureau of Economic Analysis). In GDP terms total saving was
17.6 percent in the 2000s (World Bank, 2019).
Governments’ generous tax cuts and its various economic recovery packages in the 2010s
substantially decreased government saving. In addition to that, government’s mandatory and
discretionary expenditures (over 20 percent of GDP) also played important role on low level of
government saving in this period. In total, government saving rate averaged -3.6 percent of GNI
from 2010 to 2018 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). Household saving climbed up to almost
8 percent of GNI in the first half of the decade and then it declined. It is averaged 5.9 percent of
GNI (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Like previous decades low level of government and
household saving rates increased the importance of corporate saving. Business or corporate
saving rate was strong in this decade. It averaged over 15 percent of GNI which is almost 3
percentage point higher than previous decade’s average (Bureau of Economic Analysis). From
that point, like previous decade corporate saving in this period significantly helped to balance
the downward trends of household and government savings. It is important that, this is not the
case for only the U.S. Many countries, especially developed countries, all around the world have
shifted their composition of national saving away from household and government savings
toward corporation saving for more than two decades. For example, most of the industrial
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counties’ corporate saving rates were around 10 percent of GNI and most of these countries’
investment was funded by their household and government savings in the 1980s; however, in
the 2010s these countries’ corporate saving rates increase over 15 percent and two-thirds of
their gross investment is funded by their corporate saving (Chen, Karabarbounis and Neiman:
2017: 1-3). After non-residents (2.5 percent) contribution, gross saving rate in the 2010s
averaged 20.1 percent of GNI and 17.1 percent of GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis; World
Bank, 2019).

Saving Rates in the United States
Household Government Corporate
Total
8.4
3.5
10.3
22.2
8.6
3.6
11.2
23.4
9.6
0.5
11.6
21.7
8.4
-0.2
12.4
20.6
6.7
0.5
11.8
19
5.8
-1.1
12.4
17.1
5.9
-3.6
15.3
17.6

1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Nonresident
-0.1
-0.6
-0.1
1.6
1.4
4.4
2.5

Total
22.1
22.8
21.6
22.2
20.4
21.5
20.1

Table 13 Household, Government, Corporate and Nonresident Saving Rate in the U.S.
Source: Household, Government and Corporate savings data collected from various sources of Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Minneapolis, Dallas, San Francisco, Richmond
and Boston. Gross National Saving data are derived from World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), White
House archives and Federal Reserve Banks publications.
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Fluctuation in U.S. Productivity
After the World War II U.S. productivity in the private nonfarm business sector rose
steadily. Several factors played important role on this expansion. First of all, advances in
productive knowledge, cost-reducing technological innovation and commercialization of these
technological innovations increased productivity in the 1950s. It was important that all these
technological progresses came from organized research and development (R&D) programs. Due
to these programs many new industries were created such as jet engine, plastic and electronics
industries. Besides that, there were many newly created consumers appliance products such as
air conditioning, television, washing machine and dishwasher. All of these created strong
efficiency gains in the U.S. throughout the decade. Other than efficiency gains, there were also
capital-deepening. Businesses in this decade invested in more machinery and equipment which
made employees produce more products in each hour they work. On the other hand, there
were many changes in quality of labor. Increase in the average education and training of the
employees raised productivity significantly in this period. Finally investing in public capital also
improved productivity. During this decade substantial amount of investment in
telecommunication, electricity and transportation networks such as highways and ports
increased productivity of the corporations. In sum, total factor productivity grew at 1.4 percent
(with 2011 constant national prices) per year while labor productivity grew at a 2.8 percent
(University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014).
Productivity growth in the 1960s was the continuation of the previous decade. The growth
rate fell by almost half percent for total factor productivity in the 1960s (2011 constant national
prices). Like previous decade a great deal of productivity growth continued to come from
technological knowledge. Technological knowledge and diffusion of this knowledge to new
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industries improved productivity remarkably until the mid-1960s. On the other hand, during this
period corporations reached new local, national and international markets with the investment
in transportation and telecommunication networks. All of these helped corporations to achieve
economies of scale. Corporations significantly lowered their cost of production with the
advantages of economies of scale in the 1960s. It is also important that during his inaugural
address President Kennedy spoke his famous words, "ask not what your country can do for you,
ask what you can do for your country” (JFK Presidential Library and Museum, 2020). After this
speech, President Kennedy was able to put pressure on industries and unions to keep wages
down. This was another important factor that allowed corporation to lower their cost of
production. Besides that, corporations in this decade entered into a period of consolidation.
Many corporations merged and created stronger institutions such as ITT Corporation, Litton
Industries, Textron, and LTV (Ling Temco-Vough) (Dean, 1970: 17). These institutions increased
their capital investment which resulted in a growth of the capital-labor ratios. The surge in the
rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio increased the productivity growth. From 1960 to 1966
the average annual labor productivity growth rate was 3.1 percent. However, productivity
slowdown started at the end of 1966 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). Annual productivity
growth dropped to 1.87 percent per year from 1967 to 1970 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Overall labor productivity grew by 2.7 percent and total factor productivity 1.0 percent (with
2011 prices) per year in the 1960s (University of Groningen and University of California, Davis,
2019; Sprague, 2014).
The productivity slowdown started in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s it
continued to decline. The rate of labor productivity averaged 2.0 percent and total factor
productivity 0.1 per cent (2011 prices) per year in this decade (University of Groningen and
University of California, Davis, 2019; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). There were several
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factors that were responsible for productivity slowdown in this period. First of all, the capitallabor ratios decreased due to companies’ low rates of investments (Giandrea and Sprague,
2017). The reduction in the capital-labor ratio reduced the growth of productivity. Second of all,
in this period government increased its rules and regulations over businesses. New types of
environmental and safety regulations were created. In order to meet these rules and
regulations, companies used more of their resources which resulted in a reduction in
productivity. The energy crises significantly lowered productivity growth. The price of oil
quadrupled in this decade. Due to high oil prices, companies delayed their investment and
slowed down their business’ activities. Research and development (R&D) expenditures
decreased from 3 percent to almost 2 percent in the middle of this decade (Congressional
Budget Office, 2005: 3-5). Decrease in R&D spending negatively affected productivity in this
period. On the other hand, in the 1960s and the 1970s European countries and Japan finished
reconstructing their economies from World War II. They strongly entered into the world market
and gained a big share of world trade due to their scientific and technological changes.
Meanwhile, the U.S. was experiencing an exhaustion of the post-World War II technological
boom. From that perspective, there was a depletion of investment opportunities in this decade
in the U.S. Finally, changes in labor demographics also played a significant role on declining
productivity growth in this era. In the 1970s inexperienced young baby boomers and women
entered into the labor force, while more productive and highly experienced older generation
exiting the workforce (Dohm, 2000: 17). All of these factors caused a significant slowdown of
total factor and labor productivity in the 1970s.
Labor productivity growth in the 1980s was not very different from the previous decade. It
rose by an average of 1.5 percent per year which was just 0.4 percent below the annual average
of previous decade (Giandrea and Sprague, 2017). Total factor productivity on the other hand,
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grew by 0.5 percent from previous decade’s rate to 0.6 in the 1980s (2011 prices) (University of
Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). The
first and second oil shocks of previous decade and the recession of 1980-82 were the major
contributors to low productivity in this decade. Besides that, depletion of investment
opportunities still had negativity effect on productivity growth. Some industries such as
telecommunication, electric-utility, automobile and computer, unsuccessfully tried to extend
the ongoing exploitation of economies of scale (Shackleton, 2013: 11). However, they were not
successful. Their failed attempts actually led to reduced productivity. In order to increase
productivity in this decade companies got involved in the process of corporate restructuring,
downsizing and reengineering. However, predicted outcomes could not be gained in this
decade. It is also essential to know that depletion of earnings from the expansion of
transportation and communication networks also played important role on productivity
slowdown in this decade. Finally, a significant decline in non-military research and development
programs in the 1980s was another factor that contributed to productivity slowdown (Eiseman,
Koizumi and Fossum, 2002: 4).
There were two completely different periods in the 1990s. The first half of this decade was
the continuation of previous decade. The labor productivity in the private nonfarm business
sector grew at a 1.7 percent per year in this period which was not much above the last two
decades rates (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). However, in the second half productivity
grew rapidly, averaging 2.4 percent per year (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Factors such as
capital deepening, efficiency gains and increase in skill drove a dramatic improvement in
productivity growth that started in 1996. First of all, there was a massive increase in the quality
and quantity of capital stock that contributed a lot to productivity growth. This surge was not
only about an increase in the number of machines that used for production, it was also about
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large quality improvements. It is important to know that many of these improvements were
because of the revolution in information technology (IT). In this period there was a rapid
investment in information technology (IT). The investment for IT increased from 3 percent of
GDP in 1991 to 5 percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s (Gorman, 2001). This huge investment
led to rapid improvement in the information-technology-producing sectors. Overall the growth
of IT improved the efficiency of businesses in production that helped to increase productivity.
Meanwhile, the prices of IT products fell rapidly. Due to declining prices, producers and sellers
of IT products had a positive supply shock. This also had positive impact on productivity growth
in the second half of this decade. On the other hand, companies by that time obtained a lot help
from their’- reengineering (adopting new techniques such as just-in-time deliveries, and crosstraining of employees), downsizing (laying off unproductive employees), and restructuring
(improving corporations’ financial, legal and operational structures) attempts that had started in
the previous decade. With this help in the second half of the 1990s companies used their
resources better. During this period, it is also important to know that employees who took
classes and leant how to use computer and IT systems increased their skills which result in
boosting their productivity. In addition to that, increased rates of college attendance in this
decade was one of the other sources that raised productivity. Low oil prices on the other hand
permitted companies to invest heavily in IT which was another factor that accelerate
productivity in the 1990s. In sum, total factor productivity grew at 0.8 percent while labor
productivity grew at a 2.1 percent per year in the 1990s (University of Groningen and University
of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).
IT fueled productivity growth lasted through the middle of the 2000. In the first half of the
2000s annual average labor productivity was 3.4 percent and total factor productivity was 1.2
percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019; University of Groningen and University of
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California, Davis, 2019). After 2004-05 the contribution of information technology to
productivity growth became much less important. The productivity growth dropped below 2
percent in the middle of the decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). The financial crisis of
2007-09 and high oil prices in the second half of the decade discouraged business owners to do
investment. During this period gross domestic investment as a share of GDP fell its lowest level
(13.4 percent) since World War II (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). The lack of investment
first decreased the demand and then productive capacity of the U.S. in the 2000s. Both factors
in this period were major contributors to low level of productivity. In total, annual productivity
growth dropped to 1.9 percent per year in the second half of the 2000s. Overall labor
productivity grew by 2.7 percent annually and total factor productivity 0.7 percent per year in
this decade. (University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014;
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).
The sluggish economic growth after the recession lowered the productivity growth in
2010s. The growth rate mostly remained under 1 percent in this decade. Forces that caused
weak GDP growth (2-3 percent) and low level of investment (16-17 percent) (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2020) were the key factors on low productivity growth in this period. On the
other hand, recent technological advances could not drive strong productivity growth in the
2010s. In this era, it is very difficult to improve labors’ skill by increasing their educational
attainment when most of the workers already have at least a high school or college degrees.
From the same point, it is also very difficult to boost productivity by expanding transportation
and communication networks as in the past decades that cannot be repeated. These are mostly
one-time sources that already boosted productivity in the past decades. Finally, it is important
that trade and investment increase competition and productivity growth. However, since
financial crises in 2007-09 the U.S. in many cases shut down its borders and in the Trump
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administration the U.S. lunched trade wars with many countries. This was another factor that
slowed down the productivity in this decade. In sum, from 2010 to 2018 the average annual
labor productivity rate dropped to 1.1 percent from 2.7 in previous decade. During the same
period total factor productivity rate also dropped to 0.5 percent per year (University of
Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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Figure 29 U.S. Labor Productivity Nonfarm Business and Total Factor Productivity from 1950 to 2018
Source: Labor Productivity Data is collected (various years) from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total Factor
Productivity is derived from (various years) from University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis and various years from Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Figure 30 U.S. Real GDP, Labor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity by Decade
Source: Real GDP data collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and BEA database, Labor Productivity data
collected (various years) from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total Factor Productivity derived from (various years)
from University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and various years
from Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Conclusion for the Second Part (Economic Power of the U.S.)
Before analyzing the findings of this section there are some key points that need to be
considered. As it was mentioned earlier that U.S. economic power has been hotly debated by
many intellectuals for decades. In these debates some of intellectuals strongly argue that U.S
economic power is in decline. However, the reason for the decline of U.S. economic power
changes for each of these scholars. Massive expenditures in the Kennedy and Johnson
administration, economic crises in the Nixon and Carter administration, huge debt and deficit in
the Reagan administration and weak neoliberal economic policies and financial crisis in the Bush
administration are just some of these reasons that have been used by these scholars
interchangeably. It is crucial that even though intellectuals use different reasoning in their
studies, they all conclude their analysis with the statement that says it seems impossible for the
U.S. to regain its global economic leadership in the world that it had enjoyed in the early postwar period. However, how accurate can a research study be if any intellectual takes early postwar period as a base era? In other words, is comparing U.S. economy in the post-war period
with U.S. economy any time after that the right way of analyzing the question of “is U.S.
economic power in decline”?
It is a well-known fact that WWII was one of the most important events not only in the
20th century but also in entire human history. WWII was the greatest and deadliest war in the
history. Around 60 million people were killed through six years of ground battles and aerial
bombardments. Many cities and towns laid in ruin at the end of the war. Industrial, agricultural
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and transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, tunnels, ports, airports, and railways) had
been destroyed. Millions of people were forced to abandon their houses and to move on to new
lands. Poverty and hunger became common problems even in Western European countries
which had once controlled most of the world’s economic resources. European countries
(potential competitors to U.S.) had spent enormous amount of their money for this war. From
that point, their gold reserves were quickly depleted. In addition to that, they borrowed heavily
mainly from the U.S. in order to finance the war. Therefore, at the end of the war they were
deep in debt. For example, before the war Great Britain was the world’s largest creditor;
however, at the end of the war it became largest debtor in the world (Burton, 2020). Besides
that, Britain lost most of its industrial production and more than a quarter of its wealth in this
period (Broadberry, 2020: 30-31). In all, in the post-war era Britain was in a big economic ruin.
From the same perspective, the Soviet Union also suffered heavy losses in the war. Over 25
million people were killed which means that the Soviet Union lost more than 15 percent of its
population at the end of the WWII (Brainerd, 2007: 1-2). In addition to that, its economy had
been devastated. The Soviet Union lost almost half of its industrial base and a big share of its
agricultural output (Kotkin, 2000: 188). Economies in France and Italy were also in ruin after the
war. In Germany industrial production decreased by about 50 percent (Wunderlich, 2010: 3-29).
Besides that, Germany like Soviet Union lost about 10-15 percent of its population in the war
(University of Houston, 2016). Cities and towns, including some of the leading industrial centers,
all around Germany had been destroyed. Moreover, Germany was divided into many zones after
the war and forced to pay massive sums of money to many countries particularly in Europe. On
the other side of the world, China was already in difficult economic condition due to the SinoJapanese war before the WWII. During the war Chinese economy was in tatters. After the WWII,
China started its costly full-scale civil war with Communist forces. Most parts of the country by
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that time were stalked by famine. At the end of the civil war, China came close to bankruptcy.
Finally, Japan, like Germany, was mostly devastated. It lost its colonial territories, and one-third
of industrial production (Okazaki, 2017: 57). Its GNP declined by over 50 percent of its prewar
level (Okazaki). Besides that, Japan faced with a severe inflation and balance of payment deficit
crises. Most of its population was near starvation in the early post WWII era.
In a nutshell, all previous Great Powers (and potential competitor of the U.S.) were in ruin
and their economies were seriously devastated by WWII in the post WWII era. However, there
was a country that came out from the war unscathed even though most of the countries were
destroyed both physically and financially. It was the United States. The U.S. suffered very little
physical destruction when it is compared to the destruction that other countries faced. And in
financial terms the U.S. essentially benefitted the most from the war. This was an extraordinary
condition in the world history and under this extraordinary condition a strong and steady U.S.
economic expansion was anticipated in the decades following WWII. However, at the end of
that exceptional period U.S. economic power was expected to gradually decline as previous
great powers in Europe and Japan finished reconstructing their economies from the devastation
of WWII. This is exactly what happened in the post-WWII era. While other countries such as
Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, Japan and France were struggling to rebuild their
economies, the U.S., on the other hand, increased its production significantly and raised its GDP
from $300 billion in 1950 to over $1 trillion at the end of the 1960s. It is important to know that
under this particular period of time the U.S. benefited a lot from wartime and non-wartime
production, privileged status in the international monetary system, many direct and indirect
stimulus and economic recovery programs, infrastructure and social safety programs and the
advances in science and technology. Overall, the U.S. accounted for 37-38 percent of world
nominal GDP and 28-30 percent of world real GDP from the early 1950s to the late 1960s.
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However, this started to change when previous big powers finished rebuilding their economies
from the WWII and caught up with American economy. At the end of the 1960s these countries
strongly entered into the world market and gained a big share of the world market from the U.S.
Meanwhile, due to the fierce competition from Europe and Asia and also drastic changes in the
international economic system, the U.S. lost many of its advantages that it had enjoyed since
WWII. Therefore, at the end of the 1960s economic growth of the U.S. began to wane for the
first time since WWII. The pace of decline accelerated in the next decade. Factors such as social
welfare spending, the war in Vietnam, the OPEC oil embargo, government’s monetary and fiscal
policies and a series of international economic and political turmoil in the world created severe
economic problems for the U.S. in the 1970s. Due to these problems, U.S. economic growth
slowed down significantly. At the end of the decade U.S. GDP as a percentage of world GDP
declined from 36-37 percent to 26 percent. However, in the following two decades the U.S.
economy rebounded and grew considerably till the new century. The major factors that
stimulated the economic expansion of the U.S. in this period were supply-side economic
policies, low oil prices, stock market boom, scientific and technological development,
globalization and rising trade between countries, appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and
relatively peaceful international environment especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. From
that point, U.S. economy increased from $2.8 trillion at the beginning of the 1980s to almost
$10 trillion at the end of the century. During the same period U.S. GDP as a percentage of world
GDP raised from 25 percent to almost 30 percent. Nevertheless, in the first decade of the new
century the U.S. economy was in decline once again. It is important that the decline of U.S.
economy during the 2000s was more severe than the one that U.S. had suffered few decades
earlier. The first recession of the decade started in 2001 when many software firms went to
bankrupt. In the same year terrorist attacks of September 11 worsened economic downturn.
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Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Hurricane Katrina, high oil prices, inappropriate and ineffective
monetary and fiscal policies and finally the financial crisis of 2007-09 were the other factors that
adversely influenced economic growth in this decade. In short, the U.S. faced many serious
economic and political problems from beginning to the end of this decade which made it one of
the most tumultuous decades in the U.S. history. In all, throughout the decade the U.S economy
grew only 15.8 percent. The U.S. GDP as a share of world GDP decreased from about 30 percent
to 23-24 percent in the 2000s. The financial crisis in the second half of the decade had especially
serious long-term effects on U.S. economy. From that point, early in the 2010s U.S.’s households
and businesses were not confident for the future of the country. Therefore, they cut their
spending and investment plans. Besides that, inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies caused
the U.S. to have a slow recovery in the first half of the 2010s. On the other hand, high oil prices
and the crises in Europe and elsewhere lowered the demand for U.S. products remarkable.
However, consumer/business confidence and economic optimism expanded in the second half
of the decade. The new administration launched various new tax and stimulus programs in
order to increase consumer demand and economic capacity. Meanwhile, there was a sharp drop
in oil prices which had positive impact on increasing economic activities in the U.S. On the other
hand, Europe and many other parts of the world started to recovery from the financial crises.
This also had positive impact on the U.S. economic expansion. The GDP growth rate slowly and
gradually increased. At the end of the 2018 it reached almost 3 percent and the U.S. economy
passed $20 trillion in nominal terms. The U.S. share of world GDP dropped 21 percent in the first
half of the decade and then gradually increased to almost 24 percent. In terms of real GDP, the
U.S. share of world GDP held stable at about 21-22 percent of world total.
Ultimately, it is crucial that if one looks beyond any particular short-term period and see
overall picture by looking at the long-term period, he or she will find out that there is no
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permanent and disastrous decline trend that has appeared in the U.S. It is certain that the
power of the U.S. that measured by economic expansion (GDP growth) and the U.S. share of the
world output has relatively decreased. However, this decline is not long-term and irreversible.
American share of world output has only decreased from 29-30 percent to around a quarter of
the world output. From the same perspective, there is no permanent and fundamental decline
seen in the U.S. growth rate. It is clear that the U.S. has experienced a slower economic growth
(2-3 percent GDP growth) since the financial crisis of 2007-09. However, this drop, like the U.S.
share of the world output, is not significant and permanent. It is important to know that the
average long-term economic growth in the U.S. was 3.4 percent from 1950 to 1999, and 3.1
percent from 1979 to 1999. From that point, 2-3 percent of growth since GFC is hardly a sign of
economic stagnation of any kind. Besides that, 2-3 percent of GDP growth would not be high
enough for a developing country; however, it is a fair growth rate for a country that has massive,
mature and developed economy like the U.S. In addition to that, even 2-3 percent GDP growth
rate of the U.S. is higher than that of other developed countries such as in Europe and Japan
whose growth rates have been hovering around 1-2 percent for decades. Therefore, it is crucial
that if scholars used a more appropriate and representative base year (the late 1960s or the
early 1970), they would find out that the American share of world output and its GDP growth
rate were about the same then as it is now. There is no any kind of long-term, significant,
disastrous and absolute decline.
The same can be said for the CPI. Many intellectuals worry about inflation, deflation,
hyperinflation, or stagnation in U.S. economy by focusing on particular short-term period. For
example, policymakers and Fed’s officials had experienced serious price changes in the 1930s
and 1940s, which made them very fearful to any kind of inflationary rise in the post-war period.
Due to this idea they used restricted monetary and fiscal policies that caused several recessions
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in the 1950s. However, in the next decade, Keynesian economics dominated economic theories
and policies in the U.S. This theory argues that during chronic economic uncertainties, countries
face inadequate private investment and spending. Due to a lack of private investment and
spending, supply and demand balanced each other out at a point that does not support full
employment and high growth in countries. For the solution to this problem, the Keynesian
economics support the idea of government involvement. That means in order to substitute the
missing private investment and spending; governments step in, borrow money and spends on
goods and services that increase employment and expand economic growth. This is what
happened in the 1960s. Kennedy’s Twelve Measurement Package, Johnson’s Great Society
Programs, and all other federal expansionary fiscal (intensively) and monetary policies boosted
the economy and employment on one hand and created a huge deficit and inflationary pressure
on the other. During this period, contrary to previous decades’ ideology, restraining inflation
was not a high priority. Domestic and foreign policy objectives were more important than
curbing debt and inflationary pressures by that time. Other than that, Keynesian economics’
solution for the high inflation was seemingly simple. In order to curb inflation, governments
needed to cut the spending and raised taxes and interest rates. It was widely believed that these
actions would bring down the prices. From that point, in the next decade social and economic
programs of previous decades were extended. This increased the budget debt and also
inflationary pressure even higher. It was crucial that Nixon administration had expected lower
prices when they increased interest rates and cut some of the federal spending. However, that
didn’t happen. This was something that cannot be explained by Keynesian economic principles.
There was high inflation, high interest rate, low employment and low growth rate. The overall
situation worsened with many domestic and foreign events. Prices continued to increase in the
second half of this decade. At the beginning of the 1980s, policymakers and the Federal Reserve
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officials drastically shifted their policies for inflation. They took inflation as government’s top
priority and used severe restricted monetary policies for a long time to curb inflation and
inflation expectation. This persistency paid off and the inflation rate got down dramatically.
Around the same time, the Reagan administration displaced some Keynesian mixed economic
principles and leaned toward free-market principles that include free trade, deregulation, and
smaller government. For economic growth, President Reagan supported the supply-side
economic theory. Under this theory large tax cuts and expansionary monetary policies were
used for stimulating economic growth. However, this theory has repeatedly caused economic
cycle since 1980s. In this cycle, expansionary economic policies that government officials have
used, raised expectations, raised expectations encouraged excesses, these excesses caused
bubbles and at the end bubbles turned into crisis such as in the late 1980s stock market crisis, in
the early 2000s dot-com crisis and finally in the late 2000s housing crisis. Business or economic
cycles that have continually happening from 1980s to late 2000s is not a high priority for
government officials. It is clear that when government officials shift their policies and take this
issue as a top priority, they will take necessary actions to avoid the next economic cycles.
However, it is important that despite the fear of another possible economic cycle or inflationary
pressure due to the economic policies used during and after the GFC, the predicted inflation or
the chance of another economic cycle has not emerged. There are some reasons behind that
include investors’ expectation for the future of the economy and the lack of incentive for
investment and spending, diminishing marginal returns in businesses, shifting from
manufacturing economy to more financial and service economy and demographic reasons such
as ageing population. From that point, it seems that the inflation and inflation expectation will
not be the policymakers and Fed’s top priority, even though there is more spending on
economic stimulus programs.
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Like the decline in U.S. share of world production, rising U.S. debt is a serious concern for
many intellectuals. Starting from the 1980s and especially in the new century, many scholars
repeatedly discuss fears of the growing U.S. debt and its possible effects on the future economy.
It is a valid concern that raising debt indicates serious challenges for U.S. economy over the long
term. However, in order to correctly analyze the questions of how serious the U.S. debt is and
how it affects U.S. economy; a researcher has to look beyond any particular indicator and shortterm data, focus on aggregate data and see the big picture of the story. From that point, it is
important to know that the U.S. debt is not something new or something recent. For many
decades since WWII, the U.S. has been holding a large debt (which is measured with nominal
terms) that included the 1950s when the U.S. made up over 40 percent of world debt and the
1960s when U.S. debt was 36 percent of world debt. It is crucial that most of the scholars pay
specific attention to U.S. share of world GDP when they compare the health of the economy
now and then or two different periods of time; however, they do not do the same analysis for
U.S. share of world debt. From that point, if they take U.S. share of world debt into
consideration, (contrary to their argument) they will see that U.S. share of global debt is steady
and gradually declining from over 40 percent in 1950s to below 30 percent in the 1980s to 18
percent in the late 2010s.
Besides that, it is also crucial that most of the same scholars take federal or government
debt as the most important indicator and interpret U.S. debt concerns based on this indicator.
Thus, very few intellectuals worried about U.S. debt when the rise in government debt was low
in the 1950s (12 percent) and 1960s (24 percent). Started from 1980s intellectuals placed
specific emphasis on debt due to a huge hike in government debt. However, total debt consists
of three components; government, household and corporation debt. Household and
corporation debts are as important as government debt. For example, household and
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corporation debts played a major role in creating the financial crisis of 2007-09. It is crucial that
when many households and corporations declared bankruptcy in 2007-09, government stepped
in and used billions of dollars to bail out households and corporations. By that time household
and corporation debts were largely added to government debt and government debt increased
fundamentally (over 100 percent of GDP) in this period. From that point, if scholars pay
attention to household and corporation debt they will see that the U.S. had a serious debt issue
even in the 1950s and 1960s since its household and corporation debts by that time increased
by over 100 percent.
Another important point is about GDP growth rate and its linear negative impact on total
debt-to-GDP ratio. In other words, a strong rise in GDP rate plays important role on decline in
total debt-to-GDP ratio, or vice versa. From that point, strong GDP growth rate in the decades
after the early post-WWII period (as this study mentioned earlier that this robust growth was
because of the extraordinary conditions of that period) was associated with a significant
decrease in the total debt-to-GDP ratio. From the same perspective, relatively slow GDP growth
rate in last two decades plays crucial role on the rise in the total debt-to-GDP ratio. For example,
in both decades (1950s and 2010s) the total debt increased around the same level (44-48
percent); however, in 1950s total debt as a percentage of GDP decreased from 126 percent to
107 percent and in 2010s it increased from 213 to 218 percent. For another example, in the
1960s total debt rose by almost 70 percent and in the 2000s it rose by over 90 percent.
However, total debt-to-GDP ratio in the 1960s diminished by more than 10 percent (from 107
percent to 96 percent), although in the 2000s it increased by over 60 percent (from 158 to 218
percent).
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In sum, contrary to many intellectuals’ popular belief, the U.S. has run a big total debt not
only in last few decades, but also in every decade since WWII. Another point, which is contrary
to theory (that says high debt level causes interest rates and inflation to increase), there is no
need to fret about high U.S. debt in the recent period since historic low interest rate in the last
few decades allow the U.S. to shoulder high debt burden. It is noticeable that interest rates and
inflation are declining steadily even though the U.S. continues to hold a high level of debt.
As in the debt issue, many researchers and intellectuals have been deeply concerned
about the low savings rate of the U.S. for decades. However, it is crucial to note that most of
these scholars focus on one side of the story by analyzing household and government savings,
and overlooking corporate savings which is one of the major components of gross savings. In
that respect, in the early post-WWII era, U.S. savings rate was relatively high. Extraordinary
conditions in this period played an important role on household savings. Factors such as massive
housing booms, strong economic growth, rising household income, growing social and economic
programs and prediction about the future of the economy encourages household during this
period to raise their saving. It is also important that experiences of serious economic shocks
since the Great Depressions made household in this period much more prone to save for the
future days. In addition to that, by this time there was a perception in the government that
admire budget surpluses and high savings. However, the U.S. government’s tendency toward
savings and budget surpluses dramatically shifted after the second half of the 1960s. Their new
perception argued that it was fine with having low level of savings and budget deficit. A decade
later, the same perception moved to households. Since then, there has been a steady and
gradual decline in household savings. However, it is important that the decline in government
savings first and household savings later increased the importance of corporate savings.
Meanwhile, corporations significantly boosted their productivity and their profitability with
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President Reagan’s business friendly policies. Due to this, corporations increased their savings
considerably. Starting from the 1980s, corporate savings became the major component of gross
savings. Corporations’ high savings play an important role for compensating the effect of
decreases in government and household savings. The importance of corporate savings increased
over the last few decades not only in the U.S. but also most of the other developed countries. It
is important to know that most of the investment were funded with government and household
savings before the 1980s and the share of corporate savings were around 10 percent of GNI in
developed countries. However, after the GFC corporate saving rate increased to 15 percent of
GNI and two-thirds of gross investment started to fund by corporate savings.
Scholars have also raised many concerns about U.S. productivity slowdown when they
compare U.S. productivity growth in two different periods of time. In their argument they
usually focus on the declining U.S. productivity without addressing the root causes. It is
important to know that there were many factors that boosted productivity in the previous
decades; however, their contribution to productivity growth eventually slowed down and faded
away as time passed. For example, in the early post-WWII era (which was an exceptional period
for the U.S.) technological innovations and commercialization of this new technology played a
significant role on productivity growth. In addition, during this time there were rooms for
increasing productivity by expanding capital deepening (i.e. investing in more machinery and
equipment), improving labor quality (i.e. increasing education and training of the employees)
and raising public capital (i.e. spending on telecommunication, electricity and transportation
networks). The same factors continued to promote productivity in the 1960s. There was
especially dramatic improvement in (public capital) transportation and telecommunication
networks allowed corporations to reach many new local, national, and international markets.
Moving forward, corporations during this period significantly boosted their production and
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lowered their production cost. All these factors helped corporations to achieve economy of
scale. It is also important to note that, in this decade corporations entered into a consolidation
period. Many companies joined together and created even stronger institutions which helped
them to raise their capital investment substantially. However, it is crucial that after they finished
reconstructing their economies from WWII, previous big powers in Europe and Japan strongly
entered into the world market and quickly grabbed a big share of world trade at the expense of
the U.S. in the late 1960s and 1970s (which was the end of the exceptional period). Meanwhile,
the U.S. was experiencing the exhaustion of post WWII technological boom and depletion of
investment opportunities. There were many historic events in the 1960s that significantly
changed U.S. politics, economics, and social environments in the following decades. These
changes also had a big impact on productivity. For example, rules and regulations over
corporations increased. New type of environmental, safety, and gender requirements were
imposed on corporations. Corporations used more of their limited resources for meeting with
these requirements, which resulted in significant reduction in corporate productivity. Besides
that, due to gender equality requirements many inexperienced and less productive women
entered into the labor market while highly productive and experienced labors was exiting the
workforce. Depletion of investment opportunities continued in the 1980s. Contrary to previous
decades, investing in public capital or the expansion of transportation and communication
networks did not bring the expected outcomes. In addition to that, the process of extending the
exploitation of economy of scale was not successful like in previous decades. However, in the
1990s the revolution in IT improve the efficiency and profitability of corporations. As in the early
post WWII era there was an increase in the quantity and quality of capital stock which played a
major role on increasing productivity. In addition to that employees increased their education
(by attending high schools and colleges) and learnt how to use IT system. In sum, capital
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deepening, efficiency gains and increase in skill improved U.S. productivity remarkably in the
1990s. The contribution of IT to productivity lasted through the middle of the 2000s. Since then
its effect gradually slowed down. It is important that competitive environment in this period
positively affected productivity. However, GFC and its long-lasting effect dissuaded business
owners to do investment in the 2010s. Factors that increased productivity in the previous
decades became much less important in the 2010s. For example, there is no rooms for
increasing productivity by expanding (public capital) transportation and communication
networks which already boosted productivity in the early post WWII era. From the same point, it
is hard to increase labor productivity by increasing workers’ education attainment when most of
the workers already have at least a high school degree. These are mostly one-time sources that
already boosted U.S. productivity in the past. In the 2010s, their contribution margins to
productivity were low. It is also important that starting from the GFC and especially after second
half of the 2010s the U.S. closed its borders and launched trade wars with many countries that
lessen competition substantially. This could be another factor that negatively affect productivity.
Finally, the lower productivity growth rate in service industry (which accounted for two-thirds of
GDP and over 70 percent of jobs in the U.S.) also played important role on decreasing U.S.
productivity in this period.
In all, it is important that the U.S. underwent an important productivity growth in the
decades following WWII. However, this growth was because of the extraordinary conditions the
U.S. was experiencing by that time. From that point, factors that boosted the productivity in the
early WWII era could not bring the same productivity growth in recent decades. Therefore, the
low level of productivity growth (like low level of GDP growth) is the new normal until the U.S.
raise its productivity again with another IT kind of revolution. Finally, it is important to note that
low level of productivity is not a concern only for the U.S., but for almost all other developed
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countries. For decades developed countries in Europe and Japan have been experiencing low
level of productivity. From that point, the U.S.’s productivity level is much higher than that of
most of the other developed countries.
In conclusion, the overall findings in this section of the paper conflict with the argument of
scholars that support the view that U.S. power is in absolute and irreversible decline. This paper
asserts that under the extraordinary conditions in the decades following WWII, the U.S.
experienced a steady and strong economic expansion. This exceptional period of time came to
an end after previous great powers finished reconstructing their economies from the ruinous
consequences of WWII. Since then, the abnormal increase in the U.S. economic power has
returned to normal. Therefore, if scholars, who scrutinize this topic, take a more appropriate
and representative base year for their research, they will see that U.S. economic power is not in
a continuous, long-term and disastrous decline. For example, the decline of American economic
power in the 1970s rebounded in the next decade, and the U.S. experienced a steady economic
growth until the new century. From the same perspective, after the sharp economic decline in
the 2000s, which made many scholars believe that the U.S. economic power was in permanent
and absolute decline, U.S. economy has slowly but gradually been growing again. It is important
to note that the growth is lower than the potential; however, it is inaccurate to describe this as
a sign of overall and fundamental decline.
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Chapter 7
Economic Power of China
Introduction

As this paper mentioned earlier, since the early 2000s, many scholars have passionately
debated about the rise of China as the world’s next economic superpower. This debate gained a
lot of attention after the GFC. On one side of the debate, some scholars think that China has
proved its economic power in the world by growing around 10 percent for over three decades
and emerging from the GFC undamaged while other countries were seriously affected. These
scholars believe that China is different that previous U.S. economic challengers, and will become
the next economic superpower in the near future. On the other side of the debate, there are
scholars who think the first group of scholars are exaggerating China’s economic achievement.
They agree that China experienced an extraordinary economic growth over the last few
decades. However, they argue China will face serious financial and economic problems that limit
the country’s ability to maintain its high growth rate in the future. In that respect, these scholars
believe that China is not likely to become a rival to the U.S. on the global basis; however, it could
be a big economic rival to the U.S. on regional basis. This overall discussion made it necessary to
re-examine the question of “will China become the world’s next economic superpower?” In
order to answer that question correctly, and efficiently, this research study collects and
scrutinizes China’s economic power indicators (GDP, CPI, debt, saving and productivity) in the
following section.
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The Myth and Reality of Chinese GDP
At the end of the 1970s, China was still in the chaos due to its tragic Cultural Revolution
that had begun in the 1960s. China’s GDP was below 200 billion dollars and its income per capita
was not even $200 in a year (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). China was one of the
poorest countries in the world with its almost a billion populations. However, after the death of
Chairman Mao in 1976 Chinese government decided to change its Soviet style centrally
controlled economic policies with more market-driven western style economic policies that
included opening up trade and investment with some western countries that had no
relationship before (Morrison, 2019: 4). The aim of this policy change was to increase economic
growth and raise its people’s living standard. The economic transformation began in the late
1970s and continued in the early 1980s with various reforms. During this period government
authorities used expansionary monetary policies in order to support reforms financially.
Government launched its economic reforms in agricultural sector. First of all, government
increased prices of agricultural goods. In addition to that government gave relative autonomy to
farmers over the land use and crop selection decisions (Lohmar, Gale, Tuan, et. al., 2009: 3-5).
The new system created incentive among the farmers to increase their productivity. Increased
agricultural productivity reduced China’s food constraints which freeing millions of agricultural
workers to pursue employment in more productive sectors such as township and village
enterprises (TVEs) (Harvie, 1999: 4). It is crucial that the success of the agricultural reforms
motivated Chinese government to launch the same kind of reforms in the nonagricultural sector.
From that point, Chinese government started its reform on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by
allowing these institutions to buy and sell output at market prices after they succeed in
producing assigned quotas of production that transacted at official prices (Wang, 2018: 171-

178
173). In addition, moderate autonomy was given to these enterprises in decision regarding of
production, investment, supply, and marketing (Putterman and Dong, 2000: 413-414). On the
other hand, economic control of these entities assigned to regional governments. These
governments were permitted to operate SOEs on free market principles, rather than under the
direction of central state planning. After all of these reforms, SOEs production increased
significantly which result in a boost in gross production in the country. It is important that like in
the SOEs case, central government gave provincial and local governments a greater autonomy in
order to engage in foreign trade. After gaining autonomy, these governments created their own
trade agencies in order to engage in direct trading of their products. The number of trade
agencies in these provinces increased from 12 at the end of the 1970s to over 5 thousand at the
end of the 1980s and the amount of trade rose from $30 billion to over $80 billion in the same
period (Lardy, 1992 :694; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). Another important policy
that Chinese government took at the beginning of China’s economic reform period was to
creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in four coastal cities where central government
offered tax and trade incentives in order to attract foreign investment. In these zones non-stateowned enterprises including foreign firms were allowed to enter in industries which had
forbidden in earlier periods. In total, these reforms had positive effect on China’s economic
growth in the first half of the 1980s. From 1979 to 1985 China’s annual GDP averaged 9 percent
(World Bank, 2019). In 1985, China’s GDP grew from 178 billion dollars in 1979 to 300 billion
dollars (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). In terms of real GDP (2010 U.S. constant
prices), Chinese economy in this period increased from $341 billion in 1980 to $565 billion in
1985 (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The massive reform
movement continued in the second half of this decade. It is important to know that China
implemented these reforms gradually. During the 1980s government officials tried to figure out
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which reform policies created positive outcomes and which policies did not. If there was a
positive economic outcome of a policy then government could extend and use this policy in
other regions of the country. From that perspective, Chinese government increased the number
of SEZs from 4 to 14 coastal cities at first and then opened the entire coastal area as SEZs in the
second half of the 1980s (Chen, 2018: 597). Deng Xiaoping’s decision of “Open-door” policy in
the middle of decade played important role on extending SEZs. With this policy China drew
more foreign direct investment (FDI) due to liberalization of the country’s economic system.
Especially in the second half of the decade, Chinese government was very eager to attract more
FDI; however, by that time foreign investors were still cautious about investing in China.
Therefore, throughout the decade the annual average FDI was around $1.8 billion (Chen, 2018;
People Republic of China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 2019: Amirahmadi and Wu, 1994:
171-174). On the other hand, in order to increase trade, China enhanced its diplomatic and
economic relationships with the U.S., Japan, and some industrialized European countries like
France in the 1980s. Meanwhile, TVEs flourished in many parts of the country. There was also a
significant growth in non-state sector. All these factors raised people’s income that increased
Chinese households’ capacity to save more. High households’ savings and rising foreign capital
inflows through FDI were used for investment. Investment mainly boosted economic growth till
1989. It is important to know that during all these reforms periods Chinese authorities used
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies except for some short periods between 1980-83,
1985-86, and 1989-91 (China Financial Yearbook Magazine, 2017; Laurenceson and Chai, 1998:
396-399). In these excluding periods authorities used restrictive monetary and fiscal policies in
order to slow down the growth and inflation. In total, China’s GDP rose from $260 billion in the
middle of the decade to almost $350 billion dollars in 1989 (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2018; World Bank, 2019). That means China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 11
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percent from 1984 to 1989. During the same period real GDP rose from $565 billion to almost
$800 billion dollars ($797) (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 2019). However,
it is important to know that despite overall economic progress, some people wealth in China did
not rise accordingly in this decade. That made a lot of people unhappy with overall situation. For
example, agricultural reforms in the second half of the 1980s could not increase the productivity
as in the first half of this decade. Farmers’ income drastically decreased. Besides that, Deng
Xiaoping’s economic reforms in non-agricultural sector caused many corruption cases at the end
of this decade. In addition, newly created Central bank in this decade took many poor decisions
due to its lack of experience. For example, central bank in the 1980s validated so many loans
that included bad loans in order to keep all banks in business (Bank for International Settlement,
1999: 18-32). However, this situation created a balance of payment deficit and a serious
inflation issues later in the decade that eventually result in an important crisis that plagued
China in the late 1980s. Growing economic difficulties and widespread corruption motivated
many people such as students, intellectuals, and many urban dwellers to start their protest
movements. Their protests ended with Tiananmen Square massacre. Aftermath of the
Tiananmen Square case, economic reforms were slowed down. Some western countries issued
economic embargoes against China. Meanwhile, for decreasing inflation and soothing the
economy, Chinese authorities used restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (China Financial
Yearbook Magazine; Laurenceson and Chai, 397). In addition, Chinese government launched a
serious austerity measurement that controlled FDI and restricted monetary flows. Therefore,
the growth rate dropped from 11 percent in 1988 to 4 percent in 1989 (World Bank, 2019). It
was tragic that the growth rate was even below 4 percent in 1990. Overall, in this decade
Chinese economy grew from $191 billion in 1980 to $349 billion in 1989 (National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 2018). In other word, China’s GDP increased by 82.2 percent. In relation to
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real GDP, China’s GDP rose from $341 billion in 1980 to $797 billion in 1989 (World Bank, 2019;
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis) which means Chinese GDP increased 134 percent throughout
this decade. The average growth rate was 8.9 percent each year in the 1980s. In nominal terms
Chinese economy in this decade remained 6-7 percent of U.S. economy. However, in real term,
Chinese GDP rose from 5.2 percent of U.S. GDP in 1980 to 9 percent of the U.S. GDP in 1989.
Finally, China’s share of world GDP increased by 1 percentage point, from 1.2 percent in 1980 to
2.2 percent in 1989 (World Bank, 2019).

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

China - U.S. - World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 1980-1989
N. GDP China N. GDP U.S. N. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP R. GDP China R. GDP U.S. R. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
191
2857
11228
6.7
1.7
341
6496
27871
5.2
1.2
196
3207
11624
6.1
1.7
358
6661
28406
5.4
1.3
205
3344
11514
6.1
1.8
390
6541
28529
6
1.4
231
3634
11747
6.4
2
432
6841
29217
6.3
1.5
260
4038
12180
6.4
2.1
498
7336
30533
6.8
1.6
309
4339
12793
7.1
2.4
565
7642
31666
7.4
1.8
301
4580
15119
6.6
2
615
7906
32742
7.8
1.9
273
4855
17201
5.6
1.6
687
8180
33956
8.4
2
312
5236
19244
6
1.6
765
8522
35525
9
2.1
348
5642
20087
6.2
1.7
797
8835
36831
9
2.2

Table 14 China – U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2012) from 1980 to 1989
Source: Data (world current GDP) from 1980 to 1989 collected from World Bank and IMF; U.S. current and real GDP
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and
BEA database, China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook
and real GDP derived from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China.

After Tiananmen massacre, some conservatives tried to obstruct market-oriented reforms
and recentralized the authority. These efforts generated dissatisfaction among public and
government officials. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping retired from public view. As the final political
act in his career, he made his famous southern tour in 1992 and delivered a warning speech
about the continuation of reforms. A year later, Jiang Zemin who earned his popularity during
the Tiananmen Square events for taking a hard-line stance against protesters, became the next
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president of China. Despite western countries trade embargoes, under his administration
economic growth was accelerated with his macro-economic reforms. These reforms led to a
significant growth in Chinese household and corporate income. These large levels of income
made it possible for China to support high level of investment. At the end, high level of
investment boosted China’s economic growth like in the previous decade. It is crucial to know
that most of the investment had been made on state sector in the previous decade. In the
1990s, the resources to support SOEs gradually increased. However, even though there was a
relative improvement on SOEs’ performance from the previous decade, they were still lagged
behind other enterprises, particularly private enterprises. From that point, financial institutions
raised its loans for SOEs to cover their expenses. Nevertheless, it became clear that most of
these loans were non-performing loans which eventually created serious deficit and chronic high
inflation around the middle of this decade. In 1994 the inflation rate even reached 25 percent
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). President Zemin realized that this could no longer
be sustained before the middle of the 1990s. From that point, Chinese government reduced its
commitment to SOEs. Government authorities closed down many unprofitable SOEs or let them
to go bankrupt in order to make rest of these enterprises more competitive and productive.
Besides that, some SOEs were sold to their workers at privileged low rates and some other SOEs
were privatized. On the other hand, private investment sharply increased in this decade. Its
share in the economy rose from 3-4 percent in 1990 to over 14 percent at the end of the 1990s
(Lardy, 2014: 83). From the same point, the share of the private enterprises in industry sector
rose from 30 percent in the middle of the decade to around 70 percent at the end of the decade
(Hofman, 2018: 55, 63). Like in the previous decade, structural shift in resources such as moving
employment from agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors continued in this decade that
also had positive effect on economic growth. In addition to that, China’s economy benefited a
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lot by integrating with the world economy in this decade. Chinese authorities in the 1990s
changed its model of growth to an export-oriented philosophy. From that perspective, Chinese
government adopted market-oriented macroeconomic policies. At the end of the first half of
this decade Chinese government severely devalued the currency (the dollar to yuan exchange
rate drastically increased from 5.8 in 1993 to 8.6 in 1994), and used extremely favorable
monetary policies in order to boost export (World Bank, 2018). China became the workshop of
the world with these and other aggressive growth-oriented policies. Chinese exports growth
rapidly accelerated which made China to acquire a special place in the global production chain.
The value of export of goods and services increased from almost $50 billion in 1990 to almost
$200 billion in 1999 (World Bank, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). From that
point, export as percentage of GDP rose from 13.6 percent in 1990 to 18.2 percent in 1999
(World Bank). In addition, trade-investment reforms, cheap workforce and stable and repressive
labor laws created a huge surge in FDIs inflow in this decade. It is important that, in previous
decade Chinese government already experienced some FDI inflows that significantly contributed
to China’s economy growth in terms of employment creation, export accumulation and
technology transfer. From that perspective, Chinese government decided to launch new policies
and regulations that liberalized its FDI regime in order to attract more FDI in the 1990s. In
addition to that, in this decade Chinese policymakers opened more SEZs in cities particularly in
inland and border areas. In sum, throughout the decade the FDI increased significantly from $4
billion in 1990 to over $40 billion in 1999 even though there was serious financial crisis in the
region at the end of the decade (Zebregs, and Tseng, 2002: 3). Due to this surge, China’s
productivity and overall economy grew substantially. It is important that during the 1990s
Chinese government launched a program that aimed to sell off collective housings to their
occupiers. That program also had positive effect on GDP growth. Finally, after Central Bank’s
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inexperienced policies many banks were technically insolvent in previous decade. In the 1990s
Central Bank of China used growth-oriented monetary policies that significantly accelerated GDP
growth. However, it was an exception that from 1993 to 1996 there was a high level of price
instability in China. In this period average annual prices grew more than 18 percent (National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). However, after few years of restrictive monetary and fiscal
policies, the inflation rate dropped to 2 percent (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The
economy started to grow over 10 percent in this decade. This time the growth was stronger
than the one in the previous decade. From 1991 to 1997 China’s grew at an average annual rate
of 11.5 percent. The GDP increased from 383 billion dollars to almost 1 trillion dollars (961
billion dollars) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). In order words, this growth enabled
China to more than double the size of its economy in 7 years. However, China’s economic
growth rate slowed down to 7 percent in 1998 and 1999 due to the impact of Asian financial
crisis. The Asian financial crisis affected China through decline in the growth rate of export
volume, and decline in FDI. However, factors such as holding significant amount of foreign
reserves, having a currency that was not freely convertible, boosting public spending, using
proactive monetary policies and receiving capital inflows for long time investment protected
China from the worst effects of the crisis. At the end of the decade, two foreign colonies
returned to China, Hong Kong from Britain in 1997 and Macau from Portugal in 1999, which also
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created a positive effect for the economy.

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

China - U.S. - World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 1990-1999
N. GDP China N. GDP U.S. N. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP R. GDP China R. GDP U.S. R. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
361
5963
22626
6
1.6
828
9001
37905
9.2
2.2
383
6158
23967
6.2
1.6
905
8991
38447
10.1
2.3
427
6520
25453
6.5
1.7
1033
9308
39126
11.1
2.6
445
6859
25858
6.5
1.7
1177
9564
39725
12.3
3
564
7287
27771
7.7
2
1330
9950
40917
13.4
3.2
734
7640
30887
9.6
2.4
1476
10217
42153
14.4
3.5
864
8073
31573
10.7
2.7
1622
10602
43582
15.3
3.7
962
8577
31458
11.2
3.1
1772
11074
45183
16
3.9
1029
9063
31393
11.3
3.3
1911
11570
46338
16.5
4.1
1094
9631
32562
11.4
3.4
2057
12120
47843
17
4.3

Table 15 China – U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2012) from 1980 to 1989
Source: China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook and real
GDP derived from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China. World
nominal GDP derived from World Bank and IMF; U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St
Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and BEA database.

In total, at the end of the 1990s China’s nominal GDP rose from $361 billion in 1990 to over 1
trillion dollars ($1.093 trillion) (National Bureau of Statistics of China; World Bank, 2019). In
terms of real GDP, Chinese economy overall increased from $828 billion in 1990 to $2.057
trillion in 1999 which means China’s GDP rose by 148.4 percent in this decade (World Bank,
2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The average growth rate was 10 percent each
year in the 1990s. China’s GDP increased from 6.05 percent of U.S. in 1990 to 11.4 percent of
U.S. GDP in 1999. In real terms, China’s GDP rose from 9.2 percent of U.S. GDP to 17 percent of
U.S. GDP during the same period. Finally, China’s share of world GDP increased from 1.6 percent
in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 1999 (World Bank, 2019).
After a decade of Jiang Zemin presidency, Hu Jintao became general secretary of the
Communist Party and then the president of China in 2002. Under his administration China
experienced a rapid and robust economic growth. However, most of the causes of this economic
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growth were because of his predecessor Jiang Zemin’s implementation of reforms in the 1990s.
Like in the previous decade, factors such as large-scale capital investment, urbanization and
productivity growth were the main drivers of economic development in this decade. Integration
with the world economy continued in the 2000s. The process started with four SEZs in the early
1980s, expanded to 14 zones first and whole coastal economic zones later. Riparian and inland
regions were followed that. Finally, this trend reached its peak in 2001 by joining the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Besides that, China signed economic treaties with many Asian,
European, African and American countries such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
China-ASEAN, China-Chile, Chine-Iceland, China-Switzerland, and China-Korea Free Trade
Agreements. All of these turned out to boost Chinese export during this period. China’s average
annual export growth was almost 30 percent from 2001 to 2008 (Yao, 2018: 76). The value of
export rose from $250 billion in 2000 to $1.262 billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2018; National
Bureau of National Statistics of China Statistical Yearbook, 2018). Export as a percentage of GDP
during the same period grew significantly. It was 20.9 percent of GDP in 2000, 36 percent of GDP
in 2006 (World Bank, 2018). Due to global financial crisis at the end of the 2000s it dropped to
24.7 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank). However, even though serious financial crisis in the
world China became the largest exporter in the world at the end of this decade. It is important
that in previous decade Jiang Zemin reduced legal barriers for acquiring private enterprises. On
the other hand, Zemin shut down many unproductive state enterprises which created space for
productive private enterprises in the 2000s. After experiencing high productivity and high GDP
growth because of these policies, Hu Jintao in this decade accelerated privatization of SOEs and
TVEs in order to boost the economy further. These newly privatized enterprises pursued more
productive activities than SOEs and TVEs. On the other hand, some of SOEs and TVEs gained
back. In 2003 Chinese government established the State-owned Assets Supervision and
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Administration Commission (SASAC) for overseeing some of SOEs’ (large size SOEs) investment,
profits and growth projects (Song, 2018: 356). In addition to that, central government specified
some critical (strategic and pillar) industries and used SOEs to retain the control of these
industries (Lardy, 2018: 335). Meanwhile, central government also launched many financial and
industrial policies that in favor of SOEs. As a result of these policies, at the end of the decade
many SOEs become among the largest corporations in the world (Mourdoukoutas, 2019). Their
assets and output increased while their number and the share of contribution to the economy
continued to fall. In this decade China’s economy benefited from additions to labor force. Tens
of millions of people from rural regions moved to coastal provinces to find job in manufacturing
and service sectors (Gregory and Meng, 2018: 398-399). This created a situation that kept wages
and also cost of production low. In the second half of the 1990s, due to China’s trade and
investment reforms foreign investment in China rose. In the 2000s the extension of economic
reforms and the membership of the WTO accelerated foreign direct investment (FDI). It was
essential to know that due to lack of free market principles in the 1980s and in the early 1990s
FDI inflows increased moderately in China. By that time, total flow of FDI was lower than $10
billion (Davies, 2013: 10-11). However, the amount rose over 40 billion in the second half of the
1990s, $50 billion in the early 2000s, $70 billion in the middle of 2000s (10 percent of world FDI)
and finally over $100 billion dollar (20 percent of the world FDI) at the end of the 2000s (Davies,
10-13). Rising FDI inflows in China increased demand for labor, capital formation, technology
transfer and human capital accumulation which significantly contributed to economic
development of the country in the 2000s. GDP average growth rate in China was 10.5 percent
from 2000 to 2007. China’s GDP rose from $1.211 trillion in 2000 to $3.550 trillion in 2007
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). However, the Great Recession of 2007-09 slowed
down China’s economic growth. Chinese export dropped down more than 10 percent of GDP to
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around 24 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2019). GDP fell from over 14 percent annual growth in
2007 to around 9 percent in 2008 (National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China
Statistical Yearbook, 2019). Nevertheless, Chinese government quickly reacted to this downfall
by injecting $600 billion, over 12 percent of GDP, in various sectors of the economy (Bradsher,
2009). Regional and local governments launched to build roads, bridges, dams, rails and all other
infrastructure works in order to keep the economy afloat. Financial institutions gave out millions
of renminbi (RMB) mainly to SOEs and private companies for financing their investments. It is
important to know that even during the Great Recession Chinese government did not aim to
increase domestic consumption that much because this would have caused a wage hike. A wage
hike would have increased the cost of productions and a higher cost of productions would have
slowed down Chinese exports that China’s economy was not ready to face. That policy worked
out well. After a few years from the crisis Chinese investment and production increased as fast
on average as in the early years of decade. Growth rate returned to over 10 percent in 2010.
Overall, from 2000 to 2009, China’s GDP rose from $1.211 trillion in 2000 to $5.102 trillion in
2009 (National Bureau of Statistics of China; World Bank, 2019). During the same period real
GDP increased from $2.232 trillion to $5.502 trillion (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of
St Louis 2019). Real GDP grew by 146.5 percent in this decade. The average GDP growth rate
was 10.3 percent each year in the 2000s. China’s GDP increased from 11.8 percent of U.S. GDP
in 2000 to 35.3 percent of U.S. GDP in 2009. In real terms, China’s GDP rose from 17.7 percent of
U.S. GDP to 37.6 percent of U.S. GDP during the same period. Finally, China’s share of world GDP
increased from 3.6 percent in 2000 to 8.4 percent in 2009 (World Bank, 2019).
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Few years after the global economic slowdown, the rate of GDP growth in China started to
decline again. It is crucial that, this economic slowdown is not a cyclical downturn that China had
experienced several times at the end of each decade. This time it is deep, constant and steady
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which seems very different than previous economic downturns. In 2018 the GDP growth rate of
China gradually dropped from 10.6 percent at the beginning of the decade to 6.6 percent.
Causes of this downturn are various. First of all, productivity which was one of the main drivers
of economic growth in earlier periods has started to decline in the 2010s. Factors such as
increasing quality and quantity of the labor force, transition to market driven prices, allocating
resources more efficiently, foreign direct investment and their technology transfer continue to
contribute productivity growth; however, in the 2010s their contribution to productivity is not
the same pace of the past. It is much smaller. For example, the value of FDI grew by 100 percent
(from $50 billion to $100 billion) in previous decade. However, in 2010s the growth of FDI was
much
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The value of FDI in this decade increased from $110 billion in 2010 to around $135 billion in
2017 which means FDI increased by 22.7 percent (People’s Republic of China, Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) 2019; Chen, 596; Kroeber, 2016: 53). From the same perspective, the
pace of China’s export of goods and services also slowed down in the 2010s due to serious
economic crises and financial uncertainties in the world. The export growth rate was over 400
percent in previous decade (from $250 billion in 2000 to $1.262 trillion in 2009) (World Bank,
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2018; National Bureau of National Statistics of China Statistical Yearbook, 2018); however, in
2010s the rate dropped to 60.5 percent. China’s export increased from $1.654 trillion in 2010 to
$2.655 trillion in
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Figure 34 China’s Exports of goods and services (current US$) and Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Source: Data derived from World Bank and IMF 2018, China Statistical Yearbook and Ministry of Commerce, People’s
Republic of China (MOFCOM) various years.

Therefore, it became clear that it would be hard for China to continue its economic growth with
Deng Xiaoping’s era economic model which featured labor-intensive, low-wage manufacturing
for export, and high level of government investment. Therefore, when Xi Jinping was elected as
President of China, he decided to adopt a new economic model that included principles such as
strong domestic consumption, high value-added production, low level of SOEs and high level of
private sector roles (Garnaut, Song and Fang, 2018: 18-21). However, there are many challenges
on the way to shifting the model of economic growth. For example, Chinese government
started an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in order to fight income inequalities and
increase the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Wang, 183; Naughton, 2018: 383).
Besides that, in the middle of the 2010s China had its financial crisis. During the crisis, officials
fought hard to control price bubble which had been generated by excessive liquidity of financial
resources. In 2016, Xi Jinping started to restrain financial industry in order to reduce the risk of
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price bubble. From that point, government limited unofficial lending institutions which are
called shadow banking institutions (Financial Times, 2014; Kroeber, 140). However, private
sector very much depended on these financial institutions. Thus, government’s deleveraging
campaign had serious negative effect on private sector. In addition, after the closure of many
shadow-banking sectors, regular financial institutions became more reluctant to lend to smaller
private companies (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao, 2015: 12-13). Millions of Chinese citizens and
investors lost their savings during this period which created an atmosphere among the people
for curbing additional market reforms. Meanwhile SOEs had easy access to credit, and they were
protected from the impact of deleveraging campaigns. At the end of the decade, uncertainties
of trade wars between the U.S. and China create additional negative effect on China’s GDP
growth. In sum, China’s GDP growth rate slowed down considerably in the second half of the
2010s. However, that does not mean the Chinese economy is shrinking. It just means the growth
rate is not the same pace of the previous periods. China’s GDP rose from $6.087 trillion in 2010
to $13.608 trillion in 2018 which means China more than doubled the size of its economy in this
period (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018; World Bank, 2019). In terms of real GDP,
China’s GDP increased from $7.147 trillion in 2010 to $12.766 trillion in 2018 which means
China’s real GDP grew by 78.6 percent (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
2019). The average GDP growth rate was 7.8 percent each year in this decade. In nominal term
Chinese economy in this decade rose from 40.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2010 to 66.1 percent of
U.S. GDP in 2018. In real term, China’s GDP grew from 40.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2010 to 60.9
percent of the U.S. GDP in 2018. Finally, China’s share of world GDP rose from 9.2 percent to
15.8 percent during the same period (World Bank).
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Figure 35 and Table 16 China, U.S. and World Nominal and Real GDP (2010) from 2000-2009
Source: Current world GDP database derived from World Bank and Federal Bank of St Louis, U.S. current and real GDP
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and
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Figure 38 China and U.S. Nominal GDP and Growth Rate; Table 17 China’s Share as a Percentage of U.S. and World
Nominal and Real GDP.
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Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and World Bank. China’s real GDP derived from World Bank, IMF,
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China; Current world GDP database derived from
World Bank and Federal Bank of St Louis, World real GDP collected from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank, and IMF

China’s Inflation (CPI) Dilemma
It is important that consumer price index (CPI) or inflation affects all parts of the economy
from investment, unemployment and interest rates to government fiscal and monetary policies.
In that respect, officials usually try hard to keep inflation under control. Nevertheless, it is
usually the case that when a country transitions from central planning economy to a freemarket economy, severe imbalances between supply and demand occur. China was not an
exception. During the period of early reforms in the late 1970s, Chinese authorities aimed to
decrease price controls on goods and services. From that perspective, Chinese government
allowed farmers to sell some of their products in the market with market prices. Due to that,
prices of agricultural goods fluctuated more freely than before as part of the process of enabling
free-market forces to play a bigger role in Chinese economy. On the other hand, government
raised its procurement prices of farms products by up to 50 percent in order to boost farmers’
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income (Naughton, 1991: 207-209). However, shortly afterwards deficit in the government
budget increased due to the surge in procurement prices. In order to finance this deficit
government increased monetary supply at the beginning of the 1980s. Economic situation
started to deteriorate. Inflation reached 6 percent in 1980 (National Bureau of Statistics of
China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006). Factors such as farmers’ rising income, government
subsidies and then its deficit, and price liberalization were the main players of this first inflation
hike. In the following year Chinese government used restrictive monetary policies by increasing
interest rates, tightening credit controls and cutting its expenditures in order to restrain the
expansion of aggregate demand. This caused inflation to fell 2 percent in 1981. Conservative
fiscal-monetary policy was followed few years which kept the inflation around 2 percent
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook). However, this policy slowed
down the economic growth. After its agricultural reforms, Chinese government started to give
its main focus on urban reforms. From that point, Chinese government used the initial
(agricultural) reforms for SOEs and allowed them to sell some of their products in the market at
market prices. Authorities also allowed SOEs to make some of their expenditures and
investments decisions on their own such as setting up their wage levels, financing their
investment, recruiting and staffing (Song, 349). Besides that, much of the supervisory and
regulatory power over SOEs was transferred to provincial and local governments. SOEs gave
generous wage increases and bonuses to its employees. At the same time, they invested as
much as they could for grabbing maximum share from the market. Provincial and local
governments which were the supervisory and regulatory branches of SOEs supported these
enterprises for their investment decisions in order to promote industrial development in their
provinces or regions. They pressured state-owned financial institutions to give or extend credit
to SOEs. Therefore, SOEs borrowed heavily from state-owned banks to finance investment and
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higher wage increases without the fear of bankruptcy. From that point, government’s fiscal and
monetary liabilities to industrial SOEs gradually increased from 1.4 percent of gross national
product (GNP) in 1980 to almost 10 percent of GNP at the end of the decade (Huang, 1999:
113). On the other hand, in the middle of the decade the economy was overheated. GDP growth
rate was around 13-15 percent in that period. There was a strong increase in aggregate demand.
Due to that, import increased significantly from $20 billion in 1983 to $40 billion in 1985 (World
Bank, 2017). In total, this and all other factors such as raised wages, increased bank credits,
investment and import had a serious effect on consumer prices that pushed inflation rate to
over 9 percent in the middle of the decade (National Bureau of Statistics of China, China
Statistical Yearbook). Central government responded inflation by decreasing government
expenditures, raising interest rates and enforcing credit controls on provincial and local
branches of banks. These policies worked out well and inflation dropped 6.5 percent in 1986
(IMF, Oppers, 2017: 25). However, unlike in the first half of the decade Chinese government this
time quickly loosened its restrictive policies again. Government adopted loose monetary and
fiscal policies in order to finance investment, accelerate economic growth, and subsidize
provincial and local governments and SOEs. Eventually, inflation quickly started to increase
again with these policies in the second half of the 1980s. In addition, in the midst of this rising
inflation period, government implemented some price adjustment and further price adjustment
were announced for the following years. This made public believe that government would set all
price higher in 1989 which led to speculative buying and hoarding that additionally increased
aggregate demands (Naughton, 2009). The inflation increased over 18 percent in 1988 and 1989
(World Bank, 2019). Rising inflation was one of the main reasons of domestic unrests at the end
of the 1980s which ended with Tiananmen Square massacre. Chinese government’s response to
rising inflation was similar to that in the previous cycle such as raising interest rates, cutting
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investment growth, tightening credit control, reducing provinces’ control over administrated
prices and re-imposing price controls. However, the intensity of policies that used for this
macroeconomic instability was much stronger than the previous cases. Economic growth and
inflation significantly dropped. Inflation rate dropped from 18 percent in 1989 to 3 percent in
1990 (World Bank). GDP growth decreased from 11 percent in 1988 to 3-4 percent in 1989
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). Throughout the 1980s average CPI rate was at 7.5
percent.
After two years of low economic growth and relative stability of the overall price level,
government decided to adopt policies that accelerate the growth. Deng Xiaoping’s southern
tour and his strong message for the growth and reform played important role on that decision.
With its growth-oriented policies Chinese economy drastically increased in this period (GDP
growth rate was over 13 percent). However, these policies reinvigorated inflation again in 1993.
Most of the forces that increased prices from 1993 to 1996 were essentially similar to that in the
previous decade. In addition to that, government significantly reduced the price controls in 1992
(IMF, 1993: 27-28). That caused administered prices to rise to market level prices. Besides that,
prices and wages in this period were also on rise. It is important that in the second half of the
previous decade, Chinese government gave greater autonomy to provincial and local
governments and SOEs to set their wages and allocated their resources. From that point, most
of these institutions connected their employees’ wages to the price levels of country (Zhang,
2016: 9). That means rising prices of goods and services drove wages high. Therefore, it is easy
to predict that high wages in turn caused even higher prices of goods and services. This
mechanism by itself contributed to high inflation in this period which forced Chinese
government to implement wage reform in the middle of the 1990s for breaking the link
between wage rate and inflation. It is important that, while prices and wages kept on rising in

199
1992, government loosened its control on credits. In addition to that, government in this period
licensed many financial institutions (Okazaki, 2007: 10). With these new institutions,
government aimed to accelerate credit growth in order to boost investment and economic
growth. From that point, central government heavily financed thousands of SEZs that founded in
the first half of this decade. Moreover, in this period government continued to provide funds to
SOEs for their expenditures despite its previous decision of restructuring these institutions.
Thus, GDP growth rate in this period reached over 13 percent; however, factors that boosted
GDP rate also pushed inflation rate record high. Average annual prices grew more than 18
percent from 1993 to 1996 and in 1994 the inflation reached nearly 25 percent (National Bureau
of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006; World Bank, 2019). Chinese government
decided to implement some structural changes after the dramatic price hikes in 1993-1996. First
of all, government cut the link between price level and wage rate. In other words, wages will not
increase automatically when prices of goods and services rise. Wages only increased if workers’
skill and productivity increased (Chow, 2018: 98). In addition, government started to restructure
SOEs which had been the cause of many credit-fueled spending in the previous period. Besides
that, government implemented many actions that aimed to slow down the economy such as
raising interest rates, tightening credit control, decreasing investment growth and moderating
GDP growth. From 1995 to end of 1996 inflation came down significantly. Inflation dropped to 2
percent in 1997, meanwhile GDP growth rate declined to 7 percent (World Bank, 2019). During
and after the Asian Financial Crises in 1997, China changed its macroeconomic policy from tight
financial and monetary policy to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. With this policy China
maintained a high level of production. However, it is important that at the end of the 1990s,
China overfilled foreign and domestic markets with its goods. Oversupplying goods in this period
was one of the main factors in China that put downward pressure on consumer prices. On the
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other hand, consumer demand remained relatively low in this period. People in China like in the
past preferred to save their income rather than spend. Combination of constantly rising supply
and weakly growing demand drove prices of goods and services down after the Asian financial
crisis. From that point, China experienced deflation or insufficient demand problems in 1998,
1999 and 2002. In order to stimulate domestic demand Chinese government issued billions of
RMB. In addition, interest rates lowered and expansionary financial policies enforced (National
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2005). After these policies the
domestic demand increased and China’s economy came out from deflation. Average inflation
rate remained around 7 percent (7.7%) in the 1990s.
Like in previous decade, oversupplying and overproducing of Chinese goods were the
major factors that keep consumer prices relatively low in the 2000s. Due to massive production
of goods, China once again fell into deflation at the beginning of the 2000s. Government by that
time used expansionist monetary policies for invigorating domestic demand. However, domestic
demand remained low for a variety of reasons. It is important that, this situation didn’t create a
serious problem for China till the global financial crisis. China during this period was able to
export its products to the world. However, China’s export fell substantially when the recession
hit the U.S. and then the world at the end of the 2000s. Global financial crisis and economic
downturns in many countries significantly reduced foreign demand for Chinese goods. In
addition to that, Chinese consumption declined along with the demand of Chinese goods in the
world which made China to fell into deflation for the second time in the 2000s and third times in
last ten years. This situation encouraged Chinese authorities to adopt more aggressive
expansionist fiscal and monetary policies in order to increase domestic consumption and
economic growth. Expansionary policies increased investment and GDP till the end of the
decade (above 10%); however, domestic consumption still remained low. Meanwhile, Chinese
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authorities took stabilizing the price level as one of the top priorities of government policy
(China Daily, 2012). Since then the annual inflation rate in China has barely transcended 5
percent even though government uses massive amount of liquidity in the market as part of
government stimulus efforts. In 2000s the average annual inflation rate was 1.8 percent and in
2010s it was 2.3 percent. It is essential that there was a strong correlation between oil prices
and consumer prices especially for a country such as China that very much depends on foreign
oil. However, Chinese government uses price controls in order to keep oil and also some other
commodities’ (coal, pork, corn and wheat) prices within socially reasonable ranges. The reason
is that central government thinks that rising prices especially some important commodity prices
can cause serious social unrests in China which it was experienced in Tiananmen Square at the
end of the 1980s (Bradsher, 2011). From that perspective, rising or decreasing these
commodities’ prices have no strong effect on consumer prices goods and services. Nevertheless,
it is important to know that price control of oil and other commodities hide the true costs of
many economic processes in China and just transferring these costs to the government budget
in some ways that affects the overall economy at the end.
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China’s Debt Bomb
High national (total) debt causes a number of serious economic difficulties in an economy
such as reducing investment and income, increasing interest rates, and decreasing governments’
ability to respond future economic crisis. In that respect, for a long time after its establishment,
People’s Republic of China had adopted a balanced budget fiscal policy. However, when
government launched its economic reforms programs at the end of the 1970s, it began to run
budget deficit and issue limited debt. Most of these deficits in the first half of the 1980s arose
because of the rising procurement prices of farms products. Procurement price was an
established price to farmers for their products. Government in this period aimed to increase
farmers’ income by raising procurement prices (Huang and Rozelle, 2018: 488). In order to
finance that government borrowed from the central bank and also issued several government
bonds. The total debt was just over 50 percent of the GDP which was around $100 billion in the

203
first half of the 1980s (World Bank, 1997: 131-133). In the middle of the decade Chinese
government started to implement its urban reforms. From that point, government gave some
autonomy to SOEs for managing their affairs, pricing their products and funding their
investments. It is important to know that even though these early decentralization reforms,
SOEs were still very much financially dependent to the central government. During this period
other than direct financing, central government used subsidies, tax exemptions and soft credits
to help these firms overcome their budget constraints. Under the reforms programs in order to
boost the productivity, central government allowed SOEs to give generous bonuses, wages and
all kind of amenities to their employees (Fang, Garnaut and Song, 2018: 11-12). Besides that,
SOEs also invested heavily for gaining a bigger share in the markets and creating more jobs in
provinces and cities where they located. All of these had positive effect on growth and
productivity; however, that created a massive debt for central government. It is crucial that
during this period total of all monetary and fiscal subsidies, incentives and expenditures of SOEs
to GDP grew substantially from 1.4 percent in 1980 to over 10 percent in 1989 (Zengxian, 1997:
1254). In sum, the national debt increased over 80 percent of GDP ($280 billion) at the end of
the 1980s (IMF, 2019). Government debt accounted for 6-7 percent of the total debt (National
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1999). Corporate debt made
up almost 90 percent of China’s total debt at the end of the 1980s (over 75 percent of the GDP)
(IMF). SOEs debt made the major share of it with 45 percent. Private business debt was around
30 percent of GDP (IMF). Finally, China’s debt as a percentage of U.S.’ debt averaged 3.8 percent
in this decade and in terms of world’s debt, China’s debt made up 1.1 percent of the world debt
(Mbaye, Badia, Chae: 14-20; World Bank, 2019; Council of Economic Advisers, Boards of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).
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The inflation and corruption scandals created a serious domestic unrest in the late 1980s.
After the Tiananmen Square crackdown Chinese government suppressed reforms and used
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. Debt and deficit decreased. Nevertheless, the mounting
losses of SOEs continued in the first half of this decade. In order to finance SOEs debt, central
government launched a banking reform. Chinese government also enacted a law in 1993 that
forcing the Ministry Finance to fund its total budget deficit by issuing bonds (Lin, 2002: 78). With
these laws total debt started to increase moderately until the Asian Financial Crisis. However,
during and after the Asian Financial Crisis government drastically changed its macroeconomic
policies from tight to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. As a result of these policies total
debt increased significantly. In this decade China’s debt as a percentage of GDP passed 100
percent which means total debt moved beyond $1 trillion (World Bank, IMF, 2019). Government
debt increased to 22 percent of GDP at the end of the decade ($236 billion) (World Bank, IMF;
National Bureau of National Statistics of China, 2000). Like previous decade SOEs and private
firms (corporate) debt made the major share of the total debt. During the 1990s corporate debt
increased from 75 percent of GDP to 100 percent of GDP (Over $1 trillion). Finally, household
debt first time in this decade appeared on the debt list. Government authorities’ expansionary
fiscal and monetary policies especially during the Asian financial crisis played important role on
creating household debt at the end of the 1990s. In all, the total debt reached almost 130
percent of GDP (over $1.4 trillion) (World Bank, IMF). In this decade the ratio of China’s total
debt-to-U.S. total debt was 6.6 percent. From the same point, China’s overall debt accounted for
1.6 percent of the world total debt (IMF; Mbaye, Badia, Chae; World Bank, 2019; Boards of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).
There was a global economic prosperity from early 2000s to the Global Financial Crisis.
Thus, Chinese government continued to use expansionary monetary policies for accelerating its
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export. During this period, China heavily invested in some sectors such as steel, cement and
aluminum (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016: 1). Total debt as a
percentage of GDP rose almost 150 percent before the middle of the decade. In other words,
China’s total debt was more than $3 trillion around the middle of the 2000s (IMF, World Bank,
2019). The tragic event which was the origin of China’s debt problem was the U.S. and then
Global Financial Crises. Before the financial crisis, China’s total debt was around $4-4.5 trillion
and about 150 percent of GDP. During this time government debt was 25 percent of GDP,
household debt 15 percent and corporate debt was almost 110 percent of the GDP (National
Bureau of National Statistics of China, 2011; World Bank, IMF, 2019). Just a decade after the
Financial Crisis, the total debt of China skyrocketed to $34 trillion which was equal to 255
percent of GDP in 2018 (IMF; World Bank). In other words, China built up a massive debt
(around $30 trillion) in a decade. It is important to know that China’s rising debt issue was the
result of a deliberate self-chosen decision that was taken by Chinese government during and
after the financial crisis. The reasons of why Chinese government took decision that increase
China’s debt burden suddenly and extremely were various. First of all, Global Financial Crisis
dropped global demand for goods. Due to that, Chinese exports plummeted sharply from 35
percent of GDP in 2007 to 25 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2019). During the same
period account surplus fell more than 5 percent of GDP (Kroeber, 217; National Bureau of
Statistics of China, 2019). As a result of these, hundreds of factories shut down and millions of
workers lost their jobs in China. For keeping the economy functioning and creating hundreds of
thousands of jobs in an effort to reduce unemployment, Chinese government announced its
huge stimulus package in the middle of crisis. The first package was almost $600 billion and
Chinese government gave authority to local governments and some investors for carrying out
much of the implementation of this package (Batson, 2008). It is important that in order to get
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highest return local government and investors invested heavily in real estate sector which
resulted in big property bubbles in many cities (Anderlini, 2014). This process kept the GDP
growth steady on the one hand, but on the other hand, it created a record amount of debt.
With its huge stimulus package Chinese government also aimed to make a transition from
an export and investment driven growth model to a model that relies more on domestic
consumption and service industry. However, it is important that government stimulus package
could not accelerate domestic consumption immediately in the real economy. Most of the
stimulus went to real estate and some infrastructure projects that generated low investment
returns. Low investment returns increased country’s total debt gradually. Meanwhile, China
failed to implement structural reforms (such as strengthening economic and legal infrastructure,
increasing competition, encouraging innovation, improving public sector governance and
liberalizing labor, capital and product market) that make enterprises particularly SOEs more
productive. With the stimulus support SOEs maintained even increased their employment and
production even though the world trade slowed down drastically in this period (Morrison, 2527). This worsened overcapacity and overproduction problems of SOEs that had already
seriously damaged the efficiency of these enterprises. In addition to that, when Xi Jinping
elected as president of China in 2013 he has promoted the role of SOEs at the expense of private
domestic and foreign firms. SOEs relatively increased their productivity and profits in some
fields; however, most of the other fields SOEs were still quite inefficient and they continued to
operate with huge loses (Song, 356-361). Contrary to the previous decade, central government
rarely allowed these enterprises to go bankrupt or let very few of them taken over through
merger and acquisition. From that point, the only way these enterprises survive was to increase
borrowing from state-owned banks to cover a substantial portion of their financial losses. They
borrowed heavily and after a decade from the GFC, their debt reached over $13 trillion (Molnar
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and Lu, 2019: 16). This was an increase almost four folds compared to their debt amount in the
GFC period. It is crucial that during the same period SOEs revenue rose only 1.5 times and their
profit grew by 60 percent (Molnar and Lu). In addition to that, during this period government’s
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies drove not only SOEs but also some private enterprises
to produce more goods than market demanded. Due to overcapacity, overproduction and
structural problems, these enterprises’ efficiency declined seriously which created many
difficulties for them to repay their debts. In order to repay their debts, they borrowed more that
eventually created even greater problems for these enterprises.
Under the new growth model central government launched some programs that aimed to
improve social services and expand public safety net especially in the rural regions of China. The
size of these programs was massive that covered hundreds of millions of people. For example,
providing free rural education covered around 150 million students, producing health care
services covered more than 800 million people and supplying basic pension coverage covered
400 million people (Kroeber, 33; Bloomberg News, 2019; Yu, 2015: 1148). After these and all
other programs, the spending on education increased from 3 to 4 percent of GDP, on health
care from 4 to 5 percent of GDP, on welfare from 6 to 9 percent of GDP, on pension from 0.5 to
1.5 percent of GDP and on social security from 2 to 3 percent of GDP in a decade (The State
Council, PRC, 2019; World Bank, 2019; OECD, 2019; World Bank Trading Economics, 2019;
Zhang, L., et al, 12, 20). It is important that the majority of these programs were implemented
by regional and local governments. These programs added enormous costs to the budgets of
these governments. In order to finance these social service programs and all other programs
including especially infrastructure programs regional and local governments started to rely
overwhelmingly on extra-budgetary resources- mainly off budget borrowing. It is crucial that
regional and local governments operated their off-budget borrowing practices beyond the
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central government fiscal surveillance. From that point, these governments’ debt increased
drastically. Due to that many regional and local governments were in unsustainable level of
debt.
On the other hand, central government highly concerned that, expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies could cause a price hike in the economy that eventually could lead to a social
unrest like the one in the late 1980s. From that point, Chinese government used price control by
setting prices below market prices in some critical areas such as real estate, food and energy.
For example, in order to hold energy prices (oil, natural gas, coal and electricity) within socially
acceptable ranges, central government heavily subsidized SOEs to sell its goods and services at
low prices. However, such funding disguised the true cost of many economic activities in China.
On the other hand, it created a massive debt burden for the country in this decade. From the
same perspective, for easing the pressure of rising real-estate prices over families, central
government launched many projects such as building enormous number of residential houses in
hundreds of cities across the country in order to pull property prices down. Finally, central
government also used its policies for controlling the food prices (pork, wheat, corn) in
reasonable level. In sum, Chinese government reduced the risks of price inflation and the
potential of social unrest by using various policies that hold the prices of critical sectors’ goods
and services in socially acceptable ranges. However, on the other hand, these policies caused
massive economic disruption and led to a surge in government debt.
Currency appreciation was another factor that significantly increased budget debt in this
period. It is important that Chinese currency gradually appreciated from 8 yuan per U.S. dollar in
2005 to 6 yuan per U.S. dollar in 2014 (World Bank, 2018). Many investors in China expected
that the RMB would appreciate even more due to other countries’ (particularly the U.S.)
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pressure on China for manipulating and lowering the value of its currency against other
currencies in order to increase export to grow the economy by over 10 percent each year. This
expectation made Chinese investors borrow dollars from foreign banks and exchanged them to
RMB in order to get a high return. Chinese investors borrowed $20 billion from foreign financial
institutions in 2008; however, this number soared to $1 trillion in 2014 (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2017: 80). China’s financial liberalization
efforts in this period played important role in creating this debt. However, it is important that
when Chinese currency started to depreciate, Chinese investors rushed to repay their debt after
2015.
Another factor that increased the debt burden of China was the fast expansion of shadow
banking. Shadow banking is a non-bank financial intermediary activity. It is less transparent
service that produces high-risk loans with higher returns than traditional financial institutions.
During and after the global financial crisis under the government massive economic stimulus
packages many small and mid-size private firms still could not find enough credits from
traditional financial institutions. Therefore, these firms borrowed heavily from shadow banking
institutions that provide wider and easier access to affordable credit. Shadow banking’s loans
became popular gradually and in 2015 the size of these loans reached nearly two-thirds of
China’s GDP (over $7 trillion) (IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 2016: 36).
However, it is important that most of institutions repackaged these loans and showed them as
investment in their balance sheet. From that point, shadow banking institutions create big bad
credit bubble that pose a serious risk to Chinese financial system. Therefore, Chinese authorities
enacted a law that crack down shadow banking channels after 2016 (Financial Times, 2016).
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Energy prices were other major factors that significantly increased the debt of China in this
decade. Due to its robust economic growth in the 2000s, China’s demand for oil increased
significantly. Although its growth has slowed down since 2010, the country’s demand for oil is
continuously rising. China’s consumption of oil increased from 7800 thousand barrels per day in
2007 to over 10000 thousand barrels per day in 2012 and finally to over 13500 thousand barrels
per day in 2018 (British Petroleum Company, 2019: 20). It is important that the country has
relatively poor oil reserves. Therefore, China relies on import of oil around 75 percent of its total
usage (Clemente, 2019). From that point, it is predictable that China has been affected severely
by rising or declining global oil prices. Low prices of oil are expected to boost economic growth
of China and also increase China’s current account surpluses. On the other hand, high oil prices
are anticipated to decrease net export and total output. High oil prices also have negative effect
on consumer prices and overall economic expansion. From that point it is crucial that prices of
oil dramatically increased after 2000. Prices of a barrel oil rose from $23 in 2001 to $50 in 2005
and then $107 in 2011. It stayed average $79 per barrel till 2018 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD), 2019). However, it is very important that China uses state
control over its oil industry by adjusting the prices of oil and its products and directing all sales
through state agencies in order to keep the prices of goods and services in socially reasonable
ranges. This way maybe helps to keep the prices in order and prevents a social unrest; however,
it has a devastating effect on government budget.
After all of these spending programs Chinese government was able to create enough jobs
to reduce unemployment rate and maintained a relatively high economic growth even during
and after the Global Financial Crisis. However, the cost of implementing that was huge. China’s
debt to GDP ratio increased dramatically from about 150 percent of GDP in 2008 to over 255
percent of GDP in 2018 (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019). It is important to know that most of the
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debt is corporate debt. China’s corporate debt rose sharply from 98 percent of GDP ($4.5
trillion) in 2008 to 156 percent in 2018 (IMF; World Bank; Bank of International Settlement (BIS),
2019). This is one of the highest corporate debt-to-GDP ratios in the world. The value of total
amount of corporate debt is $20 trillion. It is also important to know that over two-thirds of
Chinese corporate debt is owned by SOEs (about $13.2 trillion) (Deutsche Bank Wealth
Management; NikkeiAsia, 2019). Local government accounted for half of SOEs debt and onethird of total corporate debt ($6.6 trillion) (NikkeiAsia; Deutsche Bank Wealth Management).
Besides that, China’s household indebtedness is moderate even though it jumped by over 30
percentage points over a decade. In 2018 household debt increased from 18.4 percent of GDP ($
846 billion) in 2008 to 51.2 percent of GDP ($6.97 trillion) (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
Government indebtedness is relatively low when it is compared to other governments’ debt. In
2018 it is 50.6 percent of the GDP ($6.87 trillion) (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019; National Bureau
of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2019). However, like the household
and corporate debt, the rise of government indebtedness from 2008 to 2018 was significant.
Government debt was 27 percent of GDP in 2008 ($1.2 trillion) (IMF; World Bank; National
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook). It is crucial to know that
regardless of the ownership of the total debt, dealing with considerably high level of debt
creates serious challenges for Chinese economy. In total, China’s debt as a percentage of U.S.
debt drastically increased from 17.1 percent in the 2000s to almost 60 percent in the 2010s. In
terms of world total debt, the ratio of China’s total-debt-to world total debt surged from 3.2
percent in the 2000s to 10.7 percent in the 2010s (IMF, Mbaye, Badia, Chae; World Bank;
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (various years)).
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Figure 42 China’s Debt to GDP Ratio (Corporate, Household and Government Debts) 1980-2019
Source: Data collected from National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (various years);
World Bank (various years); Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (various years); IMF (various years).
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Figure 43 China Total Debt as Percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2018
Source: Derived from (various years) National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, IMF,
World Bank and OECD
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2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

China - U.S. Debt to GDP Ratio 2007-2018
Government
Household
Corporate
China
U.S.
China
U.S.
China
U.S.
29
62
21
84
97
42
27
68
20
85
98
45
35
82
24
85
120
44
34
90
27
82
121
41
34
95
28
78
120
40
34
99
30
74
131
40
37
100
33
72
141
41
40
101
36
70
150
42
42
100
39
68
163
43
44
104
44
68
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45
46
103
48
68
160
45
50
104
51
66
156
46

Total
China
147
145
179
182
182
195
211
226
244
254
254
257

U.S.
188
198
211
213
213
213
213
213
211
217
216
216

Table 18 China -U.S. Debt to GDP Ratio (Corporate, Household and Government Debts) 2007-2018
Source: China’s debt data derived from National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook,
World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; IMF (various years). U.S.’s debt data collected from Council of Economic
Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for corporate and household debts; For
calculating household debt from 1950 to 2001, nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data are
used which are derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans such as credit card
debt added to household debt. Starting from 2006 student loans added to household debt. Both databases are
collected from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.
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Puzzle of China’s High Saving Rate
It is very crucial that saving, which leads to increase people’s income through investing in
investment vehicles, plays an important role for economic growth of a country. In that respect,
Deng’s Xiaoping economic reforms that started in the late 1970s made drastic changes on
China’s saving rate. At the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s, household saving was
around 6-7 percent of the GDP, government saving accounted for 15-18 percent and corporate
saving was between 8-9 percent of the GDP (Kraay, 2000: 551-554; Qian, 1988: 592-594). Total
saving in that period was around 30 percent of the GDP.
In the 1980s China’s household saving started to increase and that trend continued
through the early 1990s. There were various reasons behind China’s high household saving rate.
First of all, traditional ideas and historical factors played an important role on it. Not only in this
period, but also in earlier periods people in China tended to save more than people in different
countries. Past experiences, poverty and inequalities tragically affected people in China and
made them reluctant to spend their earnings. From that point, they increased their
precautionary saving even though their incomes started to rise. Besides that, reforms on
agriculture in rural areas and then reforms on SOEs in urban areas significantly increased the
income of Chinese households which made them able to save more for the future. In addition,
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy in this period encouraged people
in China to save more for future opportunities such as purchasing state assets or investing
private companies’ bond. It is also important that in the early stages of reforms period people
had less control over their earnings. It was usual that Chinese government forced people to save
their income or purchase company bonds. Later in the 1980s, government’s control over
people’s earning decline; however, household saving continue to rise. It is also crucial that
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demographic changes played an important role on the rise of household saving. The fertility rate
declined drastically in the 1980s due to the one-child policy that was enforced by Chinese
authorities in the previous decade. This policy created a situation that increased household
saving first by spending less for fewer children and then saving more for the future
(precautionary saving) as fewer children would take care of them when they get old (Zhang, L.,
et al, 2018: 7). Finally, rural and urban reforms crated a volatile environment in China in this
period that people felt less certain about their future income. This was another factor that
forced people in China to save more for the future. In sum, household saving increased from
around 6-7 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to 20 percent around the middle of
decade (National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1999;
Modigliani and Cao, 2004: 146-147; Kraay: 567-570). Due to social unrests and political
instabilities in the late 1980s, household saving decreased 11-12 percent of GDP and then rose
again to almost 15 percent at the end of the 1980s (National Bureau of National Statistics of
China; Modigliani and Cao; Kraay).
On the other hand, there was a sharp decrease in government saving. Before the reforms,
government was the largest saver in China (15-18 percent of GDP) (Qian, 594). At the end of the
decade government saving rate dropped more than 10 percent to 5 percent of GDP (Yang,
Zhang and Zhou, 2011: 13-14). This means government in this period spent a lot; however, it
collected little. During the 1980s government authorities mostly used expansionary monetary
and fiscal policies in order to support reforms financially. From that perspective for example,
government authorities raised procurement prices of agricultural products, gave generous
bonuses to SOEs employees, raised their wages and pressure financial institutions to extend
credits for SOEs. Government also spent a lot for establishing SEZs. Besides that, authorities by
that time gave tax breaks and all kind of incentives to foreign firms for moving them inside the
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newly established SEZs. In addition to that government spending for social services such as
housing, education, pension and medical services were high in this early reform period.
Finally, corporate saving increased few percentage points in this decade to 11-12 percent
of GDP (Kraay, 566). It is important that during the 1980s some SOEs boosted their income due
to lack of competition and their monopolistic power. On the other hand, government heavily
subsidized these institutions in order to promote growth. From that perspective, corporations’
cost of production dropped steadily. They had easy access to energy, land and capital. Besides
that, labor market reform in this decade relaxed workers mobility restrictions which allowed
millions of rural workers to move to cities (Gregory and Meng, 395-399; Meng, 2012: 76-82).
Due to a large flow of rural labor to cities, corporations in this decade were able to increase
their profit by keeping the wages down. Corporate restructuring on the other hand, in the 1980s
raised productivity and boosted corporate profit (Chow, 100). In total, China’s gross saving in the
1980s was around 32-33 percent of the GDP.
Like in previous decade household sector was the largest saver in the 1990s. Household
saving was around 17-18 percent of GDP (Kuijs, 2005: 17). Some of the reasons of high
household saving rate in the 1980s were also the same reasons of high household saving in the
1990s. For example, cultural, historical experiences, rising people income and demographic
factors such as declining fertility rate also encouraged people to save more in this decade. Other
than that, household in the 1990s saved more of their income due to China’s shrinking social
safety net. The transition from central planned economy to more market-based economy led to
the shrinking of social safety net in this decade (Zhang, L., et al., 8-9). For example, government
responsibilities of pension, health care, welfare and unemployment insurance shifted to
employers or employees themselves. As a result of this, people in China started to increase their
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precautionary savings. It is also very important that housing ownership increased drastically in
this decade. Government housing reforms at the end of the 1980s fostered the effort of
privatization of housing on the one hand, and banned company-supplied dorm style housing on
the other hand (Perkins, 2018: 150; Fang, H., Gu, Q., Xiong, W. and Zhou, L.-A., 2016: 110). After
these reforms there was a massive surge for house ownership in China that prompted
household saving in the 1990s. From the same perspective, government in this decade decided
to take an aggressive action to privatize small and medium size of SOEs by selling these
institutions to its employees which also stimulated the household saving. It is important that
weak financial market and banking system in the 1990s created a lot of serious liquidity
constraints in China. It was very hard to get a home loan or any other forms of credit in this
period (Shimek and Wen, 2008). In order to obtain a loan, borrowers had to make a large down
payment. That means increased savings were needed for obtaining the loan. This was another
factor that increased household saving in the 1990s.
Government saving rate decreased by 2 percent during the 1990s and hovered around 3-4
percent of GDP throughout the decade (Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 44). However, at the end of the
decade it dropped to 2 percent of GDP (Yang, Zhang and Zhou). Except few years after the
Tiananmen Square crackdown, government mostly used economic policies that accelerate the
growth. During and after the Asian financial crisis government authorities increased public
spending and used more proactive monetary and fiscal policies to protect China from the worst
effect of the crisis. In addition to that, government like in previous decade covered SOEs huge
budget deficits even though government enlarged its privatization of these institutions.
Corporate saving like previous decade rose moderately and reached 14-15 percent of GDP
in the 1990s (Ma and Yi, 2010: 15-16; Kraay, 566). Previous decade’s reforms expanded and
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intensified in this decade. It is important that China launched a serious large-scale market-based
reforms included privatization and restructuring of SOEs in this decade. Due to that,
corporations’ productivity and profitability increased drastically. Another important factor that
boosted corporations’ profitability and productivity was China’s export expansion. China’s
export growth accelerated when Chinese government devalued its currency and increased the
amount of subsidies for its companies. After the Asian financial crises Chinese authorities
expanded export-promoting policies and gave more subsidies to its corporations that included
refunds, low-interest loans, cheap land and preferential tax rates. Other than export expansion
and government subsidies which directly contributed to corporations’ profitability; keeping
production costs down in this decade also increased the revenues of Chinese corporations. From
that point, it is important to know that during this period Chinese authorities gradually loosened
rural-urban migration restrictions in order to keep the wages and production cost down for
corporations (Gregory and Meng, 395-396). In sum, corporate saving in this decade increased 34 percentage points from the previous decade’s average. Finally, China’s gross saving in the
1990s was around 35-36 percent of the GDP.
Household saving rate steadily increased after China’s World Trade Organization (WTO)
entry. It is very important that China’s accession to the WTO resulted in a magnificent growth of
export. This positively affected the wages. Household income grew at more than three times in
the 2000s. It rose from about $800 in 2000 to over $2.7 thousand in 2009 (National Bureau of
National Statistics of China, 2019). Due to rising income, households were able to save more.
Other than rising income there were other factors that positively affect household saving. For
example, One Child Policy that was introduced in the late 1970s resulted in more household
saving in 2000s like previous decades. On the other hand, decline in social safety net continued
in this decade which also increased household precautionary saving. The rise of private home
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ownership that had started in the previous decade also continued until global financial crisis.
Private home ownership rate in this period reached over 90 percent (Shepard, 2016). The
impact of household ownership on saving was positive throughout the 2000s. Besides that, like
in previous decades, historical and cultural experiences and demographic factors also
encouraged people in this decade to save more. In sum, household saving rate reached 22-23
percent of GDP in this decade
Government saving rate in 2000s was totally different from previous decade’s government
saving rate. During the 2000s government saving was on a steady upward trend and peaked
over 10 percent in global financial crisis times (Ma and Yi, 10; Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 44). After
the crisis government saving moderated and stabilized at around 5 percent (Zhang, L., et al, 1819). First of all, export boom in this decade significantly increased government revenues. Rising
government revenue had positive impact on government saving. Besides that, with its structural
reforms that was started in the late 1970s Chinese authorities gradually diminished its social
spending especially on health, pension and social assistance. Lower social spending in the early
2000s allowed Chinese government to increase its saving in this decade. However, starting from
the second half of this decade social safety spending started to increase under the harmonious
society program (Hofman, 63). FDI also had positive impact on government saving. During this
decade FDI rose substantially. At the end of the 2000s the value of FDI was over $100 billion
(Ministry of Commerce, PRC, 2019). However, during and after the global financial crisis
government authorities used aggressive expansionist monetary and fiscal policies which
decreased government saving at the end of the decade from 10 percent of GDP to 6 percent of
GDP.
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Corporate saving rate increased significantly after China’s accession to the WTO. This surge
continued until global financial crisis. During and after the crisis corporate saving rate
moderated as the economy slowed down. It is essential that the exchange rate played important
role on corporation saving in this decade. Chinese currency was undervalued until the late 2000s
which had a significant impact on the export boom in this decade. It is also important that
during this period government heavily subsidized Chinese corporations in order to increase
export and economic growth. A result of these, trade surpluses drastically increased and due to
trade surpluses Chinese corporations were able increase their savings. In addition to that factors
that had contributed to corporate saving in previous decade also positively affected corporate
saving in the 2000s. For example, like in previous decades Chinese authorities reduced workers
mobility restrictions and encouraged rural-urban migration in order to respond corporations’
demand for unskilled labor in urban areas in the 2000s. It is important that the demand for
unskilled workers significantly increased when China attracted more and more FDI especially in
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The demand for labor reached the heights point after China
joined the WTO. From that point, 100 million migrants joined to urban workforce in less than
ten years (from the end of the 1990s to global financial crisis) (Gregory and Meng, 396). It is
crucial that a large flow of workforce from rural areas to urban areas in that period helped
corporations to keep their wages and production costs down even though these corporations
substantially increased their profits. In total, corporate saving increased from around 15 percent
of GDP in the 1990s to almost 20 percent of GDP in the 2000s (Ma and Yi, 2010: 15; Kraay, 566).
Finally, China’s overall saving in the 2000s was over 45 percent of the GDP.
It is important that after the global financial crisis household saving remained around 2223 percent and then gradually decline to 20 percent (Zhang, L., et al, 6). One of the major
reasons of this decline is China’s economic slowdown in the 2010s after export-driven growth
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lost its power. Structural and institutional problems, the US-led trade war, aging population and
a slowing global economy negatively affect household saving rate in this period. Besides that,
factors that used to contribute significantly to household saving in previous decades have no or
less impact on household saving in this decade. For example, after serious financial and interest
rate liberalization programs in this period, financial constraints play no major role on boosting
household saving in the 2010s. It is important that in previous periods due to China’s
underdeveloped financial and banking system it was very difficult to borrow for housing, health
care, durable goods such as car and appliances and other big expenditures. Hence, households
increased their saving for their future expenses. However, since 2012 Chinese authorities have
gradually liberalized banking and financial sectors that included the relaxation of financial
constraints over Chinese household. This new situation results in a decline in household saving
rate in this decade. Besides that, housing ownership rose drastically in previous decade (reached
90 percent in the previous decade); however, in 2010 the growth stopped and then started to
slow down (87 percent) (Huang, He and Gan, 2020). Decline in homeownership ratio decreases
the household saving in this decade. In addition to that, Chinese authorities gradually decreased
social safety net until the harmonious society program in the second half of the previous
decade. Since then, Chinese government has started to rebuild the social safety net with various
programs such as new rural health care system and pension schemes. It is also important that
after his election as president, Xi Jinping pledged to improve all social and public programs. All
of these factors play substantial role on decreasing household saving in this decade.
Government saving similar to household saving increased until global financial crisis (over
10 percent). Then it slowed down and stabilized around 5-6 percent in 2010s (IMF, 2017). An
important decrease from 10 percent in the second half of previous decade to 5-6 percent in the
2010s was about rising social spending of the Chinese government. However, Chinese
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government still has lower social spending compared to other countries, even though there was
a significant spending increase on health (from 4 percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP) (World
Bank, 2019), education (from 3 percent of GDP to over 4 percent of GDP) (The State Council,
PRC, 2019), pension (from 0.5 percent of GDP to 1.5 percent of GDP) (World Bank, Trading
Economics, 2019), and social assistance to household (from 6 percent of GDP to 9 percent of
GDP) (OECD, 2019) in this decade. Besides that, it is important that social security used to be
one of the main drivers of government saving in the previous decades. However, due to aging
population the system started to give deficit in the middle of 2010s. In other words, payments
exceeded contributions in China’s social security system (almost 3 percent of GDP in the second
half of the decade) (Zhang, L., et al, 12, 20). In sum, as a result of declining global demand for
Chinese products during and after the global financial crisis it has become clear for China that it
would be very hard to continue its economic growth with its labor intensive and low-wage
manufacturing export. Since then Chinese government has spent hundreds of billion dollars in
order to transit to an economic model that features strong domestic consumption, high valueadded production and strong private sector role. However, all of these factors have negative
impact on government saving in the 2010s and brought down government saving from 10
percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP.
Like all other component of saving, corporate saving rate was stagnant during the global
financial crisis period and then slowly decreased to 17-18 percent of GDP in the 2010s (Zhang, L.,
et al, 6). It is important that during and after the initial reforms periods economic and
institutional changes resulted in the rise in corporate profitability. However, in 2010s most of
these changes had no big impact on corporate profitability. On the other hand, expansion of
export in previous decade significantly increased corporate saving. However, in the 2010s global
demand of Chinese products gradually decreased. China-U.S. trade war on the other hand just
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worsened this situation in the second half of this decade. Besides that, wages and other factors
cost of production increased during this decade which also negatively affect corporation saving.
It is crucial that in previous decade when Chinese authorities loosened rural-urban migration
restrictions, over a hundred million rural workers responded that by migrating to the cities.
However, in the 2010s only 20 million people migrate urban areas and more importantly from
2014 to 2017 there was almost no rural worker migrated to cities (Gregory and Meng, 396) even
though government officials substantially reduce rural workers mobility restrictions and
encourage them to migrate urban areas. In sum, China’s gross saving in the 2010s was around
42-44 percent of the GDP.

1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Saving Rates in China
Household Government Corporation
15-16
5-6
11-12
17-18
3-4
14-15
22-23
5-6
19-20
20-21
5-6
17-18

Total
31-34
34-37
46-49
42-45

1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Saving Rates in the U.S.
Household Government Corporation
8-9
(-1)-0
12-13
6-7
0-1
11-12
5-6
(-1)-0
12-13
5-6
(-4)-(-3)
15-16

Total
19-22
17-20
16-19
16-19

Table 19-20 Saving Rates in China and in the U.S.
Source: China’s household, government and corporate savings data derived from various resources included; National
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Modigliani and Cao, 2004; Kraay,
2000; Qian, 1988; Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 2011; Kuijs, 2005; IMF, World Bank and OECD (various years); Ma and Yi,
2010 and Zhang, L., et al.,2018. U.S. household, government and corporate savings data collected from various (years)
sources of Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Minneapolis,
Dallas, San Francisco, Richmond and Boston Gross National Saving data are derived from World Bank and Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), White House archives and Federal Reserve Banks publications.

The Rise and Decline of China’s Productivity
Productivity is one of the key sources of economic growth. It is important that in the longterm countries capacities’ to improve their living standards depends on their abilities to increase
their productivity. In that respect, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s China maintained its
Soviet-style slow, inefficient and unproductive centrally planned economy. With that economy
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Chinese government controlled a large share of country’s economic output by regulating
production, prices and resources. However, this did not bring prosperity to China. At the end of
the 1970s China was still weak, stagnant, inefficient and isolated from most of the world
economies. In order to increase economic growth, raise the income level and living standards of
its citizens, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping decided to launch several economic reforms at the
end of the 1970s. China at that time was primarily an agrarian country. Therefore, reforms were
started in agricultural sectors. First of all, government shifted collective farming system to
household responsibility system (HRS). Under the HRS, government allowed farmers to produce
more agricultural output in order to sell them in the market at market prices after they finished
selling their assigned fixed quota of products to the government with official prices (Chow, 94).
Government’s decision of giving farmers freedom over production and allowing them to make
profits from more efficient use of factors of production (particularly land and labor) created
strong incentive among farmers to be more productive in the early 1980s. With their improved
productivity farmers increased their agricultural output by almost 50 percent in the first half of
the 1980s (Lin, 1992: 45; Huang and Rozelle, 492). It is very important that the increase in
productivity and agricultural output reduced China’s food constraints in that period. Due to that,
millions of people who had employed in the agricultural sector was able to change their jobs and
work in more productive rural industrial enterprises which are also known “township and village
enterprises” (TVEs). This was a structural shift in productivity that transferred labor from low
productivity sector (agriculture) to high productivity sector (industry and service).
The success of the agricultural reforms in the early 1980s motivated Chinese government
to launch same kind of reforms in the nonagricultural sector. From that point, the government
which was responsible for 75 percent of nonagricultural output and 80 percent of the total
urban employment at the end of the 1970s (Zhu, 2012: 114), introduced dual-tracking system.
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This was very much like the HRS in the agricultural sector that state-owned enterprises (SOE)
were authorized to purchase input and sell output at market prices beyond their quotas that
was given to them by central government for their production input and output with the fixed
official price (China Labor Bulletin, 2007). Like in the agricultural sector dual-tracking system
increased the productivity in nonagricultural sectors. In addition to that, central government
gave more autonomy to provincial, city and county-level of governments and SOEs managers for
setting SOEs’ wages, hiring and firing SOEs’ workers, purchasing and selling SEOs’ goods and
services, and pricing SOEs products (Chow, 97-98). It is important that lower-level governments
and SOEs managers were thought to have greater knowledge on local SOEs’ needs. From that
point, they mostly took decisions that make SOEs more productive in this period. Besides that,
central government connected managers and workers’ wages to financial outcome of SOEs in
order to increase workers and employers’ productivity (Hoi Yei, 2006: 157). Meanwhile, due to
the central government’s generous financial and legal incentives the number of TVEs rapidly
increased from 1.52 million at the end of the 1970s to almost 19 million at the end of the 1980s
(National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). In the same
period the number of workers employed in TVEs increased from 28.3 million to almost 94
million (National Bureau of National Statistics of China). In addition to that, special economic
zones (SEZ) played important role on increasing productivity in this period. Chinese government
established SEZs in four coastal cities in 1979 and offered tax, trade and financial incentives to
attract foreign investment. By establishing SEZs, central government also planned to build
trading ties with other countries in the 1980s. In the final analysis, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms
opened the economy to internal and external markets in this decade. Expanding markets
allowed Chinese corporations to reach a higher degree of specialization and more efficient use
of resources. In addition to that reforms (HRS, managerial responsibility system) that
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encouraged workers and employers to use resources efficiently. There were also improvements
in the quality of inputs. Labor and capital qualities gradually increased in the 1980s. Finally,
technological change also played some roles on productivity in this decade. Starting from the
early reforms Chinese government adopted policies that promote technological change in order
to boost productivity. In total, annual average growth in labor productivity was 6.4 percent in
the 1980s (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019; National
Bureau of Statistic of China, 2019; CEIC, 2019). Total factor productivity grew by 2.7 percent
annually (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of
Statistic of China; Zhu, 111).
The productivity growth in agricultural sector started to slow down in the second half of
the 1980s. Government in the 1990s gradually liberalized market for agricultural inputs and
outputs. Farmers starting in the early 1990s were able to make their own decisions with less
intervention and fewer restrictions. On the other hand, central government reduced its financial
incentives for the farmers. Agricultural market liberalization encouraged farmers to invest more
on new technologies. Due to technological investment, productivity in this sector increased. Like
in the previous decade when productivity increased in the agricultural sector, a smaller number
of farmers met China’s food demand without causing any difficulties. Due to that a great
number of workers were reallocated to the nonagricultural sectors (Fang, 2018: 243-244). By
that time average labor productivity in nonagricultural sectors was at least six times higher than
the productivity in agricultural sector (Zhu, 114). Therefore, reforms and productivity growth in
agricultural sector was one of the major sources of the productivity increase in other sectors. It
was important that throughout previous decade SOEs’ productivity remained low. One of the
main reasons behind that central government had commitment to support employment in the
SOEs. Due to this commitment, SOEs had no budget constraints and market disciplines.
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However, in the 1990s after their deteriorating economic performance, the economic condition
of SOEs worsened significantly (Kobayashi, Baobo, and Sano, 1999: 12-15). From that point,
financial aid that needed to sustain SOEs increased steadily in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In
the middle of the 1990s it became clear that this could no longer be sustainable. Therefore,
central government declined its commitment to SOEs and adopted a reform program known as
“grasping the big and letting go of the small and medium size of these enterprises” (Hsieh and
Song, 2015: 299-301). According to this program, government focused on large SOEs in strategic
industries, and released small and medium size SOEs. From that point, government started to
shut down many unproductive small-medium size SOEs. The vast majority of them were
privatized and some of them were sold to their employees. In the middle of half of the 1990s
Chinese government enacted “Company Law” that basically legalized the development of
private firms (Lardy, 330). In addition to that, central government facilitated to reregister over a
million collective firms as private companies (Lardy). After these decisions the number of private
enterprises grew drastically. Labor and capital moved from state to private sector. State
financial institutions gradually recognized private enterprises and directed a larger share of their
lending to these institutions (Cheng and Wu, 2016: 2). Combination of shutting down of
unproductive small and medium size SOEs, legalizing the development of private enterprises,
and increasing the access of private enterprises to funds had strong effect on productivity
growth in China in this decade. Meanwhile, central government gradually reduced and
eventually eliminated the dual-tracking price system for the existing SOEs. In the middle of this
decade most of the products were sold at market prices. Reforming price system created some
incentives for SOEs to increase their productivity little bit. It is important that after the Asian
financial crisis in the second half of the 1990s China experienced a massive downturn in export.
In order to remove negative effect of financial crisis, Chinese authorities cut interest rates,
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increased money supplies and used other expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. That
response was successful. In a few years Chinese GDP started to increase again. However, it is
crucial that monetary and fiscal stimulus projects were directed by public institutions such as
SOEs, central, provincial or regional governments. This process cut the earlier efforts of
expansion the relative role of private enterprises in Chinese economy. Overall, due to rising
government and SOEs activities in the economy, productivity growth slowed down at the end of
the 1990s. Nevertheless, except this, there were some factors that drove productivity upwards
in this decade. For example, the quality of labor and capital increased much faster than previous
decade. The quality of high school-college education and vocational training improved
significantly (Tsang, 2000: 611). Besides that, spending on research and development rose
gradually (World Bank, 2019). These factors helped China to develop industrial technologies in
the 1990s. It is also important that starting from second half of the decade there was a sharp
increase in FDI. FDI had a significant spillover effects that brought new production technologies
and techniques and modern management practices to the country. From that point, FDI
significantly contributed productivity growth in this decade. In sum, it is important that annual
labor productivity increased by 2 percentage points from previous decade’s average and
reached to 8.4 percent in the 1990s (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis;
National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). Annual total factor productivity was increased by
less than 1 percentage point from precious decade’s average. In the 1990s annual average total
factor productivity was 3.5 percent (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis;
National Bureau of Statistic of China; Zhu).
The productivity growth in the 2000s was very much a continuation of previous decade’s
productivity growth. Like in the previous decade, factors that drove the productivity upwards
such as capital investment, resource allocation, technological change and improvement in the
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quality of input continued even more intensively in this decade. Unproductive state enterprises
(SOEs, TVEs) lost their edge. The number of SOEs that closed down increased. At the end of the
1990s there were over 50 thousand SOEs in China; after a decade that number dropped to 9
thousand (Song, 370). Many of these enterprises were privatized. Some of them restructured
and reorganized. Reallocation of factors of production (labor, entrepreneurship and capital)
from state to non-state sectors accelerated in this decade. Due to that, productivity has
significantly improved. Chinese government’s decision to enter into World Trade Organization
(WTO) opened a new era for China to launch further reforms. It is important that in order to join
the WTO Chinese government cut tariffs, reduced restrictive barriers, broadened trade rights
and allowed non-state enterprises enter the domestic trade sectors. After its entry into the
WTO, Chinese firms improved their access to foreign markets. Improved access to foreign
market created two major consequences. One was an expansion of trade which expanded the
capital accumulation and the other was a further realization of its comparative advantages that
helped China to use its production factors more efficiently (Chow, 2003: 109). Both
consequences have positive effect on productivity growth in China. It is also important that with
their increasing access to world markets after joining the WTO, Chinese firms were able to
import more technology intensive goods as both investment and intermediate input which also
promote productivity in that period. From the same point, liberalization of country’s economic
system played critical role on accelerated FDI in China in the 2000s. At the end of the decade
China attracted 20 percent of the world FDI (World Bank, Ministry of Commerce, PRC). Like in
the second half of the previous decade, FDI brought new production technologies and new
management practices that led to increase productivity. Besides that, it is also important that
the improvement in human capital continued in this decade. The number of people who
received college degrees increased. In addition to that, the quality of education at China’s
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colleges significantly improved. Finally spending on R&D significantly rose in the 2000s (almost 2
percent of GDP at the end of the decade) (World Bank; OECD, 2019). These developments also
played important role on improving the productivity in China. It is critical to know that
combination of trade liberalization, privatization, and access to foreign markets in this decade
increased competition in manufacturing sector which led to a rapid productivity growth.
However, the same thing can’t be said for the sectors that were dominated by SOEs. Especially
in the service sector government, still made up over 70 percent of employment, had strict
barriers to entry (Lardy, 334). From that point, due to overregulation, barriers to entry and low
level of competition productivity growth in government dominated sectors lagged behind of
other sectors. It is important that central government continued its previous decade’s policy of
grasping the big and letting go of the small and medium size of SOEs. On the other hand,
government identified some important industries (strategic and pillar) and used a variety of
industrial and financial measures for allocating resources to these SOEs favorably (Song, 357361). As a result, revenue and the size of SOEs increased substantially; however, their
productivity deteriorated especially at the end of the decade due to GFC and the polices that
central government adopted after the GFC. GFC was an important factor that negatively
affected productivity (slightly) at the end of this decade, but extensively in the next decade. In
all, labor productivity grew by 9.4 percent annually which was 1 percentage point higher than
previous decade’s average (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National
Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). On the other hand, total factor productivity grew by 3.9
percent annually in the 2000s (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis;
National Bureau of Statistic of China; Zhu).
It is essential that China experienced a very different productivity growth in the 2010s.
Starting from the GFC in the late 2000s, China’s productivity growth declined steadily. There
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were many factors that contribute to decline in productivity growth. First of all, during and after
the GFC the demand for Chinese export decline significantly. Chinese government responded
this decline by adopting a massive stimulus package. The aim of this stimulus was to maintain
the employment and sustain the production. Therefore, during and after the GFC Chinese
enterprises increased its production even though the world trade slowed down significantly.
Eventually this created serious overproduction and overcapacity problems that damaged foreign
trade relations and economic sustainability of China. It is important that most of this package’s
projects were in infrastructure and construction sectors that increased the economic growth
substantially; however, added almost nothing to productivity. In addition, similar to that of the
stimulus package in response to the Asian financial crisis a decade ago, central government
authorized public institutions such as SOEs, regional and local governments to administer the
monetary and fiscal stimulus project. From that point, a large amount of money from the
stimulus package was directed to unproductive SOEs that mostly generated a weak return on
assets (Song, 355). Overstaffing, overinvestment/overproduction and weak corporate
governance after the GFC prevented SOEs to be more productive (359-361). Besides that, when
Xi Jinping became president in 2013 he increased the role of the state in the economy. He
launched many reforms that boosted the importance of SOEs. SOEs increased their production
and profits in areas where private enterprises once led. On the other hand, business
environment worsened for the productive private enterprises after Xi Jinping’s reforms.
It is noteworthy that in this decade many foreign companies started to reduce their
investment in China as a result of trade disputes (particularly between China and the U.S.),
political and economic pressure of Chinese government on foreign firms, foreign firms’
reluctance to share technology and management techniques with their Chinese partners, and
finally continuously increasing production cost of corporations in China. From that point, the
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pace of FDI flows into China decreased to 2 percent per year in this decade which is 8 percent
lower than previous decade’s average of 10 percent (UNCTAD, 2019: 42). It is crucial that in
previous decade China was able to attract 20 percent of the world gross FDI; however, less than
a decade China lost half of that share (in 2018 China accounted for 10 percent of the world FDI)
(UNCTAD). Declined growth of FDI in the 2010s slowed down the transfer of foreign technology
into China which further deteriorated productivity in this country. Consequently, in order to
raise productivity Chinese government aimed to create homegrown technology with the project
called “Made in China 2025”. Chinese authorities identified ten key sectors (from information
technology to aerospace equipment and from ocean engineering equipment to bio-medicine
and high-end medical equipment) and several technologies (from 3D printing to mobile internet
to cloud computing) in this project and aimed to improve its ability to innovate and then capture
these sectors and technologies (The State Council, PRC, 2019). However, until 2019 Chinese
enterprises failed to change their organizational structure which favors top-down and autocratic
approaches to management that inconsistent with the culture of innovation. As a result of that,
Chinese enterprises found it difficult to increase productivity through homegrown technology
creation.
It is also crucial that China’s working-age population started to decline from the middle of
this decade. This played an important role on productivity decline in China. When the workingage population falls, domestic consumption decreases so do companies’ revenues. Lower
revenue means less investment on factors that boost the productivity such as R&D. China’s onechild policy is one the major reasons of working-age population decline. One-child policy also
plays important role on reaching Lewis turning point (LTP) which is a situation that (surplus rural
labor is fully employed in manufacturing and service sectors in urban areas) causes urban wages
to surge. In the previous decades the migration from rural areas (agricultural sector) to
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industrialized urban areas (manufacturing and/or service sectors) invigorated productivity in
China since average labor productivity in nonagricultural sector is higher than the productivity in
agricultural sector. It is noteworthy that in this reallocation case, migrant workers who drawn
from the agricultural sectors forced to accept low wage-jobs. They accepted low-wages because
they preferred to work in the city with low-wages over living in the farm. However, in the 2010s
there is a situation that employers in the cities (nonagricultural sectors) could not find enough
labor or attract workers from the rural areas (agricultural sector) to employ in their companies.
Due to that companies started to raise their wages in order to attract more employees. This had
important consequences. First of all, in the previous decades millions of people who had worked
in the rural areas each year went to work in the cities. This structural shift increase productivity
significantly, however; in 2010s the amount of people who head to work in the city gradually
diminished (Balding, 2019) which means the productivity growth decreased in this decade.
Another consequence was about the rising wages. Due to rising wages, companies’ profits and
savings declined. And due to declined profits and saving, companies could not finance the
capital formation for investment and expansion which also leads to decrease productivity. It is
also important that there was a structural shift from industrial sectors to service sectors in China
in 2010s which is quite different than the shift in the previous decade (from agricultural sector
to industrial sector). It is the rule of thumb that productivity in industrial sector is higher than
the service sector (Sorbe, Gal and Millot, 2018: 3). From that point, as the Chinese economy
shifts closer to service sector, productivity growth will slow further down. In addition to that,
service sector is mostly dominated by (unproductive) SOEs in China. Therefore, service sector is
strongly protected with trade and non-trade barriers from international competition. Due to the
lack of competition service sector in China has weak productivity growth.
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In sum, in order to increase productivity Chinese government proposed some reforms in
the middle of this decade that included financial and fiscal reforms such as liberalizing the
financial system and increasing the efficiency of fiscal policies (Huang and Wang, 2018: 295);
structural reforms such as reforming the Hukou system (The State Council, PRC, 2014) and
external sector reforms such as further opening up markets. However, after Xi Jinping took
office in 2013 the chance of implementing these reforms successfully gradually diminished.
Nevertheless, the productivity rate of China is still higher than most of the countries in the world
in this decade. It is important that factors such as; R&D, improvement in human capital and
some managerial capabilities, opening up some sectors to competition, resource (capital, labor)
allocation, technological changes and technology diffusion, privatization, liberalization,
institutional changes and policy reforms continued to contribute productivity growth; however,
in this decade these factors’ contribution to productivity is smaller than the previous decades’
contribution. In sum, annual average growth in labor productivity was 7.4 percent which was 2
percentage points lower than previous decade’s average (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). Total factor productivity
also declined more than 2 percentage points. It grew by 1.8 percent annually in the 2010s
(Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of
China; Zhu).

235

China GDP, Labor and Total Factor Productivity
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
GDP Growth

Total Factor P.

Labor P.

Figure 45 China Total Factor and Labor Productivity (1980-2018)
Sources: China GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis and World Bank. Labor and Total Factor Productivity Data derived from (various years) Reserve Bank
of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC; Zhu.

1980s
1990s
2000s
2010s

Total Factor Pr.
China
U.S.
2.7
0.7
3.5
0.8
3.9
0.7
1.8
0.5

Labor Pro.
China
U.S.
6.4
1.5
8.4
2.1
9.4
2.7
7.4
1.1

GDP
China
9.7
10
10.3
7.8

U.S.
3.2
3.2
1.9
2.3

Table 21 China and
U.S. Labor and Total
Factor Productivity and
GDP growth by Decade

Source: China GDP
collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and
World Bank. Labor and Total Factor Productivity Data derived from (various years) Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC; Zhu. U.S. GDP data collected from Federal
Reserve Bank of St Louis and BEA database, Labor Productivity data collected (various years) U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Total Factor Productivity is derived from (various years) University of Groningen and University of California,
Davis, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and various years from Bureau of Labor Statistics

Conclusion for the Third Part (Economic Power of China)
As it mentioned above that before its rapid economic growth, China was one of the
poorest countries in the world. In 1978, China’s GDP was below $200 billion and its GDP per
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capita was around $150. However, after the death of Chairman Mao, the Chinese government
gradually shifted its Soviet style centrally controlled and highly inefficient economy to a Western
style market-driven economy. Since then, China has experienced an unprecedented economic
growth with its GDP growth rate averaged over 10 percent for decades. With this high growth
rate China’s GDP increased from $190 billion dollars at the beginning of the 1980s to $13.6
trillion at the end of the 2010s. Nevertheless, the overall situation raised several questions
about China’s economic growth. How did China grow so fast? What were the external and
internal factors that affected China’s economy growth? Is China's economic growth sustainable?
What are the challenges for the future of China’s economic growth? What will be the future of
China’s economic growth? It is important to note that rather than properly answering these
questions, some scholars jumped to conclusions by assuming that China will continue to
maintain relatively high economic growth rates in the future which would eventually make
China the world next economic superpower.
However, this study goes into further detail to elucidates the reasons behind China’s GDP
growth and determine the likelihood of whether China can maintain its high GDP growth in the
future. In that respect, this study detects various factors that increased China’s GDP growth
significantly through the decades. For example, in the 1980s, China’s economy greatly benefited
from the reforms in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Besides that, starting from the
middle of the same decade, the Chinese government launched various economic relationships
with many countries in the western world that had no prior connection. Building economic
relationships stimulated trade and trade increased China’s GDP in this period. In addition to
that, China created SEZs and offered tax and trade incentives in order to attract foreign
investment. This worked out as planned; trade and investment rose remarkably in this period.
As a result, people’s income gradually increased. During this period, the Chinese government

237
was able to use people’s raised income for further investments. In the following decade,
economic growth accelerated through the continuation of reforms. There was a structural shift
in resources in the 1990s, which included millions of workers moving from agricultural sectors to
nonagricultural sectors. Besides that, China’s government closed down many unprofitable SOEs
in order to make rest of these remaining enterprises more competitive and productive. Some of
the SOEs were sold to their employees while others were privatized. Private investment
increased substantially through further integration with the world economy. At the end of the
1990s, Chinese authorities changed its economic growth model to an export-oriented
philosophy. From that point, China devalued its currency significantly (the dollar to yuan
exchange rate increased from 5.8 to 8.6) and used extremely favorable monetary policies for
expanding its exports. After its accession to WTO over the next decade, China drastically
increased its exports and became the largest exporter in the world. Meanwhile, as in previous
decades, China’s economy benefitted a lot from large scale capital investment, urbanization,
and privatization. Moreover, the Chinese government expanded SEZs to the whole coastal
region first and then expanded to the riparian and inland regions. Economic reforms, creation of
new SEZs, decentralization policies, and the membership of WTO significantly accelerated FDI.
Raising FDI inflows increased capital formation, technology transfer, and human capital
accumulation that all contributed to China’s economic growth during the 2000s. In addition to
that, all these processes also boosted demand for labor. It is important to note that during this
decade tens of millions of people moved from rural inland regions to coastal provinces to find
job in manufacturing and service industries. This created a situation in the 2000s that kept
wages and production cost down which made Chinese companies highly competitive in the
international markets.
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However, a few years after the GFC, China’s GDP growth started to decline. It is important
to note that this decline has been slower, but steadier and more severe than earlier cases. There
are various reasons behind this.
Primarily, factors that drove high-paced economic growth in the previous decades such as
improving quality and quantity of labor force, allocating resources more effectively, investing
public capital, and increasing FDI and export continued to contribute economic growth;
however, in the 2010s their contribution to growth is not the same pace as in the past. It is
much weaker than previous decades. For example, after the GFC, household income stagnated
in many parts of the world. Due to income stagnation, households reduced their consumption
significantly which had a major negative impact on Chinese exports since China is the largest
supplier of consumption goods. Furthermore, as a result of serious economic crises and financial
uncertainties in this era, the pace of the FDI inflows to China significantly decreased which
created additional negative effect on GDP growth. In the previous decades, reforms in
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors played significant role on economic growth; however,
their effect on growth gradually diminished. From the same perspective, China exploited latecomer advantages in the previous decades by acquiring and imitating technologies from
developed countries and achieved higher level of technological innovation with low cost and
fewer risk. However, this advantage dwindled in the recent period. It is noteworthy that China
benefitted significantly from its growing working age population in the previous decades.
However, due to the one-child policy and low fertility rate, China’s working age population has
started to decline since early 2010s. This situation created a serious burden on the Chinese
economy after the first half of the 2010s. With China’s declining working age population, it has
become harder for China to adequately support its economic growth in the new period. China
also enjoyed its mass migration of workers from rural to urban areas in the previous decades.
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This large-scale migration created a situation in preceding periods that kept the wages and the
cost of production remarkably low. As a result, Chinese corporations were able to raise their
profits, savings, and investment. Therefore, mass rural-urban migration significantly contributed
to China’s economic growth. However, this situation started to change in the early 2010s. There
are many signs in eastern coastal provinces that availability of surplus labor at low wages is
disappearing. In other words, China has passed the Lewis Turning Point. From the Asian financial
crisis to GFC over a hundred million migrants moved to eastern coastal cities to find a job in the
manufacturing and service industries. Yet, the number of workers who moved to coastal big
cities declined to 20 million from GFC to 2016. And it is crucial that there was almost no increase
in migrant workers from 2014 to 2017. One of the most important factors behind that is a trend
toward closing the wage gap between rural and urban workers. Another factor is the hukou
system that makes it difficult for workers to switch their registration from rural to urban
workers. Hukou system also restricts migrant workers’ access to urban public services. All these
factors discourage rural workers to move big coastal cities in recent period. From that point, in
order to attract rural workforce, Chinese corporations start to offer higher wages. However, it is
crucial that higher wages increase China’s production cost and also reduce its corporations’
competitiveness in the new period. It is also important that in the previous decade Chinese
economic growth model which was characterized by labor-intensive manufacturing for export
coincided with an era of increasing globalization. In that respect, China benefitted a lot from
engaging in global production and trade in this period. However, this period came to an end
after the GFC. Today’s international environment has entered a period of uncertainties. Rulebased multilateral economic system and liberal economic principles are under assault by many
institutions and countries. Therefore, in this new international economic environment it is very
hard for China to seize the same opportunities that it enjoyed in the previous period. From that

240
point, after his election as President of China, Xi Jinping decided to change China’s economic
growth model (Wong, 2019). The new model that included principles such as strong domestic
consumption, high-value added production and high level of private sector role in the economy
could not bring the same economic growth rate that China had in the previous decades. Xi
Jinping and his government’s faltering performance on these new economic principles play an
important role in that. In sum, forces discussed above that promoted rapid Chinese growth in
last four decades have been withering each and every year since the early 2010s. From that
point, China’s economic growth will decelerate even more in the new period, which is bound to
create various economic challenges for China in the near future.
Many scholars take price inflation as a serious problem for China. It is important that like
many other transition countries, China experienced extreme price volatility in the early decades
of reform. For example, China used ambitious expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in order
to finance investment and accelerate economic growth three times in the 1980s. In each of
these periods, China’s economy grew significantly. However, each of these periods ended up
with an overheated economy that led to rising prices of goods and services. Central government
responded to these price rises by raising interest rates, cutting government spending and
enforcing credit control on financial institutions. In the middle of the 1990s, China experienced
its last severe price increase after another wishful growth-oriented policy that Chinese
government had launched in 1992. At the end of this dramatic price hike, which increased the
inflation almost 25 percent, Chinese authorities decided to implement some structural changes
in the economy. From that point, China liberalized its trade and adopted an export-led economic
development model. Since then China has increased its production significantly and overfilled
not only domestic but also international markets with its goods. Nevertheless, overproducing
and oversupplying goods put a strong and stable downward pressure on prices. In addition to
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that people in China like in the previous decades preferred to save their income rather than
spend. In all, China began to experience sustained periods of price decline (deflation). It is
crucial that China fell into deflation three times in a decade. Before the GFC China was able to
export its products to the world. Therefore, falling prices were not a serious issue for China.
However, after the GFC global demand for Chinese goods fell sharply which increased the
downward pressure on domestic prices. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities adopted a new growth
model that aimed to increase domestic consumption. From that point, government used
aggressive expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Notwithstanding, after years of using
these policies, domestic consumption still remains low which creates additional downturn
pressure over prices. In all, combination of continuously rising supply and weakly growing
demand has severely raised the fear of chronic deflation in China in the new period.
It is important that declinist scholars greatly underestimate China’s debt. First of all, they
focus particularly on China’s government debt which is relatively low when it is compared to
other governments’ debt. Besides that, the same scholars fail to emphasize China’s massive debt
burden that was built up in the past decade. It is true that China used balance budget policy and
carried little debt for about three decades after its establishment in 1949. However, when
Chinese government launched its economic reforms first time at the end of the 1970s, China
began to run budget deficit and issue some limited debt. China’s total debt increased
moderately from 1980 to 2006-07 (from $100 billion to $4-4.5 trillion). During this period
procurement prices of farms products, SOEs, local and regional governments expenditures,
monetary and fiscal subsides, incentives and hundreds of thousands of infrastructure projects
were the main drivers of total debt. Before the financial crisis, which was the origin of China’s
debt problem, total debt was $4-4.5 trillion and around 150 percent of GDP (In 2006, GDP of
China amounted to around 2.7 trillion U.S. dollars). However, only a decade from the GFC
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China’s total debt increased tremendously, which deeply undermine the future of its economy
in the new period. The reasons why China’s debt level in both dollars and as a percentage of
GDP increased enormously within a relatively short time were various. First of all, instability and
uncertainty in the world economy after the GFC significantly dropped global demand for Chinese
goods. This led to a sharp decline in China’s export that caused thousands of factories to shut
down and millions of workers to lose their jobs. In order to reinvigorate the economy and
recreate hundreds of thousands of jobs, Chinese government started to use its massive stimulus
packages. This project was one of the key reasons that boosted the debt burden. It is important
that most of the funds from the stimulus packages went to real estate and infrastructure
projects that generated low investment returns. From the same perspective, SOEs acquired a lot
of stimulus support. With that support SOEs continued to maintain its employment and
production level which worsened China’s overcapacity and overproduction problems. It is
important to note that most of SOEs were inefficient and they maintained their operation with
huge loses. However, contrary to earlier periods, central government did not allow these
enterprises to go bankrupt or taken over though merger and acquisition. In fact, with the
election of Xi Jinping more resources channeled to SOEs. In the new period, Xi Jinping promotes
the role of SOEs at the expense of private corporation since he wants to continue state
ownership in critical and strategic industries that includes defense, telecommunication, energy,
civil aviation, IT, electric production and distribution, shipping, steel, coal and construction
materials. In addition to that, he sees SOEs as the backbone of the socialist economy. In other
words, he aims to implement his objectives such as maintaining economic and social stability
through SOEs. In sum, some SOEs slightly increased their profit; however, most of SOEs financial
performance declined substantially. From that point, these enterprises borrowed heavily from
state-owned financial institutions to cover their losses. After a decade from the GFC their (SOEs)
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debt level reached over $13 trillion which was equal to almost 100 percent of GDP in 2018. In
addition to that in the new period due to overproduction and overcapacity problems many
private enterprises’ efficiency declined which created serious challenges for these enterprises to
repay their debts. After GFC, China also aimed to improve social services and the expand public
safety net. Thus, Chinese authorities launched thousands of projects in central and western part
of China. These projects significantly increased the budget debt. It is important that local and
provincial governments took an important part in these projects. These governments rapidly
raised their spending in this period as well. However, for obtaining the additional resources that
needed for financing these and many other projects that includes infrastructure projects, local
and provincial governments created informal and backdoor financing practices which are called
local government financial vehicles (LGFV). It is critical that local and provincial governments
operated these type of financing practices beyond the central government surveillance.
Therefore, central government has little knowledge of how fast that debt is rising. Nevertheless,
it is expected that local and provincial governments are in unsustainable level of debt at the end
of the 2010s. On the other hand, small and mid-size private enterprises used similar types of
financing practices in this period. After borrowing heavily from shadow banking institutions,
these enterprises repackaged their loans as investment in their balance sheet. In that respect,
these enterprises like local and provincial governments are also in unsustainable level of debt at
the end of the decade. Another factor that significantly increased the debt of China is the
government price control mechanism for some critical areas such as energy (oil, gas, coal and
electricity), food (pork, wheat and corn) and real estate. Chinese government believes that a
price hike in these critical areas could lead to a social unrest, much like China experienced
previously in the late 1980s. From that point, government in China used policies that set the
prices of goods and services in these critical areas below the market level; however, these
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polices caused serious distortions in the economy and also led to a surge in government debt. In
all, at the end of 2018 China’s total debt increased to over $34 trillion which was equal to 255
percent of GDP in 2018 (Curran, 2018). That means China built up a massive debt burden ($30
trillion) in a decade after the GFC. Through these tremendous spending programs, China was
able to open tens of thousands of factories, create million jobs and maintain a relatively high
economic growth even in the 2010s which were mostly remembered as a decade of uncertainty
and instability. Nevertheless, it is important that at the end of the 2010s China’s debt reached
an unsustainable level that could trigger an economic crisis in China in the near future. From
that point, China’s future growth will very much depend on how well China deals with its
massive debt.
China’s savings rate is another topic that attracts a lot of attention. Many scholars
emphasize high savings rate in China, which is still about 10-15 percentage point higher than
global average, without addressing the factors that increased the level of savings in previous
decades and factors that started to reduce the level of savings in the new period. It is important
that China significantly increased its already high savings rate in the early 1980s. Factors such as
culture, past experiences, demographic changes, government’s strict control over people
income, weak financial and banking system, increasing people income, shrinking social safety
net and raising house ownership encouraged people to save more until the late 2000s.
Corporations during the same period substantially boosted their profits and their savings as
well. It is crucial that government subsidies such as easy access to energy, land and capital and
corporations’ monopolistic power played important role on the rise of corporation savings.
Besides that, labor market reforms during this period relaxed workers mobility restrictions that
significantly pull corporations’ production cost down and their earnings and savings up. Finally,
China’s accession to the WTO resulted in a massive growth of export which increased
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household, governments and corporation’s savings significantly. At the end of the 2000s China’s
total saving reached almost 50 percent of GDP. However, it is crucial that China’s total savings
started to decline steadily few years after the GFC. For example, seven out of eight years in the
2010s China’s total savings rate was in decline. There are various reasons behind that decline.
One of the key reasons is about China’s economic slowdown in the 2010s after its export-driven
growth model lost its power. Besides that, structural and institutional problems, the U.S.-led
trade war, and a slowing world economy negatively affect China’s saving rate in the 2010s. It is
important to note that factors such as weak financial system, rigorous state control over
people’s income and poor social safety net played important role on China’s saving in previous
decades. However, these factors had little impact on savings in the new period since China has
gradually developed its financial market, improved its social safety net and relaxed its control
over people’s income. From the same perspective, home-ownership positively affected savings
in previous decades. Starting from the early 2010s home-ownership growth ratio started to slow
down. Declining home-ownership ratio is another factor adversely affect savings in this decade.
Social security was one of the main drivers of savings before the 2010s. Yet, as a result of the
aging population in China the system has started to give its first deficit in the middle of the
2010s. Corporate savings was also in decline. Previous reforms and expansion of export had a
big impact on corporate profitability. Nevertheless, their effect gradually diminished after the
GFC. Besides that, wages (Lewis Turning Point) and other cost of productions such as raw
materials increased in the 2010s which negatively affect corporate savings. It is important that
in order to pull wages down, Chinese authorities loosened rural-urban restrictions; however,
there are still very few rural workers migrate to cities in the new period. In sum, China’s saving
rate steadily and constantly declined from about 50 percent at the beginning of the decade to
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43 percent at the end of the decade. After scrutinizing factors that is mentioned above, this
paper predicts that China’s savings rate will fall further in the future.
As in the savings issue a lot of scholars pay specific attention to China’s productivity
growth. In their research, most of these scholars emphasize China’s rapid productivity growth
and its effect on the growth of Chinese economy. It is true that productivity improvement
played an essential role on China’s economic growth in the previous decade. However, since
GFC, Chinese productivity growth has declined steadily. This is mostly because the factors that
significantly contributed to productivity in the previous decades have little or no effect on
productivity in the new period. For example, in the early 1980s reforms in agricultural sector
(household responsibility system) improved farmers productivity remarkably. Raising
productivity in the agricultural sector freed millions of rural workers to move cities and work in
more productive manufacturing and service industries. From the same point, reforms in
nonagricultural sectors (dual-tracking system) improved the productivity of SOEs. The spillover
of technology and knowledge from FDI was another factor that boosted China’s overall
productivity in this period. There were also substantial improvements in labor and capital. For
example, high school and college education improved significantly. Spending on research and
development rose remarkably. The government started its further reforms on SOEs in the
middle of 1990s. Chinese authorities took an important decision and closed down many
unproductive SOEs. Thousands of other SOEs were privatized. Labor and capital moved to more
productive private sector. It is important that, after China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese
enterprises improved their access to global market. In addition to that, these enterprises started
to import more technology intensive goods (inputs) that they used in their production function
in order to promote their productivity further. Competition also increased noticeably
particularly in manufacturing sector which led to a drastic productivity growth in this period.
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However, few years after the GFC China started to experience a steady and continuous
productivity slowdown. There were many factors that contributed to a decline in productivity
growth in this period. First of all, after the GFC, Chinese authorities used massive stimulus
projects in order to reinvigorate the growth. It is important that these projects caused serious
overproduction, overinvestment and overstaffing problems that led to a decrease in China’s
overall productivity. It is also important that most of the stimulus projects went to infrastructure
and real estate sectors that rapidly increased GDP; however, they added almost nothing to
productivity. Furthermore, for administrating these projects central government authorized
unproductive SOEs and other local and provincial institutions that generated lower return from
assets. From the same perspective, after his election as President of China, Xi Jinping
substantially increased SOEs’ role in the economy. During this period, highly unproductive SOEs
started to control most of service and some manufacturing sectors which private enterprises
once led. Foreign corporations in this decade started to reduce their direct and portfolio
investments to China as a result of China’s aggressive policies over foreign corporations, trade
disputes, particularly between China and the U.S., foreign corporations’ unwillingness to share
technology and know-how with their Chinese partners, and finally constantly increasing
production cost of corporations in China. Decline in direct and portfolio investments in China
further deteriorated productivity. It is crucial that starting from the middle of the 2010s China’s
working population started to decline. When the working age population falls, domestic
consumption decreases. Decline in domestic consumption causes corporations to have less
revenue and less investment that needed for boosting the productivity. Around the same time,
China reached the LTP. Due to LTP, corporations’ production cost started to increase, and that
lead to corporations to have less revenue and investment which is critical for increasing
productivity. In addition to that, China’s service sector is growing at the expense of the
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manufacturing sector in the new period. It is important that productivity in service sector is
much lower than the productivity manufacturing sector. This shift is quite different than the
shift in the previous decades. In the previous decades, China experienced a transition from
agricultural economy to manufacturing economy that played positive role on productivity
growth since productivity in manufacturing sector is higher than productivity in agricultural
sector. Finally, it is crucial that China’s service sector is protected with many barriers and mostly
dominated by unproductive SOEs (in financial, banking, insurance, transportation, and utilities
(water, gas, and electricity) sectors). This is another factor that causes further deterioration in
productivity in the new period. In sum, it is important to know that factors that drove China’s
productivity upwards in the previous decades are no longer contributing the productivity in the
same way. In addition to that, some (new) factors that are mentioned above lead to a decrease
in productivity. From that point, it is predicted that the almost decade-long drop in China’s
productivity growth will continue further in the future.
In conclusion, it is important to note that overall findings in this section contradict the
findings of scholars that state that China will continue to maintain relatively high economic
growth rates and will displace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower. This paper
asserts that forces that drove high-paced economic growth in China in previous decades have
been withering each year since the early 2010s. As a result of that, China has been facing a
number of major challenges that include excessive debt and persistent decline in prices,
productivity and savings. Consequently, China’s economic growth has been steadily slowing
down. It is very important that this economic slowdown is not a periodic downturn that China
had experienced several times at the end of each decade since 1980s (the Tiananmen Square
massacres at the end of the 1980s, the Asian Financial crisis at the end of the 1990s and finally
the GFC at the end of the 2000s). This time the decline is continuous, more intensive, more
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stable and more severe than previous cases. Thus, it will be very hard for China to maintain its
high economic growth that it enjoyed in the last three decades. From that point, China’s future
will be more about dealing with its own problems (mentioned above) rather than displacing the
U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
As this study mentioned earlier, the decline of American economic power has been
vigorously debated for decades. Starting from the Kennedy administration, there were many
cases that scholars interpreted as the beginning of American economic power decline. The
financial crisis of 2007-09 is the latest case of the same debate. However, unlike the previous
cases, scholars who support the idea of U.S. economic power is in decline after the financial
crisis, strongly believe that this time the decline is different. This time the decline is real. In
addition, the same scholars also argue that China, as an economic challenger which is different
from previous ones, will replace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower. All these
concerns made this topic necessary to examine again. From that point, this research study set its
research questions as “is U.S. economic power in decline?” And “is China replacing the U.S. as
the world’s next economic superpower.”
In order to answer the first research question, this study qualitatively explores four case
studies, France and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, the
Oil Crisis and the role of Saudi Arabia, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and
the U.S. - the EC – Japan Triangle, and finally the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
relationships between the U.S. and developing countries, and analyzes perspectives of American
economic power. In these case studies, this paper assumes that an economically powerful
country (the U.S.) should have capacity to make decision that benefit itself alone, while at the
same time it should have the ability to decrease the capacity of other countries that intend to
challenge its (American’s) core interests and leadership position in the world economic system.
However, after analyzing the cases, this paper reveals how the U.S. could not control and

251
influence the behavior of other countries in line with its own interest, not only during the period
after the financial crisis of 2007-09, as many scholars predicted, but also in many decades before
the financial crisis. In that respect, this paper asserts that there is no significant change in U.S.
economic power now and then. In other words, contrary to most scholars’ arguments, U.S.
economic power is not in decline.
In the second part of this study, the same question (is U.S. economic power in decline?) is
tested by analyzing quantitative data that includes GDP, CPI, debt, savings, and productivity.
After analyzing the data, this paper claims that under the extraordinary conditions (or period) in
the decades following WWII, the U.S. experienced a sharp economic growth. Nevertheless, this
exceptional period of time came to an end at the end of the 1960s. Since then, the abnormal
increase in U.S. economic growth has returned to normal. From this point of view, the decline of
American economic power in the 1970s rebounded in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, after the
rapid economic decline in the 2000s, which made many scholars believe that U.S. economic
power was in permanent and fundamental decline, the U.S. economy has slowly but steadily
been growing again. Thus, as in the first part of this paper, overall findings of the second part of
this study conflict with the arguments of scholars that state that U.S. economic power is in an
irreversible decline.
In the last part, this paper tries to determine whether China can overtake the U.S. as the
world’s next superpower. After analyzing GDP, CPI, savings, debt and production, this paper
argues that forces that contributed to rapid economic growth in China in previous decades have
been fading away each and every year since the beginning of the 2010s. Therefore, China’s
economic growth has been slowly and gradually slowing down. It is important that this
slowdown is not a cyclic downturn that China had faced several times in previous decade. It is
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continuous, more stable and more intensive than previous slowdown cases that will pose many
challenges to China’s future growth. In that respect, paper concludes that China’s future will be
more about dealing with its own challenges, rather than overtaking the U.S. as the world’s next
economic superpower.
Lastly, it is crucial to note that there are two major limitations in this research study that
could help shape future work. First, for analyzing qualitative data, four cases are scrutinized.
These cases exemplify the most important international economic and financial events in the
period before the financial crisis of 2007-09. Through these cases, this research study builds a
pattern and develops a theory that aims to answer the first research question. However, it
would be helpful if future studies consider more cases to account for in order to support its
pattern and its theory more strongly. From the same perspective, this research study analyzes
five economic indicators, GDP, CPI, debt, savings and productivity, and tries to answer the
research questions in the second and third part. Nevertheless, a more complete picture about
whether U.S. economic power is in decline and whether China is overtaking the U.S. as the
world’s next economic superpower can be obtained by adding additional indicators such as
competitiveness, GDP per capita, unemployment, technology and innovation, and income
inequality to future research studies. It is crucial that the decline of American power and China’s
rise as the world’s next superpower will remain contested issues with strongly held positions for
and against it at least in the near future. In that respect, additional indicators that mentioned
above help to answer research questions effectively in the future studies.
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